Opinion
NUMBERS 13-15-00363-CR
03-31-2016
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. DENNIS RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellee Dennis Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a state jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). By one issue on appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting Rodriguez's motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2014, Police Officer Steven Ruebelmann observed a vehicle traveling without a working license plate light. The vehicle also failed to use its turn signal before making a right turn. Ruebelmann pulled the vehicle over for these traffic violations. Inside the vehicle was Rodriguez, the driver, along with several passengers. Ruebelmann asked Rodriguez to produce his driver's license. However, none of the vehicle's occupants had a valid driver's license, including Rodriguez. Ruebelmann discovered that the vehicle belonged to Rodriguez's mother. According to Ruebelmann, he decided to impound the vehicle at that point since there was no licensed driver to operate the vehicle, which was still pulled over on the side of the roadway. Ruebelmann testified that he intended to release Rodriguez with just a citation. However, before calling a "wrecker" to pick up the vehicle, Ruebelmann performed an inventory of the vehicle. During the impoundment inventory, he discovered a crack pipe hidden between the driver's seat and the center console, as well as several small baggies of cocaine in the visor on the driver's side. After arresting Rodriguez, Ruebelmann searched Rodriguez's person and found a Brillo pad that was identical to the Brillo pad in the crack pipe discovered in the car.
Once Ruebelmann discovered the drugs, he determined "to extend [the passengers] the courtesy of allowing them to . . . contact a licensed driver" in the area to come and pick up the vehicle for them. Ruebelmann testified that since the crime became a controlled substance investigation instead of a mere traffic violation, the vehicle occupants were in enough trouble and he wanted to save them the expensive impound fee. Thus, Officer Ruebelmann never actually impounded the vehicle and he never completed an impound inventory form.
On December 11, 2014, Rodriguez was indicted for possession of a controlled substance. See id. On June 29, 2015, Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence. Even though the trial court stated several times that Officer Ruebelmann did "the right thing," the trial court granted Rodriguez's motion. The State requested the court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. After forty days, the State filed a notice to remind the court that it still hadn't filed findings of fact and conclusions to law. The trial court did not outright decline to do so but it still has not filed findings of fact or conclusions of law. This appeal ensued.
If a trial court does not submit findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to the losing party's request, an abatement is sometimes required. See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The reason for this rule is that having findings of facts and conclusions of law available can be vital to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion; thus, a losing party is entitled to have the trial court submit these findings and conclusions, even on a pre-trial suppression hearing. See id. However, abatement in the present case is not required because Rodriguez and the State essentially agree on all historical facts. The only determinations to make are questions of law or mixed questions that do not depend on credibility, and we review both de novo. See id.; see also State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In its only issue on appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because the State performed a valid inventory search.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we employ a bifurcated standard, giving almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations. See State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. In determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred, the reasonableness of police conduct is measured in light of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the challenged conduct. See O'Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Likewise, seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. See Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.). Once the defendant shows that the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, it is the State's burden to establish that there actually was a warrant or that there was an applicable exception. See id.
An inventory search is a "well-defined exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); see Perry v. State, 933 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, pet. ref'd). The inventory search is normally applicable when "authorities have legitimately come into possession of belongings or containers of the arrestee and they must inventory the contents of the property initially lawfully taken into custody." Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Inventory searches serve several purposes, such as protecting the police department from false claims of theft and protecting the property itself from pilferage. See id. at 193. For an impound inventory to be lawful, the impoundment of the vehicle must have been lawful. See Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
Texas courts have generally found impoundment to be reasonable when the driver was alone when arrested or when passengers could not show they were licensed drivers. Courts have not required police to try to contact a relative or friend of the accused to come to the scene to take possession of the vehicle.Yaws v. State, 38 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (citations omitted); see Mitchell v. State, 09-05-289 CR, 2006 WL 2075204, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 26, 2006) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("[W]hen a driver is arrested, the law does not require police officers to independently investigate possible impoundment alternatives absent objectively demonstrable evidence that such alternatives exist.").
Furthermore, "an inventory search is not rendered unlawful because it is conducted prior to actual impoundment." Jackson v. State, 468 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Daniels v. State, 600 S.W.2d 813, 814-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("The fact that [an] inventory search [is] conducted prior to the automobile being towed rather than at the city pound makes no difference.")). Even if the vehicle is ultimately not impounded, an inventory search may still be proper if the officer's decision to commence impoundment procedures was proper at the time the inventory search was conducted. See id. (holding that an inventory search was proper even though the vehicle was not actually impounded). Courts have also held that inventory searches should not deviate from department policy. See Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 196.
B. Discussion
The State's argument is that it does not have to actually impound the vehicle to perform a valid inventory search: as long as an inventory search was initially justified, then the search is valid. See Jackson, 468 S.W.3d at 199. Rodriguez claims the opposite: that there was no proper inventory search since Ruebelmann did not follow through with impounding the vehicle. Rodriguez further asserts that officers have no discretion to impound or not impound because that would give them too much "leeway" to use impounding as a "ruse" to perform an improper inventory search. However, this argument is unfounded. For an impound inventory to be lawful, the underlying decision to impound must always be lawful. See Benavides, 600 S.W.2d at 810. The State must always show that the facts known to the officer would lead a reasonable person to believe that impounding the vehicle was appropriate. See O'Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 551.
In the present case, Rodriguez never demonstrated that Ruebelmann failed to follow department policy regarding inventory searches. See Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 196. Rodriguez pointed to a section of the police manual regarding what to do when the impounder arrives, but Rodriguez could not find anything that required the vehicle to actually be impounded. In fact, Ruebelmann testified that the manual leaves it to the police officer's "discretion" to decide how to resolve the impoundment process. Once Ruebelmann arrested the driver, it was reasonable for him to impound the vehicle because no one in the vehicle had a driver's license. See Yaws, 38 S.W.3d at 724. Furthermore, Ruebelmann was not required to contact anyone else to take possession of the vehicle before deciding to impound because there were no obviously apparent alternatives. See Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 196. Because it was reasonable to impound the vehicle, it was reasonable to perform an impound inventory. See Benavides, 600 S.W.2d at 810. Under Jackson, it does not matter that Ruebelmann ultimately decided not to impound the vehicle; the important fact is that Ruebelmann's decision to commence the impoundment process was proper when he decided to perform an inventory search. See Jackson, 468 S.W.3d at 195. Therefore, Ruebelmann was conducting a valid impound inventory when he discovered the cocaine.See id. The validity of that impound inventory was not affected by Ruebelmann's later decision to release the vehicle without actually impounding it. See id. That decision was, as the trial court stated several times, merely a "kind gesture" that was neither "wrong" nor "inappropriate." We sustain the State's sole issue.
The trial court even stated during the hearing that "[the impound inventory] started out valid." --------
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress and remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Nora L. Longoria
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 31st day of March, 2016.