Opinion
No. 52918-8-I
Filed: May 31, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 03-1-00363-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 08/11/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Larry E McKeeman.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Koch Pllc, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Jennifer K. Ryan Gilman, Barrett Gilman Ziker, 1000 2nd Ave Ste 3500, Seattle, WA 98104-1063.
David Bruce Koch, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Eric Danie Rupp — Doc #861123 (Appearing Pro Se), Washington State Penitentiary, 1313 N. 13th Avenue, Walla Walla, WA 99362-1065.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Seth Aaron Fine, Attorney at Law, Snohomish Co Pros Ofc, 3000 Rockefeller Ave, Everett, WA 98201-4060.
Eric Rupp suffered a mental disorder that did not prevent him from understanding the proceedings in his prosecution for murder or communicating intelligently with his counsel, but led him to reject potentially viable mental defenses in favor of a justification defense based on his delusions of a conspiracy. Because the quality of the assistance a defendant must be able to provide counsel to be competent does not require the ability to choose wisely among alternative defenses, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rupp competent and allowing him to proceed pro se. We affirm.
FACTS
Rupp was charged with first degree murder of his grandmother for killing her by striking her in the head with a rock. According to police reports, Rupp said he killed her because she was part of a government conspiracy against him.
Early on, Rupp and his appointed counsel Anna Goykhman reached an impasse on strategy. Goykhman advocated use of a mental defense that Rupp did not wish to present. Rupp filed a motion to represent himself. Immediately after Rupp submitted his motion, Goykhman filed a motion to determine Rupp's competency. Because Rupp's counsel questioned his competency, the court returned Rupp's motion to proceed pro se. The court ordered Rupp transferred to Western State Hospital for an examination.
Dr. Thomas Danner, a forensic psychologist from Western State, evaluated Rupp to determine his competency to stand trial. Because Rupp had stated his intention to represent himself, Dr. Danner also considered Rupp's competency to waive counsel. The defense retained psychologist Dr. Kenneth Muscatel to evaluate Rupp's competency and investigate mental defenses. Though Rupp allowed Dr. Muscatel to sit in on interviews with Western State staff, he refused to be interviewed separately by Muscatel. After the interviews, the court conducted a competency hearing at which both experts testified.
Danner and Muscatel agreed that while Rupp suffered a delusional disorder, he was a very intelligent man who more than adequately understood the proceedings and the various roles of the participants. As for Rupp's ability to assist in his own defense, Dr. Danner opined that Rupp's delusion was encapsulated and did not render Rupp incompetent. Dr. Muscatel testified that he could not actually offer an opinion that Rupp was not competent, but he had substantial concerns about competence because it appeared Rupp's mental disorder would in essence become his defense. Rupp's appointed counsel
When Rupp's trial counsel prompted Dr. Muscatel to characterize Rupp, who had obtained a helicopter pilot's license and a realtor's license, as suffering from `disorganized thinking', he corrected her: `His thinking is not disorganized. If anything, it's hyper-organized. It's extraordinarily well organized. There is no question that he can put on an impressive show, I mean, with charts and — I mean, look at his CD and look at his videotape. It would be well organized. I can guarantee you that.'
submitted a declaration indicating that Rupp refused to communicate with her rationally, insisted on presenting his conspiracy defense, and refused to discuss employing mental defenses. Rupp testified that he was competent. The court also considered a videotape and computer CD that Rupp had assembled presenting the circumstantial evidence he believed would support his defense.
The court found the question difficult, but ultimately concluded Rupp was competent to stand trial. The court then heard Rupp's motion to represent himself. At the conclusion of a two-day hearing, the court granted his motion. At trial Rupp presented the alleged conspiracy as justification for his acts and was convicted. He appeals, challenging through counsel the trial court's determination that he was competent to stand trial and to waive counsel.
After the trial court's competency ruling and before the court heard Rupp's motion to proceed pro se, Rupp's counsel filed a motion for discretionary review in this court over Rupp's objection. Court of Appeals No. 52430-5-I. A commissioner of this court denied the motion, concluding that there was no obvious abuse of discretion because the trial court's decision was supported by one of the evaluations and was consistent with State v. Hahn, 106 Wn.2d 885, 726 P.2d 25 (1986). When Rupp's standby counsel attempted to raise the issue of competency again during trial, the trial judge, who was not the judge that had ruled on competency before, expressed his agreement with the earlier judge's and the commissioner's reliance on Hahn.
DECISION
No incompetent person can be tried while his or her incapacity exists. RCW 10.77.050. `Incompetency' is statutorily defined as `lack[ing] the capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her own defense as a result of mental disease or defect.' RCW 10.77.010(14). Because it is uncontested that Rupp clearly understood the proceedings against him, only the latter part of the test is in issue here.
Our Supreme Court has made it clear that the `ability to assist' requirement of competency to stand trial is minimal. State v. Harris, 114 Wn.2d 419, 429, 789 P.2d 60 (1990). A defendant need not be able to suggest a trial strategy, help to formulate defenses, or even be able to recall past events. Harris, 114 Wn.2d at 428; State v. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S. Ct. 2255, 90 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1986); State v. Hahn, 106 Wn.2d 885, 894, 726 P.2d 25 (1986). In determining competency, the trial court considers the `defendant's appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal and family history, past behavior, medical and psychiatric reports and the statements of counsel.' State v. Dodd, 70 Wn.2d 513, 514, 424 P.2d 302 (1967). In reviewing a trial court's decision on competency, we grant the trial court great deference. Dodd, 70 Wn.2d at 519-20.
