BOSLAUGH, J.

The defendant, Mark Schroeder, appeals from a sentence to imprisonment for 2 to 3 years for assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury. The defendant has assigned as error the trial court's refusal to instruct on the defense of justification, or choice of evils, as provided in section 28-834, R.R.S. 1943.

The assault took place in a cell at the Reformatory Unit near Lincoln, Nebraska. The defendant was confined in the cell with three other prisoners, one of whom was Gary Riggs, the victim.

The defendant was 19 years of age at the time of the offense. Riggs was 24 years of age. Riggs had a reputation among the other prisoners for sex and violence and the defendant was afraid of Riggs. In its brief the State concedes that Riggs had unquestionably placed the defendant in a position of general subservience.

The evidence shows that the defendant and Riggs had been gambling and that the defendant owed Riggs approximately $3,000. Riggs had threatened to make a "punk" out of the defendant by selling the debt to some other prisoner. A punk is defined in the record as a prisoner who commits homosexual acts with other prisoners.

The defendant testified that he did not want to gamble with Riggs but Riggs made the defendant continue to play cards and gamble. On the day before the incident, the defendant and the other two prisoners in the cell submitted a written request that Riggs be moved to another cell.

On the night the assault occurred the defendant and Riggs played cards until about 10 p.m. The defendant testified Riggs said that he might walk in his sleep that night and "collect some of this money I got owed to me tonight."

The defendant went to bed about 10 p.m. but, apparently, was unable to sleep because of what Riggs had said. The defendant got up about 1 a.m., and stabbed Riggs in the back with a knife made from a table knife. Riggs was asleep at the time but awakened when he was stabbed. When Riggs tried to remove the knife from his back, the defendant struck Riggs in the face several times with a metal ashtray. The guard was called and Riggs was taken to the hospital.

Section 28-834, R.R.S. 1943, which is a part of the self-defense statute enacted in 1972, provides as follows: "(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if:

"(a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;

"(b) Neither sections 28-833 to 28-843 nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and

"(c) A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

"(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability."

The defendant submitted a requested instruction based upon section 28-834, R.R.S. 1943, and NJI No. 14.33, as revised, which the trial court refused. The defendant contends the refusal was erroneous. The State contends the request was properly refused because the harm or evil sought to be avoided was not greater than that sought to be prevented and there was no specific and imminent threat or injury to the defendant's person at the time he stabbed Riggs.

The defendant was charged with stabbing with intent to kill, wound, or maim but the jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury. The State argues that the determination as to which harm or evil is greater is to be made by a comparison of the punishment prescribed by law for the acts in question. This does not appear to be a correct interpretation of the statute.

Under section 28-836(4), R.R.S. 1943, the use of deadly force may be justifiable if the actor believes such force is necessary to protect himself against sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. The defendant's evidence was such that the jury could have found that the defendant believed he would be forced by Riggs to submit to sodomy if he did not kill or disable Riggs that night.

The circumstance of confinement is an important factor in this case. Under ordinary circumstances the actor has a duty to retreat if he can with complete safety avoid the necessity of using force by retreating. 28-836(4)(b), R.R.S. 1943. The duty to retreat was not applicable here because the defendant could not retreat.

The State further contends that the defense was not applicable because there was no specific and imminent threat of injury to the defendant. Riggs was asleep when the defendant stabbed him and Riggs had made no overt act or assault upon the defendant. Section 28-836(1), R.R.S. 1943, provides that the use of force may be justifiable if the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion.

The rule in this state has been that in order to excuse or justify a killing in self-defense the defendant must have reasonably believed that his life was in imminent danger or that he was in imminent danger of suffering great bodily harm. State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 183 N.W.2d 258; State v. Archbold, 178 Neb. 433, 133 N.W.2d 601; State v. Kimbrough, 173 Neb. 873, 115 N.W.2d 422; Barr v. State, 45 Neb. 458, 63 N.W. 856; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N.W. 571.

The present statutory requirement is that the actor believe such force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion. Although the term "present occasion" may have relaxed somewhat the former requirement of imminent danger, the present statutory requirement is essentially the same requirement as existed prior to the enactment of section 28-836, R.R.S. 1943.

The problem in this case is that there was no evidence to sustain a finding that the defendant could believe an assault was imminent except the threat that Riggs had made before he went to bed. The general rule is that words alone are not sufficient justification for an assault. Grebe v. State, 112 Neb. 759, 201 N.W. 142. See, also, Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529, 345 A.2d 645.

There is a very real danger in a rule which would legalize preventive assaults involving the use of deadly force where there has been nothing more than threats. We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant.

This is a difficult case and we are of the opinion there are extenuating circumstances which justify a reduction in the sentence. The judgment is modified by reducing the term of imprisonment to 1 year, the statutory minimum. AS modified, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.