Opinion
No. COA12–1267.
2013-07-16
STATE of North Carolina v. Frank Gene SEAGLE, Defendant.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jill A. Bryan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State. Michael E. Casterline, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 26 March 2012 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in Lincoln County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 March 2013. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jill A. Bryan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State. Michael E. Casterline, for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Frank Gene Seagle (“defendant”), having been convicted of first degree sexual offense with a child and taking indecent liberties with a child, appeals the trial court's pretrial order denying his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers. After careful review, we affirm.
Factual Background
The State's evidence tended to establish the following facts at trial: Prior to 2008, defendant and April Shuford (“Shuford”) were good friends. When Shuford lost her home in the winter of 2008, she and her two daughters—D.B. (“Dana”) and A.H. (“Amy”) —began living with defendant in his mobile home in Lincolnton, North Carolina. Two weeks later, Shuford's fiancé, Jason Bradley (“Bradley”), also moved into defendant's home. The home had two bedrooms—defendant slept in one and Shuford and Bradley shared the other. Dana and her older sister slept on a sleeper sofa in the living room.
The pseudonyms “Dana” and “Amy” are used throughout this opinion to protect the minors' privacy and for ease of reading. N.C. R.App. P. 3. 1(d).
One night, while Dana and Amy were asleep in their bed, defendant got into bed next to Dana, reached underneath her underwear, and touched her “private”—meaning her vagina—with two of his fingers. When Dana moved, defendant stopped, got up without saying anything, and went back to his bedroom.
In August 2009, approximately a week before Dana's fifth birthday, Shuford took Dana and Amy to the pediatrician for a “well-child visit,” which included a genital examination. During Dana's genital exam, the doctor found evidence consistent with digital penetration of her vagina. After the exam, Dana told her mother that defendant had touched her “private area” with his hand.
Shuford contacted the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office and Detective Seth Bailey (“Detective Bailey”) began an investigation. Detective Bailey went to defendant's home on 27 August 2009 to take pictures of the living arrangements in the mobile home. Although Detective Bailey did not ask defendant about the alleged sexual abuse at that time, he did ask defendant to come down to the sheriff's office the next day for questioning. Defendant met Detective Bailey at his office on 28 August 2009 and the two men talked for 30 to 40 minutes. During the interview, which was not recorded, defendant denied having any sexual contact with Dana. At the end of the interview, defendant left Detective Bailey's office and went home.
On 13 September 2009, Shuford and Bradley went to defendant's home to pick up some of her belongings. Defendant was at home and asked to speak with Shuford privately. In response to questioning by Shuford, defendant admitted to her that he had touched Dana.
On 16 September 2009, Detective Bailey contacted defendant through his parents and requested that defendant come to the sheriff's office on 17 September 2009 for a polygraph test. Defendant's father drove defendant to the sheriff's office the following day. Detective Bailey escorted defendant to the polygraph room where—along with Detective Hal Kluttz (“Detective Kluttz”)—the two detectives questioned defendant for approximately one hour. During the interview, which was recorded, defendant initially denied inappropriately touching Dana. Eventually, however, defendant told the detectives that he had, in fact, digitally penetrated Dana's vagina. Defendant also provided a written statement in which he admitted to “put[ting] [his] finger inside [Dana's] vagina.” Defendant left the sheriff's office after the interview and was arrested the next day.
Defendant was charged with first degree sexual offense with a child and taking indecent liberties with a child. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to Detectives Bailey and Kluttz, arguing that the statements were obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order on 26 March 2012 in which the court determined that defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated and that, therefore, the statements were admissible. At trial, over defendant's objections, the trial court admitted into evidence the videotape of defendant's interview with the detectives on 17 September 2009 as well as a copy of defendant's written statement.
