Opinion
No. CR 21-97004
May 15, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Curt Rivard, Jr., has been charged in a two-count information with the crimes of Arson 1st, in violation of Section 53a-111 of the Connecticut General Statutes, and Burglary 3rd, in violation of Section 53a-103 of the Connecticut General Statutes. The state claims that on or about January 3, 2006, the defendant and a co-defendant illegally gained entry to the old vacant Griswold town hall building located at 34 School Street in Jewett City, Connecticut. The state further claims that after entering those premises, the defendant and co-defendant set fire to the premises which completely destroyed those premises.
Mr. Rivard was initially arraigned in G.A. 21 in Norwich on January 12, 2006, and on January 17, 2006, his case was transferred to Part A. On February 7, 2006, he was presented in Part A and at that time Special Public Defender Jeremiah Donovan was appointed by the Court to represent the defendant. Attorney Donovan requested some time to review the case file and to file appropriate motions with the Court. At the time of the alleged crimes, the defendant was in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (hereinafter referred to as "DCF"), having been committed since October of 2004 and was 16 1/2 years old with a birth date of June 2, 1989. On that same date, the Court also appointed Dennis Whalley, Mr. Rivard's DCF caseworker, as his guardian ad litem.
On April 20, 2006, Attorney Donovan filed a Motion to Suppress in the defendant's behalf, moving to suppress all statements made by Mr. Rivard to law enforcement authorities, both during the investigative phase of the case (hereinafter his "first statement") and the statement made following his arrest upon warrant (hereinafter his "second statement"). Counsel contends in the written motion that both statements were made involuntarily and that the second statement was stale.
Attorney Donovan, initial counsel for the defendant, cited additional grounds in the written Motion to Suppress. While that motion was subsequently adopted by successor counsel for the defendant, the only arguments which were pursued concerned the voluntariness of both statements and the staleness of the second statement.
The Court scheduled a hearing on the Motion to Suppress for June 8, 2006. At that time, Attorney Donovan requested additional time and the Court rescheduled the motion for hearing on July 27, 2006. Prior to the scheduled date for hearing, Attorney Donovan was contacted by Attorney Norm Pattis that the defendant's family was hiring him privately to represent Mr. Rivard. On July 31, 2006, Attorney Pattis filed an in lieu of appearance for Attorney Donovan and requested that the Court reschedule a pretrial for August 6, 2006. On that date, the Court pretried the case and, in order to give Attorney Pattis an opportunity to review the state's file, rescheduled the hearing on the Motion to Suppress for October 19, 2006. Attorney Pattis adopted Attorney Donovan's previously filed motion in part. (See Footnote 1.)
On October 19, 2006, at the request of defense counsel, the Court once again rescheduled the Motion to Suppress hearing for November 29, 2006, requesting briefs to be filed by all parties by November 22, 2006. On November 7, 2006, both the state and defense informed the Court that a key witness for the defense would be undergoing surgery on November 14, 2006, and, therefore, would be unavailable to testify on November 29th. The Court met with the parties on November 29, 2006, and on that date was informed by Attorney Pattis that the witness would be incapacitated from her disc surgery for two months. Accordingly, the Court rescheduled the suppression hearing to February 8, 2007. On November 29th, defense counsel filed his Memorandum of Law and Proposed Findings of Fact in Support of the Motion to Suppress.
On February 8, 2007, Mr. Rivard was present with Attorney Pattis, his defense counsel, and Dennis Whalley, his guardian ad litem. Prior to commencement of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Attorney Pattis requested to meet in chambers with the Court and the state to discuss information which had been brought to his attention by some of the defendant's own witnesses that morning. During the in-chambers conference, Mr. Pattis informed the Court, among other preposterous revelations, that the current wife of the defendant's stepfather with whom the defendant had virtually no contact or connection, had told the defense witnesses that the family had hired Attorney Pattis to represent the defendant because Mr. Pattis had a personal relationship with the Court and, therefore, would be granted special favors by the Court. Having been provided with this information, the Court ordered the substance of the chambers conference to be placed on the record in open court. At that time, the Court also canvassed the defendant as to his knowledge or lack thereof regarding these allegations. The defendant informed the Court that his stepfather had hired Attorney Pattis to represent him, he met with and felt comfortable with Attorney Pattis, and he did not believe that Attorney Pattis had any special relationship with the Court.
