Opinion
No. 5-749 / 04-1956
Filed November 23, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Kristin L. Hibbs, Judge.
Willard Richard Sanders III appeals from his conviction and sentence for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, and Brent D. Hereen, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Willard Richard Sanders appeals from his conviction and sentence for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.261(1), 321.261(3) and 321.263 (2003).
I. Background Fact and Proceedings.
Robert Shattuck died of injuries he sustained when struck by a car as he walked on or alongside Highway 30 in rural Tama County. Jennifer Giebel, a passing motorist, found Shattuck lying on or near Highway 30. She would later testify she saw a maroon and white car swerve to miss something on the highway at or near the place where she found Shattuck. The car did not stop after Giebel saw it swerve. From the debris found at the scene of the accident, investigators determined Shattuck was struck by a Ford LTD manufactured between 1979 and 1982. Public records indicated that Sanders owned a car matching that description. State Trooper Michael Schwen found a 1979 Ford LTD with a white top and a missing front turn signal lamp at Sanders's Cedar Rapids residence. The debris found at the accident scene matched the missing turn signal lens. After making this discovery, Officer Schwen confronted Sanders with this evidence while at Sanders's residence, and Sanders was escorted to Schwen's patrol car for an interview.
According to Schwen's testimonial version of the ensuing conversation, he read Sanders a Miranda advisory before asking him about the accident. When Schwen asked Sanders about the broken lens, Sanders responded by indicating that he thought he needed an attorney. Schwen stopped the interview and took Sanders to Schwen's nearby office. Schwen's testimonial version also indicates that he read Sanders another Miranda advisory upon arrival at Schwen's office and Sanders signed a "waiver of the Miranda," acknowledging his willingness to answer Schwen's questions. Before continuing with the interview, Sanders called his wife and his father. According to Schwen's testimony, he overheard Sanders tell one or both of them "that the night before he had struck an object or person on Highway 30."
Sanders was subsequently charged with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in personal injury or death. At Sanders's bench trial, the State called several motorists who testified that they saw a man walking on Highway 30 near the accident scene on the night Shattuck was killed. One or more of them testified they had to swerve to avoid hitting Shattuck. A deputy state medical examiner testified Shattuck's injuries could be traced to the damage to the bumper and hood of Sanders's car. Sanders testified that he was not speeding and that he knew he hit something but did not know whether the object was an animal or a person. Sanders claims he was scared and as a result continued on his way to Cedar Rapids without stopping. He also claimed he could not have swerved to avoid hitting the object because a car was approaching in the opposite lane.
The trial judge found Sanders guilty as charged. Sanders was thereafter sentenced to a suspended two-year term of incarceration, subject to his placement for 365 days at the Fort Des Moines Correctional Facility. Sanders was also fined $1,000 and placed on probation for two years.
On appeal Sanders challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also claims he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
We initially reject the State's claim that we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider either of these issues. Specifically, the State argues that Sanders's notice of appeal mentions only sentencing issues and makes no reference to the issues he now relies on for appellate relief.
Appellate jurisdiction "`is limited, in the sense that it is contingent or conditional upon timely appeal by statutory method and within statutory time.'" Jensen v. State, 312 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Iowa 1981) (quoting Brock v. Dickinson County Bd. of Adjustment, 287 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Iowa 1981)). Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.101 states that an appeal of a criminal action shall be taken in the same manner as an appeal of a civil action. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.6(1) specifies the following concerning the notice of appeal:
An appeal . . . is taken and perfected by filing a notice with the clerk of court where the order, judgment, or decree was entered, signed by appellant or appellant's attorney. It shall specify the parties taking the appeal and the decree, judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from.
An appellant must substantially comply with these rules so that "the notice does not confuse, mislead, or prejudice the appellee." McBride v. City of Sioux City, 444 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa 1989). "[A] notice of appeal must sufficiently describe the judgment or order appealed from so as to leave no doubt as to its identity." Schrader v. Sioux City, 167 N.W.2d 669, 672-73 (Iowa 1969). "[R]igid adherence to the rule would serve no useful purpose." Citizen First Nat'l Bank v. Turin, 431 N.W.2d 185, 188 (Iowa 1988) (citing Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972)).
Our supreme court has stated:
as long as the opposing party is not misled to his irreparable harm, a notice of appeal which can reasonably be construed as an attempt in good faith to appeal from an appealable decision is sufficient; and, as a rule the notice is sufficient if it reasonably shows that an appeal is intended and the judgment, order, or decree appealed from substantially states the other facts required by the statute to be shown.
Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. v. Stewart, 579 N.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Iowa 1998) (citing 4 C.J.S. Appeal Error § 371, at 421 (1993) (footnotes omitted); accord 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 327, at 98-99 (1995)). Otherwise stated, "if one can infer from the notice of appeal an intent to appeal from the judgment and the appellee has not been misled, the appeal will be entertained." Blink v. McNabb, 287 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Iowa 1980); Citizen First Nat'l Bank, 431 N.W.2d at 188. "This interpretation of the rule is consistent with our preference for disposition of cases on the merits and not on mere technicalities." Id. (citing Hawkeye Sec., 199 N.W.2d at 378).
