Opinion
A155663
06-26-2020
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent, v. SARAH I. Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. FS160093)
Sarah I. appeals, in propria persona, after the trial court denied her motions to stay or vacate an Oklahoma child support order registered in California and to quash income withholding orders (IWOs). Sarah I., who is disabled, contends the trial court wrongfully refused to consider her contentions and evidence that the North Coast Regional Department of Child Support Services (the Department) violated federal and state disability laws requiring it to accommodate her disabilities in connection with the registration and enforcement of the Oklahoma support order. Sarah I. further contends the trial court erroneously determined that she failed to follow proper procedures for challenging the registration of the Oklahoma support order; modified the Oklahoma order in violation of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (Fam. Code, § 5700.101 et seq.) to increase her support obligation by $25; and improperly took judicial notice of non-final court records in her separate federal civil rights action against the Department and others. We affirm.
Pursuant to the California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, governing "Privacy in Opinions," we refer to appellant by her first name and last initial and to the other parent by initials only.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sarah I. and N.R. are the parents of twin daughters born in Oklahoma in 2004. In 2014, Sarah I. moved to California and established residence in Humboldt County, while N.R. and the twins remained in Oklahoma.
On October 9, 2014, an Oklahoma administrative law judge entered an order requiring Sarah I. to pay child support in the amount of $633.66 per month, which included $583.66 in current child support and $50 towards arrears. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Child Support Services, requested that the administrative order be docketed as an order of the Oklahoma state court, but Sarah I. objected to the request. The Oklahoma state court affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the administrative order. The court affirmed the findings of personal jurisdiction and Sarah I.'s paternity, but vacated the findings regarding the parties' income, current child support and arrears, and scheduled a de novo review of these matters.
Sarah I. is a transgender female.
After a trial in August 2015, the Oklahoma court issued a journal entry of its findings, which included the following: (1) minimum wage would be imputed to Sarah I. for purposes of calculating past due and current child support; (2) Sarah I.'s underemployment was a result of her transgender status, making imputation of a higher income unwarranted; (3) Sarah I. owed past due child support for the five years prior to the paternity action; (4) Sarah I. had a $2,500 credit towards past due child support for monies paid on behalf of the children; (5) a judgment in the amount of $18,592.94 was entered against Sarah I. and in favor of N.R., representing past due child support; and (6) Sarah I. was ordered to pay ongoing monthly child support in the amount of $321.50, commencing on September 1, 2014. The journal entry was filed in Oklahoma state court on January 13, 2016. Thereafter, Oklahoma prepared a registration statement to have the support order enforced in California.
On April 27, 2016, the Department filed and served a notice in the Humboldt County Superior Court seeking registration of the Oklahoma support order. The notice, issued on Judicial Council Form FL-570, stated: "If you want to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order, you must request a hearing within 25 days of the date that the notice was mailed to you . . . . You can request a hearing by completing and filing a Request for Hearing Regarding Registration of Support Order (form FL-575)."
The Department has requested judicial notice of Judicial Council form FL-575 pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). The Department argues that the form is relevant to establishing the particular instructions that Sarah I. received for requesting a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the Oklahoma support order. We deferred ruling on the request and now deny it, as the proffered form has a revision date of January 1, 2017, which postdates the filing and service of the notice of registration at issue here.
Sarah I. did not submit a hearing request to the trial court, but she did send a letter to the Department in which she "demand[ed] that California conduct a due process hearing and refuse to recognize the judgment of Oklahoma, and to determine and reduce the amount of the judgment and payment schedule to amounts that are reasonable given [her] current income and reasonable living expenses." It appears that no hearing was held on the registration of the Oklahoma support order.
We previously granted Sarah I.'s motion to supplement the record to include a copy of her letter, which is undated. Sarah I. contends in her moving papers that she sent the letter in February 2016 after the Department informed her of the impending registration of the Oklahoma support order.