In an effort to assure that Mr. Pattis did not have a conflict in continuing to represent the defendant, at defense's and the state's joint request, the Court granted a continuance on the Motion to Suppress to allow defense counsel an opportunity to write the defendant and provide him with a copy of the transcript from the record proceeding on February 8th. The Court ordered that an expedited copy of the transcript be forwarded to the Court, the state and defense. The matter was continued for status until February 26, 2007, and the hearing was continued until March 2, 2007.
On February 26, 2007, the defendant, the guardian ad litem, Attorney Pattis and the state were present. The Court inquired of the defendant on the record regarding the letter he had received from Attorney Pattis. The defendant responded that he had received a letter outlining the situation which arose on February 8, 2007 and Attorney Pattis' continued representation of him. The defendant also acknowledged that he had received a copy of the transcript from the court proceeding that day. When questioned by the Court, the defendant said he wanted Attorney Pattis to continue to represent him in his pending criminal matters. Both the state and defense acknowledged that they were fully satisfied with the Court's canvass of the defendant on the matter of representation. As previously agreed, the Motion to Suppress was scheduled for hearing on March 2, 2007.
The hearing commenced on March 2, 2007 and completed on April 16, 2007. All parties were present and represented. On March 2, 2007, the Court granted an oral Motion of Sequestration of the witnesses.
During the course of the proceedings on March 2, 2007, defense counsel represented to the Court and the state that defense witness, Robert McDade, claimed that the state's witness, Trooper George Muriel, spoke to state's witness Officer Collins about Muriel's testimony after Muriel testified. The Court made inquiry as to the claim. Upon questioning, Mr. McDade could only confirm that he had seen Trooper Muriel talk with Officer Collins. He heard some whispering, between the two officers, but Mr. McDade acknowledged that he did not know if they were talking about this case. The Court, therefore, finds this claim to be of no consequence and further finds that there was no violation of the Court's sequestration order.
Curt Rivard, Jr. was born on June 2, 1989, and was 16 1/2 years old at the time of these alleged offenses. At the time of his questioning regarding these charges, Mr. Rivard had been residing with his aunt, Betty Bittman, for approximately one month at her residence located at 7th Avenue in Waterford, Connecticut. Other residents of the home included Robert McDade; Ms. Bittman's son, Dawn Burgess, Mr. McDade's girlfriend; their child and another minor child; Evelyn Grimes, Ms. Bittman's mother; Ellen, Mrs. Bittman's friend; and the defendant, Curt Rivard, Jr. Prior to the month before the defendant moved into the Bittman home, Ms. Bittman had not seen Curt Rivard for over six years, since he was around nine years old. Curt Rivard came to live with Ms. Bittman and her extended family through a telephone call he placed to her, telling her he wanted to see her and the family. She did not know where Curt had been living before then except "here and there" and apparently did not consider it important enough to inquire. Dawn Burgess had never met the defendant before he moved in to the Bittman residence, one month earlier. It is unclear what length of time had passed since Robert McDade had last seen Curt.
Curt Rivard has been in the custody of DCF since September 10, 2004. His biological mother, Ms. Bittman's sister, is deceased; his biological father is not a presence in his life. His guardian, through the Department of Children and Families, is Dennis Whalley. The defendant had been missing from his DCF placement since October 9, 2005 and had not been satisfactorily compliant in that placement. Mr. Whalley did not know where the defendant was residing, but had heard he might have left the state, which was confirmed by the defendant's testimony, that he had taken a train to Florida for a period of time and returned to Connecticut by plane.
On January 6, 2006, Mr. Rivard's biological father's girlfriend called the Bittman home to say that the police were looking for Curt. Mr. McDade called the number and spoke with Trooper Muriel, who said he would get back to Mr. McDade. Instead of returning Mr. McDade's telephone call, Trooper Muriel and Officer Collins showed up at the Bittman home in Waterford. From this point on, the chronological narrative diverges in as many directions as there were witnesses. Recall differs as to the time of day, who answered the door, who was present at the initial questioning, where people sat and various other details. All witnesses agreed that Trooper Muriel led the questioning and was the more aggressive of the two officers in the questioning of the defendant. Ms. Bittman, the homeowner, acknowledged that she knew that she did not have to let the officers into her home, yet testified that "she felt she had to." At no time did she or anyone else from Curt's "family" tell him to stop answering questions or say anything to the troopers about getting an attorney for Curt. Ms. Bittman testified she did not know that he could have an attorney and "she wasn't thinking about that." Trooper Muriel testified that the defendant's responses to the questions asked were appropriate, he never stopped answering the questions and he never asked for an attorney.