In Citizen's First National Bank, the court found a notice of appeal sufficient even though it omitted an issue argued in the appellant's brief and referenced a judgment that did not pertain to the omitted issue. 431 N.W.2d at 188. In that case, the appellee had "not claimed that prejudice resulted from this alleged defect nor that they were misled." Id. The supreme court held that "[w]ithout these two elements, we cannot find the notice was insufficient." Id. (citing In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1980)).
Although the content of and omissions from Sanders's notice of appeal are undisputed, the State fails to demonstrate how it was confused, misled, or prejudiced. In the absence of such a showing, we are unable to conclude Sanders's notice of appeal was insufficient to invoke our subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict are reviewed for errors of law. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Iowa 2002) (citing State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 2001)). If substantial evidence supports the verdict, we uphold it. Id. "We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record." Id.; State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993) (citing State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 338 (Iowa 1980)). "Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 684 (citing Robinson, 288 N.W.2d at 339. We "cannot make a substantial evidence determination if [we] only consider the evidence supporting guilt," because "a rational fact finder cannot render a verdict without taking into consideration all the record evidence." Id. We must consider all the record evidence. Id.; Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 76 (citing Heard, 636 N.W.2d at 229).
"The State must prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged." Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 76 (citing State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Iowa 1976)). "The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt" creating more than "speculation, suspicion, or conjecture." Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 76 (citing State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Iowa 1981)). Iowa Code section 321.261(1) states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident . . . and if able, shall then return to and remain at the scene in accordance with section 321.263.
Iowa Code section 321.263(2) requires that the surviving driver remain at the scene of the accident except to seek necessary aid and if the surviving driver must leave, the driver must leave his or her "driver's license, automobile registration receipt, or other identification data at the scene of the accident." Additionally, if the surviving driver must leave the scene, he or she must "promptly report the accident to law enforcement authorities, and shall immediately return to the scene of the accident or inform the law enforcement authorities where the surviving driver is located." Iowa Code § 321.263(2).
Nothing in the language of the statute explicitly requires the driver have knowledge that the accident caused injury. State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1981). The 1913 and 1927 versions of this statute section were drafted in such a way that a driver could only violate that statute if he or she knew the accident caused injury and failed to stop and render assistance. Id. In 1939 the statute changed, and the knowledge requirement was omitted. Id. at 6. In Miller, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the surviving driver had to have knowledge that the accident caused injury to a person to violate the statute by leaving the scene of the accident. Id. After an analysis of similar cases in other jurisdictions and its interpretation of similar Iowa statutes, the supreme court concluded that "knowledge is an implied element of the offense." Id. The question for the court is then whether the knowledge must be actual knowledge or the theoretical knowledge of a reasonable person. Id. at 6-7. In analyzing how other jurisdictions handle this issue, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted the ruling in People v. Holford, 403 P.2d 423, 427, (Cal. 1965), which states:
(T)he driver who leaves the scene of the accident seldom possesses actual knowledge of injury; by leaving the scene he forecloses any opportunity to acquire such actual knowledge. Hence a requirement of actual knowledge of injury would realistically render the statute useless. We therefore believe that criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.
Miller, 308 N.W.2d at 7. This rule was followed in State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983). There, the court stated that "it is only necessary that the driver know or be reasonably charged with knowledge that the person has been injured." Id. at 141.
Sanders argues that the State failed to prove the predicate fact that he knew or should have known he hit a person, let alone his knowledge of the likelihood that a person was injured. We believe Sanders's attempted distinction of these facts makes no difference in the view of the evidence in this case.
There is evidence from four other motorists who encountered Shattuck on the highway near the accident scene, indicating they recognized Shattuck as a person. Their testimony, in addition to Sanders's incriminatory statements and fear based decision not to stop after striking Shattuck supports the jury's implicit finding that he knew or could be reasonably charged with knowledge that a person was injured. We affirm on this issue.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Turning to Sanders's argument that his counsel was ineffective, we review his claim de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999). To show counsel was ineffective, Sanders must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001); State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). "The ultimate test for determining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is whether, considering the entire record and all of the circumstances, the attorney's performance was within the range of normal competency." State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995) (citing Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984)). Sanders must overcome the presumption "that counsel is competent and that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d at 739 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-94).
"Generally, we do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal." State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002) (citing State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1997)) "Rather, we preserve such claims for postconviction relief proceedings, where an adequate record of the claim can be developed and the attorney charged with providing ineffective assistance may have an opportunity to respond to defendant's claims." Id.
Sanders maintains that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty by not filing a motion to suppress his incriminatory statements made to the investigator. Sanders asserts that his statements made to the police should have been suppressed because the police continued to question him after he requested counsel. Sanders further claims that his statements to the police prejudiced him because they tended to undermine his theory that he lacked knowledge as to what he hit. Because the record is not sufficient to resolve these issues, we preserve them for postconviction relief.