The jury found defendant guilty of both charges. The trial court, with respect to the first degree sex offense conviction, sentenced defendant to a presumptive range term of 300 to 369 months imprisonment, with a pretrial confinement credit of 881 days. On the charge of taking indecent liberties with a child, the court sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of 16 to 20 months imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on 60 months supervised probation. The court further ordered defendant to register as a sex offender upon his release. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
Analysis
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to Detectives Bailey and Kluttz because, defendant argues, the statement was not voluntary. It is well established that, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the scope of review ordinarily consists of determining whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the court's findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law regarding the admissibility of the challenged evidence. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).
Defendant made two statements—an oral statement during the interview and a written statement that was typed by Detective Bailey and signed by defendant after the interview. Defendant's arguments appear to relate only to the admissibility of the oral statement.
However, where—as here—the trial court's factual findings are not challenged on appeal, they are binding on the reviewing court, and the only question is whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. State v. Carter, 212 N.C.App. 516, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 515, 520,appeal dismissed and disc. review denied,365 N.C. 351, 718 S.E.2d 147 (2011). The determination of “[w]hether a confession is voluntary is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 579–80, 422 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1992).
It is fundamental that “[v]oluntary confessions are admissible in evidence against the party making them; involuntary confessions are not.” State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 810, 164 S.E. 337, 338 (1932). A confession is voluntary “[i]f, looking to the totality of the circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker [.]’ “ State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973)).
Our Supreme Court has set out several non-exclusive factors to be considered in assessing whether a statement is voluntary: (1) the length of the interrogation; (2) the defendant's age and mental condition; (3) whether the defendant had been deprived of food or sleep; (4) whether the defendant was in custody; (5) whether the defendant was deceived; (6) whether the defendant was held incommunicado; (7) whether threats of violence were made against the defendant; (8) whether promises were made to obtain the confession; (9) whether the defendant's Miranda rights were violated; and (10) the defendant's familiarity with the criminal justice system. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 880–81 (2002); State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 45, 530 S .E.2d 281, 288 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1114, 148 L.Ed.2d 775 (2001). Because “voluntariness is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession[,]” the presence or absence of one or more of these factors in isolation is not determinative. State v. Barlow, 330 N.C. 133, 140–41, 409 S .E.2d 906, 911 (1991).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his statement was voluntary because Detectives Bailey and Kluttz “subverted” defendant's Miranda rights. Yet elsewhere in his brief, defendant admits that the detectives did not “run afoul of Miranda [ ] because they did not conduct a custodial interrogation ....“ As defendant concedes that he was not in custody or deprived of his freedom of movement in any significant way during the 17 September 2009 interview, the detectives were not required to advise defendant of his Miranda rights. See In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 247, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009) (explaining that Miranda warnings are required prior to questioning only when a suspect is in custody, meaning that the suspect has been “formally arrested” or has had “his freedom of movement restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest”).
Defendant next argues that the detectives created a coercive environment during the questioning, pointing to the facts that the room in which he was questioned was “cramped,” the door to the room was closed during the interview, the detectives positioned themselves between him and the door, and Detective Kluttz touched him several times during the course of the questioning. Defendant's reliance on these isolated factors as being determinative of involuntariness, however, ignores the rule that the question of whether a statement is voluntary is determined by considering all of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. State v. Schneider, 306 N.C. 351, 355, 293 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1982).
In addressing the totality of the circumstances, here, the trial court's uncontested findings show that (1) defendant voluntarily came to the sheriff's office; (2) Detectives Bailey and Kluttz were not in uniform and did not display any weapons during the interview; (3) the detectives repeatedly advised defendant that he was not under arrest, he was not going to jail that day, and he was free to leave at any time; (4) the interview room was eight-by-ten feet in dimensions and had a table that took up most of the room's space; (5) defendant sat in a chair in a corner of the room while Detective Kluttz, for most of the interview, sat in a chair positioned between defendant and the door; (6) defendant was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way (although Detective Kluttz did, at various points, pat defendant's leg, place his hand on defendant's back, and touch his shoulder and chest); (7) Detective Kluttz occasionally moved closer to defendant during the interview and, at other times, rolled his chair away from defendant, telling defendant that he was free to leave and that he would get out of defendant's way; (8) defendant did not request food or drink and never asked to take a break; and (9) the questioning lasted for approximately one hour.
These unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion that defendant's admission was not coerced. See Greene, 332 N.C. at 581, 422 S.E.2d at 739 (holding police officers' acts of leaning into defendant's face and touching his arms and legs during questioning was not coercive); State v. Hunter, 208 N.C.App. 506, 512, 703 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2010) (concluding defendant's statement was not coerced despite being interviewed in “room with approximate dimensions of 10 feet by 12 feet” where “[SBI] agents did not have weapons” and “defendant was not restrained”).
Defendant further argues that his statements were involuntary due to implicit promises of leniency by the detectives. Defendant claims that Detective Kluttz's offer to help arrange alcohol treatment for him if he admitted to sexually abusing Dana implied that defendant would not be incarcerated. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[i]t has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that confessions induced by force, threat, fear or promise of reward are inadmissible.” State v. Richardson, 295 N.C. 309, 326, 245 S.E .2d 754, 765 (1978). However, in order for a promise to render an inculpatory statement involuntary, it must be related to “relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, not to any merely collateral advantage.” State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 458, 212 S.E.2d 92, 102 (1975).
Our Supreme Court rejected an identical argument in State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied,455 U .S. 1038, 72 L.Ed.2d 155 (1982), holding that offers by law enforcement officers to “help” the defendant in that case with his alcoholism did not amount to an implicit promise of leniency rendering his confession involuntary because such offers were “matters entirely collateral to the criminal charges” against him. Id. at 219,283 S.E.2d at 744. Similarly, here, Detective Kluttz's offer to arrange for alcohol treatment for defendant concerns a collateral benefit rather than the criminal charges to which defendant's statement relates. Defendant, moreover, makes no assertion that any express promises of leniency with respect to his prosecution or sentencing were made to him in exchange for his admission that he inappropriately touched Dana.
Defendant next points to the amount of alcohol he had consumed prior to being questioned on 17 September 2009, suggesting that his intoxication rendered his statement involuntary. While intoxication is a factor bearing on the voluntariness of a statement, the fact that a defendant is intoxicated at the time he or she gives a statement does not necessarily render it involuntary; rather, intoxication is simply one factor to be considered in determining voluntariness. State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 114, 711 S.E.2d 122, 133 (2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 182 L.Ed.2d 176 (2012).
Referring to his affidavit in which he states that he consumed at least six beers before going to the sheriff's office, defendant claims that his state of mind was “undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the alcohol he'd imbibed.” Defendant, however, misstates the applicable test. The issue is not whether a defendant's state of mind is influenced to some degree by alcohol, but rather, whether the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words. See State v. Marion, 126 N.C.App. 58, 60, 483 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1997) (“The inquiry to be conducted is whether the defendant is so impaired as to be unconscious of the meaning of his words, not whether he or she has consumed drugs or alcohol.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court's findings establish that while defendant smelled of alcohol when he arrived at the sheriff's office, Detective Bailey did not notice a “strong odor” of alcohol. Although defendant told the detectives that he had consumed “a few beers” earlier that day, he did not appear to the detectives to be intoxicated. During the interview, defendant did not seem confused and his answers to the detectives' questions both made sense and were appropriately responsive.
These findings support the trial court's conclusion that “defendant was not so intoxicated that he was unconscious of the meaning of his words.” See State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 434, 516 S.E.2d 106, 122 (1999) (concluding incriminating statements were voluntarily made where defendant “spoke clearly and coherently, understood questions, and made appropriate responses” despite having taken drugs prior to questioning), cert. denied,528 U.S. 1084, 145 L.Ed.2d 681 (2000); State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 30, 463 S.E.2d 738, 752 (1995) (upholding trial court's conclusion that defendant's statement was voluntary where although defendant had been drinking prior to giving statement to police detective (1) he was coherent and not confused during interview; (2) his responses were appropriate with regard to the questions asked; and (3) he was able to follow directions), cert. denied,517 U.S. 1197, 134 L.Ed.2d 794 (1996).