There was a time during the questioning at the Bittman home when Mr. McDade requested and was granted permission from the troopers to speak to Curt alone. Mr. McDade and the defendant left the dining room, went to another room in the home and spoke privately for about ten minutes.
The troopers wanted the defendant to come to Troop E for a statement. The troopers told Curt that they could transport him or, if he chose, his aunt could bring him. Ms. Bittman, Ms. Burgess and the defendant all claim that the troopers told Curt that his aunt could be with him for questioning if she brought him to Troop E. Mr. McDade recalled that the troopers said Ms. Bittman could "accompany Curt," and he assumed this meant that she could be present during questioning. Both troopers denied that any such promise was made to the defendant. The defendant claims that he told the troopers he would not go to Troop E "unless his aunt could be with him the whole time" and that Trooper Muriel said "okay."
Upon arrival at Troop E, Curt was taken by the troopers for questioning and, once again, the testimony is divergent. Ms. Bittman claims that she was shoved and the door slammed to prevent her from accompanying Curt into the interview room; Ms. Burgess had no recollection of any shoving or any slamming doors.
The documentary evidence shows that the defendant was given his Notice and Waiver of Rights at 3:41 p.m. on January 6, 2006. The defendant signed that form and initialed all rights that he had waived. (State's Exhibit I.) Seven minutes later, at 3:48 p.m., Trooper Muriel proceeded to take the defendant's statement which was completed at 5:30 p.m. That statement consists of a four-page document which the defendant signed on all four pages and initialed corrections on all four pages. (State's Exhibit 2.) The defendant claims he does not recall if the police read the notice and waiver to him, despite his having signed the same and having recognized his signature and initials. He further testified that he signed the Notice and Waiver of Rights after he gave his statement, despite the times listed on those documents, times which are contrary to the defendant's recollection. Trooper Collins testified that he was present in the room when Mr. Rivard had his rights read to him and when Curt signed off on those rights. He further testified that he did not recall or remember reading his statement or initialing his statement, but did recall signing it. The defendant also claims that the police told him what to write and what to sign, and he did what they asked because the officers promised him he would be charged with a lesser charge than the arson charge. He further testified that he did not remember what was true or false in his statement. Basically, Mr. Rivard testified that he told the officers what they wanted to hear.
Part of his inability to recall, according to Mr. Rivard, was that he had smoked a blunt immediately before the officers' arrival at the Bittman home that afternoon, and the marijuana might have been laced with illy. He claimed he had smoked it just prior to the officers arriving when he was walking around the residential neighborhood; smoking calmed him down, but also might have led him to hallucinate. Neither Trooper Muriel nor Trooper Collins observed the defendant acting under the influence of any substance throughout the course of their time with Mr. Rivard that day. Ms. Bittman testified that she had no knowledge as to whether Curt was using drugs that day; she testified that she did not think he did because drugs and alcohol were not allowed in her home. Ms. Burgess testified that she thought Curt smoked marijuana that day because his eyes were bloodshot.
The defendant had been previously diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder and, in the past, had taken medication for that diagnosis. Mr. Whalley, the defendant's DCF caseworker, testified that the defendant had not been prescribed any medication at the time he went AWOL from his assigned DCF foster home in October of 2005. He also testified that the defendant had been consistently noncompliant with his medication when prescribed in the past. There was no evidence before the Court that the defendant had any other mental health issue which affected his ability to comprehend or made him manipulable.
In sum, the defendant only had two clear recollections of the events of that day: first, that the troopers told him his aunt could be present during the questioning and claims that he asked for her three times during the interrogation; and second, that if he gave a statement, the gist of which the officers would engineer, he would be charged with a less serious offense. Both Trooper Muriel and Trooper Collins denied any promises being made to Mr. Rivard, either allowing his aunt to accompany him in the interview or telling him that he would receive a lesser charge in exchange for his statement. Trooper Collins stated that when he took Curt from the lobby at Troop E to the interview room, he never asked that his aunt be present nor refused to go with the officers. During the interview, Trooper Collins acknowledged that he was "in and out" of the interview room attending to other matters and not present for the entire time that Trooper Muriel took the defendant's statement.
