Opinion
Cr. Action Nos. S99-05-0272 thru 0274.
Date Submitted: December 23, 1999.
Date Decided: February 14, 2000.
Paula Ryan Steiner, Esquire.
Karl Haller, Esquire.
Dear Ms. Steiner and Mr. Haller:
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendant, Terrence Smullen ("Defendant"). For the reasons stated in this letter, the motion is denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 12, 1999, the Delmar I.G.A., a grocery store in Delmar, Delaware, was robbed at knife-point. A man entered the store and while brandishing a knife, demanded money from the checkout clerk. The checkout clerk, fearful for her life, gave the man the money from the cash register. The man then fled through the front doors of the store.
An investigation by the Delmar Police Department resulted in the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the Defendant in connection with this robbery. It was discovered that Defendant was living in Fruitland, Maryland. On March 30, 1999, a fugitive warrant for the Defendant was issued in Maryland based on the active arrest warrant in Delaware. The Delmar Police, who have jurisdiction in both Delaware and Maryland, arrested Defendant on that same day in Maryland. When Defendant was arrested on the fugitive warrant, he refused to waive extradition. Defendant's refusal set into motion the provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. On April 30, 1999, Defendant appeared before a Magistrate in Maryland for a hearing. Defendant's period of detention in Maryland was then extended for an additional 60-day period to allow for the issuance of a governor's warrant.
On May 17, 1999, Defendant was indicted by a Delaware Grand Jury on charges of robbery in the first degree, misdemeanor theft, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. After the indictment, a Rule 9 arrest warrant was issued by the Superior Court for Defendant. On June 25, 1999, the Department of Justice submitted requisition papers to Governor Carper's office for the return of Defendant to Delaware. Governor Carper signed the requisition papers on June 29, 1999, and they were mailed the same day to the Governor of Maryland, Parris Glendening. On July 1, 1999, Governor Glendening signed a governor's warrant for the return of the defendant from Maryland to Delaware.
On June 30, 1999, the 90-day period on the original Maryland fugitive warrant expired. The paperwork on the governor's warrant was not completed by this date. Thus, on June 30, 1999, the March 30, 1999 fugitive warrant was dismissed by a Maryland magistrate. Anew Maryland warrant was issued on the same day because Defendant had been indicted and was still wanted on charges in Delaware. Defendant was then re-arrested.
The signed governor's warrant was provided to the Sheriffs Department, Wicomico County, Maryland. The 30 day hearing occurred on July 30, 1999. Defendant waived extradition, was returned to Delaware, and was held for the robbery of the Delmar I.G.A.
On October 29, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges pending against him in Delaware, based on defective proceedings during the extradition process. The matter is now before the Court for decision on Defendant's motion to dismiss.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Defendant submitted a brief on December 1, 1999. The State submitted a brief on December 23, 1999. Defendant in his brief states the charges against him should be dropped due to defective and illegal extradition proceedings. Defendant states that he was held for a period of ninety days under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and was then released. After his release a second fugitive warrant was issued and he was re-arrested. Defendant argues that there should not have been a second fugitive warrant issued because it was not clearly labeled so that the signing magistrate would know it was the second warrant in the proceeding. Defendant states allowing such proceedings to stand would defeat the purpose of the Act.
The State argues there were no defective proceedings because the statutes in Maryland and Delaware, adopted from the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, regarding extradition were followed by both states. The State also argues that even if there were defective extradition proceedings in Maryland, the issuance of the governor's warrant rendered those deficiencies moot. Along with this point, the State argues that even if Defendant was illegally detained in Maryland, it would have no effect on the robbery charges in Delaware.
DISCUSSION
Delaware and Maryland have both adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. See Golla v. State, Del. Supr., 159 A.2d 585, 586 (1990)("the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, adopted in this [Delaware] and nearly every other state"); Statchuk v. Warden. Maryland Penitentiary, Md. App., 455 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1983)("Maryland has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.") This act has been codified in both states. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 2-201 through 2-228; 11 Del. C. § 2501-2530. The Supreme Court of Delaware has stated:
The purpose of these statutes is to prevent criminals from escaping punishment. They are intended to provide a summary proceeding to enable the different states to assist one another in bringing to trial persons who have been accused of crime in a state but who are beyond its reach in an attempt to bring them to justice. The Courts generally have given these statutes the construction necessary to effect the purpose of their enactment.Golla v. State, Del. Supr., 159 A.2d 585, 587 (1960) (citingBiddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128 (1917); Lascelles v. State of Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893);Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885).)