In January 2018, Sarah I. filed a civil rights action, [Sarah I.] v. State of Oklahoma, et al. (N.D.Cal., July 6, 2018, No. C 18-00269 WHA). The complaint included claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act alleging that the defendants, including the states of Oklahoma and California and their support agencies, discriminated against her on the basis of her disabilities—a back injury and circulatory disorder—by refusing to mitigate enforcement of her child support order, suspending her driver's license, and misrepresenting her financial status to credit agencies.
Meanwhile, in March and April 2018, the Department issued income withholding orders (IWO) to two of Sarah I.'s employers—an elementary school and the Humboldt County Office of Education. The IWOs required each employer to withhold $346.50 per month from Sarah I.'s income, consisting of $321.50 in current child support, plus $25 for past-due support.
The Department maintained that it issued IWOs to Sarah I.'s several employers because her work schedule was sporadic, and she did not accumulate enough earnings from any one single employer to cover the entire support obligation.
Beginning in April 2018, Sarah I. began filing various requests, motions, briefs, and exhibits in the trial court. We address the filings relevant to the issues on appeal.
On April 16, 2018, Sarah I. filed a Judicial Council form FL-450 "Request for Hearing Regarding Earnings Assignment." Sarah I. requested that the trial court quash the IWOs on the grounds that she was poor and disabled, and the IWOs would cause her severe hardship. She further requested modification of the IWOs on the grounds that the total amount of arrearages claimed was incorrect because it failed to credit all of her payments, her disability and constitutional rights were not being respected, the monthly payment specified in the IWOs was more than half of her net monthly income, and the monthly arrearage payment would create an undue hardship on her.
Sarah I. also filed a formal motion to quash the IWOs. In her moving papers, Sarah I. contended that she had entered into a repayment agreement with the Department in April 2017 requiring her to pay $321.50 a month, and she fully complied with the agreement through October 2017, when she suffered from a near-fatal pulmonary embolism that left her hospitalized and unable to work during November 2017. According to Sarah I., the Department refused to excuse her untimely payment even though it knew her default was due to her disabilities. Sarah I. further argued that the Department, without approval from the Oklahoma state court, illegally increased the monthly child support order by $25. In an attached list of exhibits and witnesses for the anticipated hearing, Sarah I. listed herself and her primary care doctor.
In June 2018, the Department issued an IWO to another employer of Sarah I.
On July 6, 2018, Sarah I. filed a prehearing brief in which she argued that the Oklahoma support order incorrectly assessed her monthly payments and was constitutionally infirm because it was based on a false affidavit of the Oklahoma Department of Human Services' records custodian. Sarah I. further complained that she was not allowed to appear by telephone in the Oklahoma state court proceedings and was never notified by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services of her telephone hearing rights. In addition to her prehearing brief, Sarah I. filed a motion to stay enforcement or vacate the Oklahoma judgment, raising similar contentions that she was denied proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the Oklahoma state court proceedings.
In advance of the hearing on Sarah I.'s motions, the Department filed a request for judicial notice of court records filed in Sarah I.'s federal civil rights action, including an order granting the Department's motion to dismiss Sarah I.'s complaint, an order denying Sarah I.'s motion to reconsider the dismissal, and a judgment in favor of the Department.
Leave to amend was granted only for the claimed violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
At the hearing held on August 10, 2018, the trial court ruled that the only matters properly pending before it were Sarah I.'s motion to quash the IWOs, which the court denied, and "whether [the Oklahoma support order] was properly registered . . . in this jurisdiction," which the court found in the affirmative. The court found that Sarah I. "did not follow the proper procedures to object to . . . the registration of the Oklahoma order." The court also explained that it did not believe it "has the jurisdiction in the first place to modify an Oklahoma judgment," and even if it did, the court "would not exercise any equitable powers to alter the judgment because it does appear to this court that it was a validly executed or validly entered judgment." The court further stated that while Sarah I. may have had defenses to that judgment, "it's much too late to raise those at this point and this Court is not going to collaterally attack a judgment entered into by Oklahoma." The court determined that the Department "has followed all of the appropriate statutes, have taken all the steps that they are required to take in [an] order to enforce the Oklahoma judgment."