It should be noted that based on the documents in evidence, the interview and the taking of the defendant's statement lasted a little less than two hours, from 3:41 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. The interview room was small, with no windows, but with a bathroom. According to testimony, at the start of the interview, the defendant was given a soda. Neither officer detected any odor of alcohol or marijuana on the defendant. According to Trooper Muriel, the defendant was told he was free to leave. Neither officer was armed with his service revolver during the interview. The door was closed, but it was not locked. At no time during the interview did the defendant ask to stop answering questions and never asked for an attorney.
After the statement was given (State's Exhibit 2), the defendant was returned to the lobby and went home. Ms. Bittman said that was around 11:00 p.m., but the evidence shows that it was some time shortly after 5:30 p.m. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006, the defendant voluntarily returned to Troop E. At that time, he was given a notice of rights which he signed, albeit in the incorrect place on the form. (State's Exhibit 3.) Trooper Collins handed the notice of rights to the defendant, and he testified that the defendant read the notice and signed it. The defendant was then placed in custody. Later that same day, Mr. Rivard provided a second statement which started at 3:40 p.m. and completed at 3:50 p.m., which he also signed. Prior to Rivard's giving of that statement, Trooper Collins read to him the top half of the statement form which reads in pertinent part: ". . . make the following statement, without fear, threat, or promise, knowing that it may be used against me in court." (State's Exhibit 4.) Trooper Collins said that the defendant responded, "I want to tell the truth." Trooper Collins further stated that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence; there was no odor of alcohol or marijuana. He further testified that neither he nor any other authority made any promise to the defendant in exchange for the second statement nor were any threats made by him or anyone else. (State's Exhibit 4.) The defendant was not provided with a second Notice and Waiver of Rights prior to giving the second statement.
As to this second statement, the defendant once again claims that the police told him what to say and what to sign. Mr. Rivard claims he signed the second statement because he thought he could get a lesser charge.
II. DISCUSSION
Defense counsel's claim on the Motion to Suppress is twofold. First, he contends that the defendant's statements were not voluntary as they were obtained by means of illegitimate promises, overbearing behavior and threats, and thus, were taken in violation of his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, counsel contends that the defendant's second statement was stale, since it was several days after his first statement, and the defendant should have been given his Miranda warnings once again.
A. Voluntary Nature of the Defendant's Statements
Turning to the defendant's first argument that the statements were not voluntary, our case law is explicit that even if a statement was made after a valid waiver of the right to remain silent, it would still be inadmissible as a Fourteenth Amendment denial of due process of law if the statement was not made voluntarily. State v. Shifflet, 199 Conn. 718, 726 (1986). "In order to be voluntary a confession must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice of the maker." CT Page 7010 State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn.App. 591, 596 (2007), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 (2007), citing Shafer v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 290 (2006). "The question of voluntariness is one of fact for determination by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion, subject to the constitutional standards of due process." State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 452 (1987). "[T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined." Shifflet, supra, at 727 (citations omitted).
The rule requiring that confessions be voluntary is derived from constitutional due process requirements under both the federal and state constitutions. The rule requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 410 (1996). This standard was recently revisited and affirmed in State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 158 (2007), where our Supreme Court was asked to overrule the standard articulated in State v. James in favor of the more stringent burden of beyond a reasonable doubt; the Court declined to do so. "[T]he state bears the burden of persuasion on the voluntariness issue and must convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession sought to be admitted was voluntarily given." See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972). (The United States Supreme Court determined that the federal constitution requires the voluntariness of a confession to be established by a preponderance of the evidence.)
This does end the Court's inquiry, however. Even if the required warnings have been given, that by itself is not enough to assure that the statement was made voluntarily. The Court must ascertain that the person who agrees to speak has not been coerced to do so and speaks against his/her will. "The test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined." State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 418 (1999). Factors which must be considered include: the subject's maturity, education, physical condition and mental health; lack of any advice as to the defendant's constitutional rights; the location and duration of the detention; the intensity and prolonged nature of the interrogation; and the presence of physical punishment, inclusive of lack of food or sleep. State v. Pinder, supra at 419. See also State v. Perez, 218 Conn. 714, 728 (1999) (applying totality of the circumstances test). It should also be noted that federal law differs from Connecticut law. Under the federal due process clause the defendant must establish that his lack of voluntariness was the result of improper police activity. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). The Connecticut court has yet to determine whether the Connecticut Constitution requires improper police misconduct for a statement to be involuntary. State v. Byrd, 233 Conn. 517, 533 (1995).