Since the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is a uniform law, decisions from other states provide guidance in interpreting the Act. Parks v. Bourdeau, Conn. Supr., 477 A.2d 636 (1984). See also Hill v. Blake, Conn. Supr., 441 A.2d 841 (1982) (Decision from other states are valuable for interpretation of provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.) Also, extradition statutes should be interpreted liberally and should not be defeated by technical defects or omissions. See Golla v. State, supra, 159 A.2d at 587; Hughes v. Waters, Iowa Supr., 204 N.W.2d 599 (1973); State v. Shields, Md. Ct. App., 263 A.2d 565, 568 (1970)("[Extradition Laws] have not been constructed narrowly and technically by the courts as if they were penal laws, but liberally to effect their important purpose") (quoting Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917)).
Did Defendant chose the wrong forum to bring this motion for defective extradition proceedings?
Defendant has brought this motion based on the fact that he was released after 90 days in a Maryland jail, in accordance with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, and then re-arrested the same day by Maryland authorities on a second fugitive warrant issued by a different Maryland magistrate that was not specified as an alias application and warrant. All the alleged deficient proceedings happened in Maryland. If there were deficient proceedings in Maryland that does not affect Delaware's right to proceed on the Delaware robbery charges. See 11 Del. C. § 2527. In Delaware, the Supreme Court has stated procedural improprieties in an extradition, such as lack of probable cause or noncompliance with Delaware statutory requirements, would not violate Defendant's Constitutional rights or deprive Superior Court of jurisdiction over offenses. Parker v. State, Del. Supr., 521 A.2d 247 (1987).
In pertinent part, 11 Del. C. § 2527, "Preservation of rights of State", provides as follows: Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by this State of its right, power or privilege to try such demanded person for crime committed within this State, or its right, power or privilege to regain custody of such person by extradition proceedings or otherwise for the purpose of trial, sentence or punishment for any crime committed within this State, nor shall any proceedings had under this subchapter which result in, or fail to result in, extradition be deemed a waiver by this State of any of its rights, privileges or jurisdiction in any way whatsoever.
Defendant should have brought this motion or any action relating to the extradition proceedings during his detention in Maryland, the asylum state, instead of Delaware, the demanding state. The regularity of extradition proceedings may be attacked only in the asylum state [Maryland]-not after delivery to the demanding state [Delaware]. See 31A Am. Jur.2d Extradition § 158 (1989) (action of a chief executive of the asylum state in issuing a rendition warrant, and that of the executive and ministerial officers in acting in the aid of the warrant, are thus subject for the consideration of the courts of the asylum state alone); 35 C.J.S. Extradition and Detainers § 39 (1999) (the proper place for a fugitive to complain about compliance with the extradition laws is in the asylum state).
Courts that have ruled on the accused's ability to challenge extradition in demanding states under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act would consider Defendant's motion to be without merit in Delaware. See Barton v. Norrod, 6th Cir., 106 F.3d 1289, 1298 (1997)("Once the fugitive is returned to the demanding state, the right to challenge extradition becomes moot: the fugitive is no longer being detained by the asylum state, and so, the legality of his or her detention there is no longer at issue); Shack v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 3rd. Cir., 776 F.2d 1170, 1171-1172 (1985) (procedural defect in extradition proceedings in asylum state did not impair demanding state's power to try Defendant and his subsequent confinement did not violate his due process). See also Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Johnson v. Buie, W.D. Mo., 312 F. Supp. 1349 (1970) (once fugitive has been brought within custody of demanding state, legality of extradition is no longer proper subject of any legal attack by him); People v. Scott, Ill. App., 280 N.E.2d 1 (1972) (alleged unlawfulness of Defendant's extradition from Tennessee affected neither his guilt nor innocence nor jurisdiction of Illinois court to try him);People v. Sterbins, Mich. App., 189 N.W.2d 154 (1971) (Florida [asylum state] rather than Michigan [demanding state] was proper forum in which to challenge proceedings under Uniform Criminal Extradition Act which allowed Defendant's transfer from Florida to Michigan); State v. Flint, W. Va. Supr., 301 S.E.2d 765 (1983) (Extradition proceedings may be challenged only in the asylum state; once fugitive has been brought within demanding state's jurisdiction, propriety of extradition proceedings which occurred in asylum state may not be challenged).
Based on case law, Defendant has chosen the wrong forum for review and has no legal standing to bring this motion for defective extradition proceedings in Delaware. If Defendant had problems with his detention in Maryland, that was the time to raise the issue, not when he came into Delaware custody. Since Defendant did not raise this issue at that time, he cannot now challenge the legality of the Maryland extradition proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Defendant states in his motion that allowing such proceedings to stand would defeat the propose [sic] of the [Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The purpose of the law is to prevent criminals from escaping punishment. Defendant seeks to defeat the aim of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. Defendant waited until he was in the custody of the demanding state to file this action. The challenge is in the wrong forum. Moreover, this point is moot because even if Maryland had defective proceedings during the extradition process, this would not eliminate a Delaware Court's right to try, sentence or punish the defendant. Considering the foregoing, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.