Opinion
No. 38768-9-II.
January 26, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 08-1-01047-5, Ronald E. Culpepper, J., entered January 12, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Van Deren, C.J., and Bridge-water, J.
Robby Lee Robinson appeals a restitution order imposed following his plea of guilty to second degree assault. He admitted only that he punched the victim in the face, but the order required him to pay medical expenses resulting from a stab wound. He argues that his restitution should be limited to the expenses for the victim's broken nose. We affirm.
FACTS
By amended information, the State charged Robinson with second degree assault. The declaration for probable cause indicated that sheriff's deputies found the victim, Timothy Snyder, face down on the ground, bleeding from his face. He mumbled that he had been stabbed and they transported him to a trauma center, where medical staff determined that Snyder had a puncture wound in his chest involving damage to his heart.
When detectives spoke with Snyder three days later, he told them "Robby" had stabbed him. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 3. He said that he had argued with Robinson, and Robinson had slammed his front door. When he went to the door to confront Robinson, Robinson punched him in the face and the chest at the same time. Not realizing he had been stabbed, Snyder drove away from the scene. Sometime thereafter, he noticed a pain in his chest and discovered blood when he lifted his shirt. He returned to his residence and collapsed as he stepped out of his vehicle.
Robinson admitted that he had punched Snyder, but insisted that he had nothing to do with the stabbing. After interviewing Snyder and experiencing difficulty in locating witnesses, the prosecutor decided to offer a plea deal on the lesser charge of second degree assault. Both parties understood that the amount of restitution would be contested. Robinson agreed to the plea offer.
At the restitution hearing, the State argued that no one else could have stabbed Snyder. Robinson disagreed, pointing out that Snyder had said in his interview that he had contacted others before returning to his residence. The trial court noted that Snyder had identified Robinson as the assailant, and no one else had been identified as a suspect. The trial court ordered Robinson to pay restitution for all of Snyder's medical bills, totaling $33,167.10. He appeals the restitution order.
ANALYSIS
Robinson pleaded guilty to second degree assault. In his statement on plea of guilty, he said that he assaulted Snyder by hitting him in the face or nose with his fist. He argues that because he was not convicted for stabbing Snyder, he cannot be required to pay restitution for that injury.
The authority to impose restitution is statutory, and the sentencing court must order restitution "whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results in injury to any person . . . unless extraordinary circumstances exist which make restitution inappropriate in the court's judgment and the court sets forth such circumstances in the record." RCW 9.94A.753(5); State v. Moen, 129 Wn.2d 535, 543, 919 P.2d 69 (1996). We generally leave imposition of restitution to the trial court's discretion. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679-80, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on unreasonable or untenable grounds. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d at 679-80.
The law allows restitution only for losses causally connected to the crimes charged unless the defendant agrees otherwise. State v. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960, 965-66, 195 P.3d 506 (2008). Losses are causally connected if, but for the charged crime, the victim would not have incurred the loss. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 966. In determining whether the underlying causal connection exists, the court looks to the facts and circumstances of the charged offense, not the name or the elements of the crime to which the defendant entered a plea, employing a preponderance of the evidence standard. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 966; State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d 560, 565, 115 P.3d 274 (2005); State v. Thomas, 138 Wn. App. 78, 82, 155 P.3d 998 (2007).
Thus, a defendant can be held liable for all injuries resulting from the criminal acts charged, even if the conviction does not take into account those injuries. See Thomas, 138 Wn. App. 78 at 83 (defendant convicted only of DUI, rather than the vehicular assault charge, properly held liable for the passenger's injuries); State v. Landrum, 66 Wn. App. 791, 799-80, 832 P.2d 1359 (1992) (defendants who pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault after being charged with first degree child molestation were properly required to pay restitution for the victim's sex abuse counseling).
Robinson asserts that Thomas is distinguishable because the court did not consider the same statutory provision, but that does not render the analysis any less relevant. In Thomas, we employed precisely the same "but for" test and preponderance standard that we use here. 138 Wn. App. at 82 (applying the restitution statute before it was recodified into RCW 9.94A.753).
The State initially charged Robinson with attempted second degree murder, based on the stab wound Snyder suffered. Snyder identified him as the perpetrator. This established causation by a preponderance of the evidence, and Robinson's restitution argument fails.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
BRIDGEWATER, J. and VAN DEREN, C.J., concur.