The trial court also granted, over Sarah I.'s objection that the federal court's decision was not final because it was on appeal, the Department's request for judicial notice. The court stated that "in light of the US District Court's decision as well as the information that's been provided, I just don't think you have grounds. . . . [¶] . . .[¶] . . . The Court is going to adopt the district court's analysis and find that . . . you have not stated a claim under ADA or under the other act for a violation of—based on your disability based on the way this—these proceedings have gone. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I'm not going to find that there's been any violation of your rights based on your disability. I'm more than willing to accept your offer of proof that you are disabled, but I have no reason to doubt that. . . . I'm willing to accept that as fact, but that fact itself is not sufficient enough for this Court to stay the enforcement of the custody or the child support order entered by the Oklahoma state court." The court refused to allow Sarah I. to present testimony from her and her physician, finding that her disability, though undisputed, was irrelevant to the determination of the matters before it. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Sarah I.'s request for hearing as well as her motion to stay or vacate the Oklahoma support order. The court entered its written order denying the motions on August 15, 2018.
Sarah I. promptly moved for reconsideration and a new trial. This was followed by a second amended motion for reconsideration in which Sarah I. submitted a letter from the California Department of Rehabilitation dated August 20, 2018, informing Sarah I. of her eligibility and priority for services based on a physical or mental impairment.
In September 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Sarah I.'s reconsideration and new trial motions. The court found that Sarah I. failed to show new facts justifying reconsideration of the previous ruling, or any irregularity in the proceedings, accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, or insufficient evidence to warrant a new trial. Accordingly, the trial court denied both motions and entered its written order on September 26, 2018.
Thereafter, Sarah I. moved to supplement the record with new evidence, this time offering a September 20, 2018, letter from the Social Security Administration (SSA) informing her that her claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits had been approved. Sarah I. also submitted correspondences from the Department confirming the closure of Sarah I.'s case file and the terminations of the IWOs issued to her employers. The trial court issued an order stating that it would allow the papers to be filed "for record purposes," but would take no action on the motion in light of its previous ruling.
Sarah I. filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's September 26, 2018, order denying her motions for reconsideration and for a new hearing/trial.
An order denying a motion for new trial is not separately appealable but is reviewable on appeal from the underlying judgment. (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 19-20 (Walker).) Likewise, an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not separately appealable, but if the order that was the subject of the motion is appealable, the denial of the reconsideration motion is reviewable as part of an appeal from that order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g).) Here, the trial court's August 15, 2018, order denying Sarah I.'s motions to quash the IWOs and to stay or vacate the Oklahoma judgment is appealable. (§ 3554; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10).) The Attorney General does not appear to have been misled or prejudiced by the notice of appeal, as the Attorney General has filed a brief defending the propriety of the trial court's August 15, 2018, ruling. Thus, construing the notice of appeal liberally, we conclude we have appellate jurisdiction to review the August 15, 2018 order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2); Walker, at p. 22.)
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Add Respondents
Sarah I. moves to add the California Department of Child Support Services, Humboldt County Department of Child Support Services, its director Lisa Dugan, and the Oklahoma Department of Human Services as respondents in this appeal. Sarah I. contends she attempted to add these parties in the proceedings below but "was not allowed to . . . by Court Clerks under the control and direct supervision of Ms. Dugan, a party to the Federal lawsuit."
A moving party generally has the burden of establishing that the facts and law favor its position. (See Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200.) Rule 8.54 of the California Rules of Court requires a party filing a motion in the appellate court to "stat[e] the grounds and the relief requested and identify[] any documents on which the motion is based." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(a)(1).) The rule also requires the motion to be supported by a memorandum and, if it is based on matters outside the record, by declarations or other supporting evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(a)(2).)
