Opinion
No. 37219.
Filed November 21, 1969.
1. Statutes. Where the words of a statute are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed to ascertain their meaning, and this court cannot read a meaning into a statute which is unrelated by legislative language, nor can it read plain, direct, and unambiguous language out of a statute. 2. ___. If a statute is unambiguous, this court will not usurp the function of a lawmaking body to give meaning to a statute not intended by the Legislature.
Appeal from the district court for Dawson County: HUGH STUART, Judge. Affirmed.
Padley Dudden, for appellant.
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General, and James J. Duggan, for appellee.
Heard before WHITE, C.J., CARTER, SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, SMITH, McCOWN, and NEWTON, JJ.
The question involved in this case requires an interpretation of the over-width provisions of the Nebraska motor vehicle law contained in section 39-719, R.R. S. 1943. The district court decided that the "unbaled livestock forage" exception, section 39-719 (5), R.R. S. 1943, to the 8-foot statutory vehicle width limit applied to the load only and not to the vehicle. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
The facts are not in dispute. On January 5, 1968, appellant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle on the public highways in violation of the over-width provisions of section 39-719, R.R.S. 1943. Appellant was approximately 1 mile south of Gothenburg, Dawson County, Nebraska, and was enroute from G. M. Mann Hay Company to a farm 5 miles south and 3/4 of a mile east of Gothenburg. He was to pick up a load of hay at this location and return to his place of employment. The vehicle the appellant was driving had been modified by its owner, the G. M. Mann Hay Company, for the purpose of hauling loose hay. The truck bed protruded beyond both sides of the cab of the truck and measured 13 feet 9 inches between the extreme outside edges. It is clear that there was no intent at the time of the arrest to use the vehicle for any purpose other than the hauling of hay.
The statute says that: "No vehicle shall exceed a total outside width, including any load thereon, of eight feet except that such prohibition shall not apply to * * * (5) unbaled livestock forage within the county or adjacent counties not to exceed twenty feet in total width; * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) 39-719, R.R.S. 1943.
The precise issue here is whether any vehicle used to haul a load of "unbaled livestock forage" 20 feet in width can exceed 8 feet in width while the vehicle is being moved empty to a point of loading. In other words, does the exception apply only to the load or does it include the width of the vehicle also? Appellant argues that the exception applies to the vehicle and that a reasonable interpretation authorizes the use of a vehicle of such width as will carry a maximum allowable load limit; and asks us to answer the proposition that a load of lose hay 20 feet in width cannot be hauled on a vehicle which is merely 8 feet in width.
As authority for our judicial exploration of the wisdom and reasonableness of his argument he invokes a standard tool or rule of statutory construction that this court should give effect to the intent or purpose of the Legislature, and in so doing, this court should look to the object to be accomplished and the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, and place upon the statute a construction that will best effectuate its purpose. State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 155 N.W.2d 788 (1968); State ex rel. Retchless v. Cook, 181 Neb. 863, 152 N.W.2d 23 (1967); Johnson v. School Dist. of Wakefield, 181 Neb. 372, 148 N.W.2d 592 (1967); 82 C. J. S., Statutes, 323, p. 593. But the limitations on the use of this tool of statutory construction are well settled. It is not an imperative demand authorizing at all times judicial exploration of the wisdom or policy considerations motivating the enactment of a statute. Where the words of a statute are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed to ascertain their meaning, and this court cannot read a meaning into a statute which is unrelated by legislative language, nor can it read plain, direct, and unambiguous language out of a statute. State v. Levell, 181 Neb. 401, 149 N.W.2d 46 (1967); Schmeckpeper v. Panhandle Coop. Assn., 180 Neb. 352 143 N.W.2d 113 (1966); Rehkoph v. Board of Equalization, 180 Neb. 90, 141 N.W.2d 462 (1966); Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Seward, 166 Neb. 123, 88 N.W.2d 175 (1958), rehearing denied, 166 Neb. 662, 90 N.W.2d 282 (1958). If a statute is unambiguous, this court will not usurp the function of a lawmaking body to give meaning to a statute not intended or expressed by the Legislature. Ludwig v. Board of County Commissioners, 170 Neb. 600, 103 N.W.2d 838 (1960); Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70, 91 N.W.2d 240 (1958); Cavalry Baptist Church v. Coonrad, 163 Neb. 25, 77 N.W.2d 821 (1956).
The statute involved in the case at bar is totally devoid of ambiguity. It does not apply the width limitation to any vehicle used for hauling livestock forage. It merely provides that the prohibition, that any vehicle including any load thereon cannot exceed 8 feet in width, shall not apply when that load in unbaled livestock forage. Appellant's interpretation of the statute would require us to totally ignore this unequivocal language.
Nor may we permit an ingenious process of semantical word construction to create an ambiguity. The respective statutory classifications of "a vehicle" and "a vehicle including any load thereon" seem to us to be clear, and the finding of an ambiguity is not required simply because hindsight examination of the grammar of the statute could lead us to a more apt statement. If appellant's interpretation of section 39-719 (5), R.R.S. 1943, were correct then the hay or forage moving vehicular equipment could be 20 feet wide, taking up the traveled portion of most of our state highways. This in turn would require the courts to judicially explore and determine factually whether such a vehicle was being used in moving to or from a hay-loading operation. Certainly it is not the intent of the statute that a truck bed would have to be reconstructed to 8 feet in width when not hauling unbaled forage or hay. Nor are we required or authorized to judicially speculate as to the proportionate width between truck beds and overhanging hay loads. If may be, as appellant suggests, that a 20-foot-wide hay load may not be placed upon an 8-foot-wide truck bed. The point is that the statute expressly authorizes such a load width if it can be accomplished. Further discussion is unnecessary. The statute clearly says that the' maximum width limit of a vehicle shall be 8 feet. It permits unbaled forage or hay to be carried as a load thereon up to a limit of 20 feet in width.
The judgment of the district court is correct in its interpretation of the statute and is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.