Opinion
No. A04-378.
Filed December 21, 2004.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 03056573.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Marie Wolf, Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant).
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent).
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a police officer testified that appellant had refused to answer questions upon his arrest. Appellant argues that his counsel did not open the door, as found by the district court, when his counsel questioned the officer on whether appellant denied any knowledge of the gun. We affirm.
FACTS
A pedestrian flagged down Minneapolis police officer Stephen Moore and informed him that, at a nearby corner, a man dressed in white was carrying a gun. Officer Moore approached the intersection in his squad car and saw a man fitting the description who was later identified as appellant Jim Rogers. Based on Rogers's awkward stride and the movement of Rogers's pants, Officer Moore believed that Rogers was indeed carrying a gun in his left pocket.
When Officer Moore asked Rogers to stop, Rogers took off running. Officer Moore saw Rogers hide behind a car in a parking lot, drop something shiny, and resume running. Officer Moore exited his squad car and chased Rogers on foot. When Officer Moore finally caught up with Rogers, Rogers denied any wrongdoing. After a short struggle, Officer Moore handcuffed Rogers and placed him in the back of the squad car. But Officer Moore did not advise Rogers of his Miranda rights. Officer Moore then returned to the location where he saw Rogers drop something and discovered a large, silver handgun.
Rogers was charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2002). The matter proceeded to trial. The parties stipulated that Rogers was legally prohibited from possessing a handgun, making possession the only contested issue at trial.
During cross-examination of Officer Moore, Rogers's counsel inquired about the questions Officer Moore asked Rogers after he placed him in the squad car. Specifically, Rogers's counsel asked Officer Moore whether he had asked Rogers, "Where is the gun?" Rogers's counsel later asked if it were correct that Rogers told the officer, "[Rogers] didn't know anything about a gun. . . ." On redirect, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Officer Moore that Rogers refused to answer any of the officer's questions. Rogers's counsel did not object to Officer Moore's testimony. But Rogers's counsel later moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's question and Officer Moore's response that Rogers, "refused to answer my questions." The district court denied the motion for a mistrial on the grounds that Rogers's counsel opened the door during cross-examination of Officer Moore. The district court ruled alternatively that any error was harmless. The jury found Rogers guilty of the charged offense. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Rogers argues that, because his right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony that he refused to answer an officer's postarrest questions, the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jorgensen, 660 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Minn. 2003). To prevail on appeal, Rogers must establish that the district court abused its discretion and thereby deprived him of a fair trial. State v. McNeil, 658 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Minn.App. 2003).
Both the United States and Minnesota constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to remain silent. U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art I, § 7. Because exercising this right may be erroneously interpreted as an admission of guilt, admitting evidence of a defendant's silence may deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976); State v. Parker, 585 N.W.2d 398, 403-04 (Minn. 1998). Thus, a prosecutor's reference to a defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence has been deemed a violation of due process because it commented on the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S. Ct. at 2245. Use of postarrest, pre- Miranda silence in the state's case-in-chief may also result in constitutional error. See State v. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn.App. 1991) (holding that use of counseled prearrest, pre- Miranda silence in the state's case was erroneous). Thus, with limited exception, evidence of postarrest silence is improper, regardless of whether the accused has been advised by police pursuant to a Miranda warning, has been counseled by an attorney to remain silent, or has otherwise elected to say nothing. See State v. Beck, 289 Minn. 287, 292, 183 N.W.2d 781, 783-84 (1971) (noting that evidence of postarrest silence, whether accused is Mirandized or not, is improper because it may encourage jury to speculate that defendant remained silent because he was guilty). One such exception relates to impeachment of a defendant who chooses to testify. Impeachment using a defendant's silence prior to arrest, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2129 (1980), or after arrest if no Miranda warnings were given, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 (1982), is not prohibited.
Similarly, the state may use evidence of postarrest silence if the defense has "opened the door." In other words, the state may use otherwise improper evidence of postarrest silence to rebut a false impression created by the defense during witness examination. See State v. Goar, 295 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. 1980) (eliciting evidence of postarrest silence proper to rebut testimony from police officer that defendant denied guilt and cooperated with police); State v. Hjerstrom, 287 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1979) (admitting evidence of postarrest silence to rebut false impression created by defendant that police did not allow defendant to give complete version of what happened).
The statements at issue here refer to Rogers's postarrest, pre- Miranda invocation of silence. The prosecutor asked Officer Moore on redirect examination:
Q. Did you ask [Rogers] for his address and phone number when he was arrested?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did he provide that to you?
A. No, he did not.
Q. What happened?
A. He refused to answer my questions.
Eliciting testimony that Rogers "refused to answer my questions" is equivalent to eliciting testimony that Rogers invoked his right to remain silent. Because the prosecutor elicited testimony that Rogers invoked his right to remain silent after he was arrested, albeit not yet Mirandized, we consider whether this otherwise improper line of questioning is permissible because Rogers's counsel opened the door.
The following cross-examination of Officer Moore by Rogers's counsel preceded the prosecutor's questions in redirect:
Q. Now, at the time that you placed Mr. Rogers in his squad, you also asked him, "Where is the gun?" did you not?
A. I don't remember if I asked him that or not.
Q. You don't remember if you asked him anything at all?
A. I'm sure I asked him his name and his address and all that. I don't remember if I asked him if he had a gun or where the gun was.
Q. Okay. But you were concerned that he did have a gun?
A. Yes.
Q. And you wanted to find it, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Rogers told you that he didn't know anything about a gun, correct?
A. I don't remember if he said he had a gun or not.
Q. You don't remember what Mr. Rogers told you?
A. Well, I don't remember if I asked him.
Through this questioning, Rogers's counsel created the false impression that Rogers denied knowledge and possession of the gun, which Officer Moore either forgot or refused to admit at trial. It was, therefore, appropriate for the state to rebut this false impression by establishing that Rogers did not deny either knowledge or possession of the gun because he refused to answer any of Officer Moore's questions. See Hjerstrom, 287 N.W.2d at 628 (use of silence in state's case-in-chief appropriate when rebutting an impression created by defense counsel). The district court correctly concluded that Rogers's counsel "opened the door," thereby permitting testimony regarding Rogers's silence in order to rebut a false impression as to the existence of exculpatory, postarrest statements by Rogers. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers's motion for a mistrial. Affirmed.
Although not essential to our analysis, we also agree with the district court's alternate determination that, based on the facts of this case, any error would have been harmless. We agree with the district court's determination that Officer Moore's statement was "brief, quiet, and undramatic." See Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d at 429 (setting forth factors for assessing prejudicial effect, including manner in which the statement was made, whether the statement was used later during trial, and the strength of the state's case). Officer Moore made this statement in the midst of redirect examination, and the prosecutor immediately moved on to a different line of questioning. See State v. French, 402 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Minn.App. 1987) (holding that reference to silence harmless because remaining testimony neither focused on nor unduly highlighted silence). Because Rogers's counsel did not object, there was no interruption in the testimony that could have unduly attracted the jury's attention. And our review of the record establishes that a strong case against Rogers mitigated any prejudicial effect arising from Officer Moore's reference to Rogers's silence.