Sarah I.'s motion is not supported by any legal authorities or evidence and therefore does not comply with the court rules. Furthermore, the moving papers were not served on any of the proposed respondents, giving them no notice that she intended to add them as respondents in this appeal. For these reasons, we deny the motion as procedurally defective.
That said, we note there appears some confusion as to the whether the appropriate parties appear in the captions for the court records in this case. Even assuming the Department was never formally added as a party in the proceedings below, both the Department and the Attorney General represent "the public interest" in establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations (§ 17406, subd. (a); In re Marriage of LaMoure (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 807, 812), and the Department actively participated in the proceedings below and on appeal, including filing a notice in this court substituting the Attorney General as counsel of record for purposes of the appeal.
II. Standard of Review
"A trial court child support order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review, and the trial court's findings of fact in connection with a child support order under the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.] 'To the extent the trial court's decision reflects an interpretation of a statute, it presents a question of law that we review de novo.' " (In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 906-907.)
III. Registration of the Oklahoma Support Order
Sarah I. contends the trial court erred in determining that she failed to follow proper procedures to challenge the enforcement or validity of the Oklahoma support order. Specifically, she argues that she sufficiently requested a hearing by sending a letter to the Department in February 2016 complaining of constitutional and other infirmities in the Oklahoma state court process and demanding a "due process" hearing, and that the Department had a duty to request a hearing in the trial court on her behalf. We are not persuaded.
The UIFSA governs the procedures for establishing, enforcing and modifying child support orders in cases involving more than one state. (In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 206.) A support order issued in another state may be registered in this state for enforcement by filing the order in a "registering tribunal." (§§ 5700.601, 5700.603, subd. (a).) Once registered, the out-of-state support order "is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state." (§ 5700.603, subd. (b).) "Except as otherwise provided in this part, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered support order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction." (§ 5700.603, subd. (c).)
Upon registration of another state's order, "the registering tribunal" must provide notice to the nonregistering party (1) "that a registered support order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this state"; (2) "that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order must be requested within 20 days after notice"; (3) "that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages"; and (4) "of the amount of any alleged arrearages." (§ 5700.605, subds. (a), (b)(1)-(4).)
"A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered support order in this state shall request a hearing within the time required by Section 5700.605." (§ 5700.606, subd. (a).) "If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing." (§ 5700.606, subd. (c).) "If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law." (§ 5700.606, subd. (b).)
"The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to Section 5700.607." (§ 5700.606, subd. (a).) The contesting party has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses: (1) "the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party"; (2) "the order was obtained by fraud"; (3) "the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order"; (4) "the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal"; (5) "there is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought"; (6) "full or partial payment has been made"; (7) "the statute of limitation under Section 5700.604 precludes enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrearages"; or (8) "the alleged controlling order is not the controlling order." (§ 5700.607, subd. (a).)
A plain reading of these statutes makes it reasonably clear that the nonregistering party must request a hearing from the registering tribunal that provided the notice. Here, Sarah I. does not dispute she received notice from the Humboldt County Superior Court of the registration of the Oklahoma support order, and she did not file a timely hearing request with that court. And contrary to Sarah I.'s assertion, her undated letter to the Department, even assuming it was timely (see ante, fn. 5), did not constitute a request to the registering tribunal (the trial court below); indeed, she cites no authority supporting her contention that her letter triggered a duty on the part of the Department to file the request on her behalf. Moreover, Sarah I. provides no explanation as to why she waited over two years before moving to vacate the registered Oklahoma support order, although it should have been readily apparent that the Department did not file a hearing request on her behalf in 2016. At bottom, Sarah I.'s failure to timely contest the registered order resulted in confirmation of the order by operation of law. (§ 5700.606, subd. (b).)
