Opinion
No. C0-95-1766
Filed June 25, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 95015109.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, (for Respondent)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Donna J. Wolfson, Assistant County Attorney, (for Respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lawrence Hammerling, Deputy State Public Defender, (for Appellant)
Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Schumacher, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)
Unpublished Opinion
Appellant Timothy Richard Schaak challenges his conviction for kidnapping. He argues the district court: (1) denied his right to confrontation by excluding evidence; and (2) abused its discretion by imposing the mandatory minimum fine. We affirm.
Facts
In the early morning of February 19, 1995, Minneapolis police officers flashed a light into a parked car containing Schaak and the victim. The victim had a look of shock and fear. When she exited the car, her breasts were exposed. The victim hugged an officer and whispered, "He just raped me," and then began crying uncontrollably. Schaak fled on foot. An officer caught Schaak and a fight ensued in which Schaak several times reached for his knife before being secured by several officers.
The state charged Schaak with three counts of criminal sexual conduct and one count of kidnapping. At trial, the state presented evidence that Schaak grabbed the victim after she parked her car and forced her back into the car. He then drove away, parked, held a knife to the victim, and sexually assaulted her. Schaak's defense was that he spotted the victim passed out in her car at a traffic light, and, being a Good Samaritan, he got into the car and drove it away to prevent her from driving while intoxicated. He theorized that when police arrived, the victim fabricated a kidnapping and sexual assault story to avoid DWI prosecution.
Schaak developed his theory by eliciting admissions from the victim that she lied to police regarding whether she had driven while intoxicated on the night in question. Schaak repeatedly offered evidence concerning the victim's prior DWIs and alcohol-related license cancellations, in addition to her pending DWI charge. Schaak argued the DWI record gave the victim a greater motive to lie than an ordinary citizen confronted with a DWI would have, because the victim would face jail time for gross misdemeanor DWI. The court excluded the victim's DWI record because the evidence was speculative and the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value. The court reasoned the jury had heard ample evidence concerning the victim's motive to lie.
The jury found Schaak guilty of kidnapping but not guilty of criminal sexual conduct. The court sentenced Schaak to a presumptive term of 78 months executed and imposed a fine, assessment, and surcharge of $18,025.
Decision
1. The district court's decision on the admission of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard deferential to the district court's ruling. State v. Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 925 (Minn. 1994). A court may exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury * * *." Minn. R. Evid. 403; Starkey, 516 N.W.2d at 925.
The discretionary power of the court to control the scope of cross-examination is limited by the Confrontation Clause. State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995). The main purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to secure the defendant's opportunity for cross-examination. Id.; see also State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996) (Confrontation Clauses of federal and state Constitutions serve same purpose). Vindication of the right to confrontation requires that courts allow defendants the opportunity to present evidence material to their theory of the case. Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 866.
Here, the court denied Schaak's repeated requests to admit evidence of the victim's DWIs. Schaak offered the evidence to support his theory that the victim had a motive to lie to avoid prosecution for gross misdemeanor DWI.
In State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 1995), the complainant reported to a police officer an alleged sexual assault by Pride. Id. at 865. At trial, the court denied Pride's requested cross-examination of the officer regarding the romantic relationship that developed between the officer and the complainant following the alleged assault. Id. at 864. Pride's theory of the case was that the complainant fabricated the assault story in an effort to move her relationship with the officer from friendly to romantic. Id. at 865. The jury convicted Pride. Id. In a plurality opinion, the supreme court held that the district court failed to vindicate Pride's cross-examination rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 866. The majority concluded the jury might have had a "significantly different impression" of the credibility of both the complainant and the officer had the court allowed the testimony concerning their subsequent romantic relationship. Id.
Here, unlike in Pride where the district court totally precluded Pride's ability to show a motive for the complainant to lie, Schaak was able to show a motive for the victim to lie. The question is whether the victim's motive to lie to avoid gross misdemeanor DWI rather than an ordinary DWI would have given the jury a "significantly different impression" of the victim's credibility. See id. at 866. We conclude the difference is not "significant," given that Schaak's defense successfully: (1) insinuated the victim's DWI problems by eliciting testimony that she had a suspended driver's license and could not afford insurance in "her situation," (2) established that the victim was intoxicated on the night in question, (3) established that the victim lied to police several times to avoid DWI repercussions, and (4) elicited inconsistencies bearing on the victim's credibility. Accordingly, Schaak's confrontation rights were fully vindicated, and the question becomes one regarding the court's discretion to exclude evidence.
In applying a rule 403 balancing, the added probative value of allowing evidence of the victim's DWIs is exceedingly minimal. The victim had a motive to lie, and indeed Schaak developed this theory. In fact, the jury at least partially discredited the victim's testimony by only convicting Schaak for kidnapping. Further, the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury was significant given the public disdain for drinking and driving. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim's DWI record.
2. When a defendant is convicted of kidnapping, the district court must impose a minimum fine of $15,000. Minn. Stat. ___.101, subd. 4(1), 609.25, subd. 2(2) (1994). Further, the court "shall" impose an assessment of 20 percent of the amount fined, in addition to a $25 surcharge. Minn. Stat. ___.101, subd. 1(a), (b) (1994). The court has the discretion to reduce the mandatory minimum fine, surcharge, and assessment if the court makes written findings on the indigency of or undue hardship on the convicted person. Minn. Stat. ___.101, subd. 5 (1994).
Here, the district court imposed the mandatory minimum statutory fine, surcharge, and assessment of $18,025. Schaak argues he is indigent, and thus the court should have exercised its discretion and reduced the fine to zero. We disagree. There is no requirement in the statute that a court base fines on a defendant's ability to pay. State v. Patterson, 511 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994). The court is required to make findings on indigency only if the court decides to reduce the fine. Id. Thus, the court here was not required to consider Schaak's ability to pay and was not required to make findings on his indigency. Further, Schaak merely asked that the fine be waived without presenting evidence bearing on indigency. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the mandatory minimum fine, assessment, and surcharge.
Affirmed.