Defendant's final argument is that his statement was involuntary in light of the “trickery and deceit” used by the detectives during the interview. Our Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, although “deceptive methods or false statements by police officers are not commendable practices, standing alone they do not render a confession of guilt inadmissible.” State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 574, 304 S.E.2d 134, 148 (1983). Only in those instances where, considering the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's will has been overcome by the deceptive practices do such techniques render an inculpatory statement involuntary. State v. Barnes, 154 N.C.App. 111, 114, 572 S.E.2d 165, 168 (2002), disc. review denied,356 N.C. 679, 577 S.E.2d 892 (2003).
In support of his argument, defendant asserts that Detective Kluttz “twisted reality” by (1) minimizing the alleged sexual abuse as a “mistake”; (2) assuring defendant that he was not a bad person; (3) suggesting that the “demons” of alcohol were to blame; (4) expressing an interest in helping defendant obtain treatment for his alcoholism; and (5) urging him to tell the truth in order to avoid being seen as a social outcast.
In State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 422 S.E.2d 730, the Supreme Court held that statements by police officers to the defendant that “they were his only friends and that they would help him with any problems he had” were not coercive because the comments did not suggest that, by incriminating himself, the defendant could avoid prosecution or obtain a lesser sentence. Id. at 581–82, 422 S.E.2d at 739.
Here, as in Greene, we are satisfied that the use of this technique was not employed in a manner calculated to procure a false statement by defendant. Even accepting as true defendant's account of Detective Kluttz's statements, none of those comments—downplaying the severity of defendant's conduct, deflecting fault away from defendant, feigning concern for defendant's alcoholism, or appealing to defendant's desire to avoid social stigma—conveyed a message that defendant was likely to avoid prosecution altogether or obtain a more favorable sentence if he admitted to sexually abusing Dana. See also State v. Blackman, 93 N.C.App. 207, 211, 377 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1989) (rejecting contention that law enforcement officers' strategy of “ingratiat[ing] themselves with defendant and present[ing] themselves as his friends” was coercive where tactic did not expose defendant to “any of the ordeals traditionally associated with coercive interrogations”).
Defendant also asserts that Detective Kluttz deceived him by stating that Dana would take a polygraph test and that Detective Kluttz was confident that she would pass it. Even if it were true, as defendant suggests, that the detectives did not actually intend to make Dana take a lie detector test, Detective Kluttz's statement that Dana would pass the test was phrased in the form of a speculative opinion about an event that had not yet occurred—rather than as a statement of established fact—in that the test, if it were to be given at all, would have necessarily been administered in the future. See State v. Lobato, 139 N.M. 431, 434–35, 134 P.3d 122, 125–26 (N.M.Ct.App.) (holding that officer's expression of opinion that DNA testing of evidence would incriminate defendant did not coerce confession where statement was expressed as an opinion and officer indicated that testing had not yet been performed), cert. denied,139 N.M. 567, 136 P.3d 568 (N.M.2006).
In any event, even assuming arguendo that Detective Kluttz's statement could be viewed as a misrepresentation regarding the evidence against defendant, our Supreme Court has observed that such statements, “as contrasted with threats or promises, have been tolerated in confession cases generally, because such statements do not affect the reliability of the confession.” Jackson, 308 N.C. at 574, 304 S.E.2d at 148. Accordingly, we conclude that Detective Kluttz's statement about Dana taking and passing a polygraph test did not coerce defendant's admission. See State v. Graham, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 733 S.E.2d 100, 105 (2012) (holding that false statements made to defendant indicating that he had failed polygraph test and that police had incriminating DNA evidence against him did not render his statement involuntary), disc. review denied,366 N.C. 432, 736 S.E.2d 492 (2013).
In sum, the trial court's uncontested findings support its conclusion that defendant's statement to law enforcement officers on 17 September 2009 was voluntary. The trial court, therefore, did not err in determining that defendant's statement was admissible and in denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's order.
AFFIRMED. Judges McGEE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).