We do not decide whether a registered out-of-state support order can never be vacated by a court of this state after it is confirmed by operation of law under section 5700.606, subdivision (b). As indicated, Sarah I. waited over two years before seeking to vacate the registered Oklahoma support order, and she has not attributed the delay to anything having to do with her disabilities. Although Sarah I. claims the process is too complex for self-represented litigants like herself, the record shows she has successfully navigated court procedures, including filing a Judicial Council form FL-450 request for hearing regarding earnings assignment order.
Sarah I. further argues that the Department and the trial court violated section 5700.603, subdivision (c), of the UIFSA by modifying the Oklahoma order to increase the amount of her support obligation by $25. We disagree. As we shall explain in part IV.A, post, the income withholdings for child support and for arrearage payments are distinct, and the Department's collection of an additional $25 per month for liquidation of arrearages was expressly authorized under section 5246, subdivision (d)(2). There was no improper modification of the Oklahoma support order.
Sarah I. suggests that section 5246, subdivision (d)(2), does not apply in interstate cases, but she is mistaken. The withholding of an arrearage payment under section 5246, subdivision (d)(2), is among the procedures available to the Department to enforce support orders, and under the UIFSA, a registered out-of-state support order "is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state." (§ 5700.603, subd. (b).)
For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Sarah I.'s motion to stay or vacate the Oklahoma support order. In so concluding, we do not intend to diminish the difficulties Sarah I. has faced in attempting to appear in Oklahoma to challenge or obtain modification of her support order. Her recourse, however, remains in the Oklahoma court system, as the UIFSA expressly permits modification of a support order only by the issuing court maintaining continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. (§§ 5700.205, subd. (a)(1), 5700.603, subd. (c); In re Marriage of Connolly (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 395, 402].)
There is no dispute here that the issuing tribunal maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of Sarah I.'s support order, as N.R. and the twins continue to reside in Oklahoma. (§ 5700.603, subd. (a)(1).)
IV. Motion to Quash or Stay the IWOs
When a trial court orders a party to pay an amount for child support, the court shall include in its order an earnings assignment order. (§ 5230, subd. (a).) An "[e]arnings assignment order for support" refers to an order that assigns to an obligee a portion of the earnings of a support obligor due or to become due in the future. (§ 5208, subd. (a).) In lieu of an earnings assignment order signed by a judicial officer, a local child support agency may serve on an obligor's employer an order/notice to withhold income for child support, which "shall have the same force and effect as an earnings assignment order signed by a judicial officer." (§ 5246, subd. (a).) An earnings assignment order may be quashed, or its service stayed. (§§ 5260, 5270.)
Sarah I. argues the trial court should have quashed or stayed the IWOs because she submitted sufficient proof that the Department violated its obligations under federal and state disability laws to engage in the interactive process and reasonably accommodate her disabilities. Sarah I. contends her physician's letter, indicating she had a qualifying disability and was totally unable to work, was sufficient to require the Department to accommodate her disabilities with a stay of the enforcement proceedings. Again, we are not persuaded by Sarah I.'s contentions.
A. Quashing an Earnings Assignment Order
An obligor may move to quash an assignment order on the grounds that (1) "the assignment order does not correctly state the amount of current or overdue support ordered by the courts"; (2) "the alleged obligor is not the obligor from whom support is due"; or (3) "the amount to be withheld exceeds that allowable under federal law in subsection (b) of Section 1673 of Title 15 of the United States Code." (§ 5270, subd. (a).)
There is no dispute that Sarah I. is the obligor from whom support is due, and she does not argue that the amounts to be withheld exceeded what is allowable under federal law, as specified in section 5270, subdivision (a)(3). The IWOs sought withholding of $321.50 in child support—the same amount ordered by the Oklahoma state court. On this record, the trial court correctly determined that the grounds for quashing the IWOs were not established.