Rupp does not dispute that Dr. Danner's testimony could support a finding he was competent. Rather, Rupp contends the trial court erred by failing to apply the correct legal standard. He compares the court's oral finding that Rupp did not have the ability to `rationally assist in his defense' with a nonstatutory definition of competence derived from the common law often, but not uniformly cited in Washington: `A person is not competent if he is incapable of properly appreciating his peril and of rationally assisting in his own defense.' State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 281, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) citing Harris, 114 Wn.2d at 427-28.
But we must consider the trial court's remarks in the context of the entirety of the court's findings and the argument and evidence before it. In doing so, we understand that by this language the court was rejecting the notion that Rupp's counsel was trying to advance-that because Rupp was asserting his right to control his defense and wished to present an irrational defense, he was not capable of assisting counsel.
Contrary to Rupp's claim, the trial court did not erroneously remove any component of rationality from the test for competence. The trial court found Rupp's delusional condition quite similar to the defendant facing the death penalty in Harris, 114 Wn.2d 419. The court quoted the Harris court's statement defining the rationality component of the ability to assist counsel as the ability `to communicate rationally with counsel', Harris,114 Wn.2d at 430, and concluded that under that standard, Rupp was competent.
The trial court also correctly noted that Dr. Muscatel had been the defense expert witness in Harris. We note Dr. Muscatel's reservations about Harris's competence were similar to his concerns regarding Mr. Rupp.
The difficulty for Rupp's counsel was that Rupp thoroughly understood the strategy his counsel wished to employ and communicated all too effectively his disagreement. Because Rupp refused to support a mental defense, he refused to cooperate with counsel's approach and intentionally and successfully acted to thwart counsel. This was illustrated not only by Rupp's initial and later attempts to proceed without counsel, but also by Rupp's selective invocation of his right to remain silent during the evaluation process. Disagreement with counsel over strategy, however, does not by itself establish that a defendant is incompetent. State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 901, 822 P.2d 177 (1991).
As the trial court observed, competence cannot ultimately turn upon the determination of whether it is `rational' for a defendant to disagree with his attorney's strategy, because defendants exercising the constitutional right to control the conduct of their cases often appear to act irrationally to those knowledgeable in the ways of the criminal justice system. The trial court correctly focused on the repeated holding of our Supreme Court that the defendant need not be able to `suggest a particular trial strategy' or to `choose among alternative defenses' to be capable of assisting in his defense. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d at 482; Hahn, 106 Wn. 2d 885, 894; Harris, 114 Wn.2d 419 at 428; State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 662, 845 P.2d 289, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993).
In Hahn, the defendant, like Rupp, suffered from delusions of a conspiracy involving secret government plots. These apparently motivated his crime and led him to reject an insanity defense and request the right to proceed pro se over his counsel's objection. The Court of Appeals reversed Hahn's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. In doing so, it held that the finding of Hahn's competency to stand trial was supported by the record, and that Hahn validly waived the insanity plea. Hahn, 41 Wn. App. at 880-81. The court reversed, however, on the basis that the record did not affirmatively establish that Hahn made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Hahn, 41 Wn. App. at 884.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction. Hahn, 106 Wn.2d 885. The Supreme Court analogized to State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983), in which that court reversed a trial court's entry of an insanity plea over the objection of a defendant who was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The Hahn court adopted the Jones rationale that `respect for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of proceedings' and that `basic respect for a defendant's individual freedom requires us to permit the defendant himself to determine his plea.' Hahn, 106 Wn. 2d 885 at 892, quoting Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 742-43, 664 P.2d 1216 (internal quotations and citations omitted.)
The Hahn court also held that the Court of Appeals had employed too strict a standard of competency, but found the error harmless since the court of appeals had found the improperly high standard met. Hahn, 106 Wn. 2d at 894.
Had Rupp's counsel attempted to mount a defense Rupp agreed with, it appears Rupp would have had no difficulty communicating to provide information necessary for the defense. When the public defender's office offered to provide a different attorney after the first day of the hearing on Rupp's request to proceed pro se, Rupp did not immediately reject the offer but met with members of the public defender's office out of court. When proceedings resumed, he explained that though they offered another attorney, he had found that `no defense that the public defender's office is going to put forward is acceptable to me. So based on that, I would prefer to go pro se[.]'
Rupp attempts to distinguish Hahn. He correctly notes that the experts in Hahn had agreed the defendant was competent. But Hahn is instructive nonetheless because, as here, both the question of Hahn's competence and his waiver of counsel were before the appellate court. Also similar to this case, the issues in Hahn arose from the defendant's refusal to cooperate with his counsel's preferred strategy and his resulting insistence on proceeding pro se. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Hahn made a point of clarifying the standard of competence. In doing so, the court did not express the test in terms of a general `rationally assist' standard and expressly rejected the notion that the ability to choose among alternative defenses was necessary. Hahn, 106 Wn. 2d at 894.
Rupp contends that his disability involved more than just an inability to choose among defenses-he was unable to cooperate with counsel and insisted upon mounting a defense not based in reality. But even Dr. Muscatel understood Rupp's inability to cooperate with his counsel was the product of the disagreement about strategy. And as Rupp himself pointed out during the competency hearing, the conclusion that he suffered from a delusion itself was necessarily based on not believing his version of events, which he believed he could prove to a jury through the materials he had painstakingly assembled.
In reply, Rupp also contends that that court made an unchallenged finding that Rupp's delusion involved his attorney. The portion of the court's oral ruling he refers to, however, was merely an imprecise paraphrase of what was contained in counsel's affidavit. We do not regard this unsupported `finding' as a verity that controls the outcome of this case.
We conclude that the trial court did not apply the wrong legal standard or abuse its discretion in finding Rupp competent to stand trial and competent to waive his right to counsel.
Affirmed.
APPELWICK, SCHINDLER and COLEMAN, JJ.