Sarah I. contends the IWOs improperly sought an additional $25 beyond the amount of support ordered by the Oklahoma state court. We disagree. The $25 amount was not an increase in Sarah I.'s support obligation, but an arrearage amount that the Department was authorized to withhold. Section 5246, subdivision (d)(2), provides: "If the underlying court order for support does not provide for an arrearage payment, or if an additional arrearage accrues after the date of the court order for support, the local child support agency may send an order/notice to withhold income for child support that shall be used for the purposes described in this section directly to the employer that specifies the updated arrearage amount and directs the employer to withhold an additional amount to be applied towards liquidation of the arrearages not to exceed the maximum amount permitted by Section 1673(b) of Title 15 of the United States Code." (§ 5246, subd. (d)(2).) Here, the Oklahoma support order addressed only Sarah I.'s ongoing support obligation, and Sarah I. does not dispute the Department's evidence that she had a substantial arrearage balance.
Sarah I. alternatively contends the $25 was a "penalty" imposed on her despite her disabilities, in violation of section 4726, subdivision (b)(2). She is mistaken. Section 4726, subdivision (b)(2), provides that "No penalties may be imposed pursuant to this chapter" if various conditions are met, including that the obligor has proven he or she suffers from a disability which substantially impairs his or her ability to comply with the support order. Here, the record establishes that the $25 withholding was not a penalty imposed under the chapter in which section 4726 appears (chapter 5 "Civil Penalty for Child Support Delinquency"), but a payment for liquidation of existing arrearages imposed under a different chapter of Part 5, Division 9 of the Family Code (chapter 8 "Earnings Assignment Order").
Accordingly, the Department was authorized under section 5246, subdivision (d)(2), to withhold an additional amount towards liquidation of arrearages, subject to any applicable statutory limits. For example, section 5246, subdivision (d)(3), imposes a five percent cap on arrearage withholdings for disabled obligors receiving Social Security Disability Insurance and/SSI benefits who supply the local child support agency with proof of eligibility and (if applicable) receipt of SSI benefits. At the time of the August 2018 hearing, the record before the trial court contained no indication that Sarah I. qualified for this exception to the statutory withholding provision.
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits are paid by the SSA to workers who have earned enough Social Security credits but can no longer work due to a disability. (42 U.S.C. § 423(a).) As the Department points out, the record contains a letter sent from the SSA to Sarah I. in July 2018 indicating that she did not qualify for disability benefits because she "had not worked long enough under Social Security." In contrast, SSI benefits are provided "to assure a minimum level of income for people who are age 65 or over, or who are blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established federal minimum income level." (20 C.F.R. § 416.110.)
Sarah I. seizes upon the statutory phrase "would be eligible to receive SSI/[State Supplementary Payments (SSP)]" in section 5246, subdivision (d)(3), to argue that the Department is legally required to provide accommodations to disabled support obligors even though the obligor is not yet receiving SSI benefits. Her interpretation is both incomplete and incorrect. Under the statute, a disabled obligor who meets the SSI resource test and either is receiving SSI/SSP or, but for excess income "as described by" a section of the Code of Federal Regulations, would be eligible to receive SSI/SSP, must also supply the local child support agency with proof of eligibility and, if applicable, receipt of SSI/SSP or Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (§ 5246, subd. (d)(3) ["and the obligor has supplied the local child support agency with proof of eligibility . . . ."]) in order to be entitled to, not a stay of enforcement, but the five percent cap on Social Security disability payments.
It was not until Sarah I. supplied the Department with proof of her SSI eligibility that broader statutory protections applied. (42 U.S.C. § 659(a) [only monies or benefits based on remuneration for employment subject to withholding for child support]; see 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) [SSI benefits are not subject to exclusion, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 118203, subd. (a)(5)(D) [local child support agency "shall" close case when it determines that noncustodial parent has no earnings or assets to levy or attach for support and cannot pay support because noncustodial parent receives SSI/SSP and has no other attachable income or assets].) As Sarah I. acknowledges, the Department promptly terminated the IWOs and closed its case once it received proof of her eligibility for SSI benefits in September 2018.
Although Sarah I. complains that the Department should have done so a year earlier, and that requiring her to supply a letter from the SSA was harsh, unnecessary, and pretext for discrimination, her argument is based on incorrect interpretations of sections 4726, subdivision (b)(2) and 5246, subdivision (d)(3), which we have already rejected. Until Sarah I. actually received SSI benefits, the legal authorities prohibiting garnishment of SSI benefits and requiring case closure simply did not apply. (42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 659(a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 118203, subd. (a)(5)(D).)
We summarily reject Sarah I.'s remaining contentions. The trial court acted within its discretion refusing to admit the testimony of Sarah I.'s physician, as Sarah I. does not contend or demonstrate that the testimony would have sufficed as proof of her eligibility for or receipt of SSI. Nor did the trial court err in granting the Department's request for judicial notice of the records in Sarah I.'s federal action. The federal court's rulings were subject to permissive judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)) and were relevant to Sarah I.'s contentions in the instant matter that the Department's enforcement actions against her (including its failure to mitigate her support obligations) violated federal disability laws. And contrary to Sarah I.'s contention that the federal decision was not final because it was on appeal, "[t]he federal rule is that 'a judgment or order, once rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal or modified or set aside in the court of rendition.' " (Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Board (1978) 20 Cal.3d 881, 887.) Finally, Sarah I. has forfeited her argument that the Department violated "California contract equity principles" because she failed to raise it below (Martine v. Heavenly Valley Limited Partnership (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 715, 728), and, in any event, the contention lacks merit, as child support enforcement is governed by the applicable statutes and regulations discussed throughout this opinion.
For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sarah I.'s motion to quash the IWOs.
Finally, any perceived error in the trial court's denial of Sarah I.'s motion for reconsideration of its earlier August 2018 order appears harmless. As Sarah I. acknowledges, the Department promptly terminated the IWOs once proof of SSI eligibility was supplied, effectively rendering the motion to quash moot.
B. Stay of Earnings Assignment Order
A trial court may stay service of an earnings assignment order "only if the court makes a finding of good cause or if an alternative arrangement exists for payment in accordance with paragraph (2) of subdivision (b)." (§ 5260, subd. (a).) Good cause for staying a wage assignment exists only when all of the following conditions exist: (1) "the court provides a written explanation of why the stay of the wage assignment would be in the best interests of the child"; (2) "the obligor has a history of uninterrupted, full, and timely payment, either through the wage assignment or other mandatory process of previously ordered support, during the previous 12 months"; (3) "the obligor does not owe an arrearage for prior support"; and (4) "the obligor proves, and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence, that service of the wage assignment would cause extraordinary hardship upon the obligor." (§ 5260, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(D).)
Section 5260, subdivision (b)(2), requires "a written agreement between the parties that provides for payment of the support obligation as ordered other than through the immediate service of a wage assignment. Any agreement to stay service of a wage assignment shall include the concurrence of the local child support agency in any case in which support is ordered to be paid through a county officer designated for that purpose."
Here, Sarah I. failed to meet all of the statutory requirements for establishing good cause or otherwise show that an alternative arrangement for payment existed in accordance with section 5260, subdivision (b)(2). Even assuming Sarah I.'s untimely payment in November 2017 should have been excused due to her disabilities, Sarah I. did not demonstrate either that the requested stay was in the best interests of the children, or that she did not owe arrearages for prior support. (§ 5260, subd. (b)(1)(A), (C).) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the IWOs. Furthermore, as discussed, any perceived error by the trial court in denying reconsideration appears harmless because the Department promptly terminated the IWOs once proof of SSI eligibility was provided, effectively mooting Sarah I.'s stay request.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying Sarah I.'s motions to quash the IWOs and stay or vacate the Oklahoma support order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
/s/_________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Petrou, J. /s/_________
Jackson, J.