In applying the law to the facts of this case, this Court does not find that either of the defendant's statements were involuntary. The defendant claims that they were not voluntary because they were made based on two promises: first, that Ms. Bittman, the defendant's aunt, could accompany him into the interrogation; and second, that if he cooperated and gave a statement, his charges would be reduced. As to the defendant's first claim, the only evidence before the Court regarding the presence of Ms. Bittman during Mr. Rivard's questioning at Troop E is from the testimony of the defendant, Ms. Bittman and Ms. Burgess. The defendant claims he recalls very little from that day, but is very clear that he remembers this. The Court finds the defendant's selective memory a convenience to him at best and a fabrication at most. Ms. Bittman and Ms. Burgess also both say that the troopers said Ms. Bittman could be with the defendant once he arrived at Troop E. The Court finds their testimony no more credible. The credible testimony from the defendant's side came from Mr. McDade who originally stated on cross examination that the troopers told his mother that she could "accompany" the defendant to Troop E, and that he "took it to mean" that she could be with Curt when he was questioned.
Mr. McDade changed this testimony on redirect and said he heard the troopers tell his mother, Ms. Bittman, that she could be with Curt when he was questioned.
Both Trooper Muriel and Trooper Collins testified that no such promise was ever made to the defendant. This Court had an opportunity to listen to and view and observe the demeanor of each of the witnesses. Based on those observations, the Court finds the officers to be the more credible witnesses. The Court believes Mr. McDade's testimony on cross examination that the troopers told Ms. Bittman that she could "accompany" her nephew to Troop E and that she, Ms. Burgess, and the defendant assumed that meant Ms. Bittman could be with Curt during questioning. Once they arrived at the station and it became apparent that Ms. Bittman could not accompany Curt, neither his aunt on the defendant's behalf nor the defendant himself refused to proceed to the interview. No one asked that Curt have an attorney at that time. During the course of the interview, Curt answered questions, signed his Notice of Waiver of Rights, gave a statement, signed the statement and even corrected it and initialed those corrections in a number of places.
The defendant also claims that he provided the first statement given on January 6, 2006, because he was promised that he would be charged with a lesser offense (reckless burning in lieu of arson) if he cooperated. Again, the only evidence before the Court as to that alleged promise comes from the defendant's testimony. The Court listened carefully to that testimony and observed the defendant throughout the course of it; the Court does not find his testimony credible. The defense would like the Court to believe that the defendant, a naive, terrified and young boy under the influence of marijuana, possibly laced with illy, was wrested from his aunt's home in Waterford, taken to Troop E, isolated and made promises. As characterized by defense counsel, "Mr. Rivard is a troubled young man whom the gods have scorned." (Defendant's Memorandum of Law, p. 11.)
This Court is sympathetic to Mr. Rivard's loss of his biological mother and apparent undependability of his biological father, but defense counsel's characterization of his client is not what the evidence shows. The defendant was 16 1/2 years old when questioned by the police in January of 2006. While this Court concedes that the defendant was young in chronological years, the evidence does not confirm that the defendant was naive and terrified. In fact, the defendant is "wise beyond his years." The defendant has a wealth of "street smarts," survival skills and wherewithal to take care of himself. He was able to escape the protective supervision of DCF, his statutory guardian, leave the State of Connecticut, take a train to the State of Florida, return by plane to Connecticut, and coordinate a living arrangement with a family member whom he had not seen in over six years. Mr. Rivard accomplished all of this without any apparent financial resources.
The evidence does not convince this Court that the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time he gave his statement. He testified that he had just smoked a blunt prior to the officers' arrival at his aunt's home. Despite that, neither Trooper Muriel nor Trooper Collins smelled any aroma of marijuana during any of the time they were with him. His aunt testified that she didn't think the defendant used drugs; she did not allow them in her house. The troopers stated that all of the defendant's answers and actions on the day in question were appropriate.
The defendant was not isolated and, in the Court's opinion, he was not intimidated. The defendant was questioned at troop E for a period of time which constituted less than two hours. The questioning began about 3:48 p.m. and finished at 5:30 p.m. This time period followed the normally accustomed lunch time and preceded the normal dinner time. There was a bathroom attached to the room in which he was questioned. Before questioning began, he was brought a soda. While the room was admittedly small, both troopers were not in the room together the whole time; neither trooper was armed.
On January 11, 2006, when the defendant gave his second statement, he wants the Court to believe that he was promised lesser charges if he cooperated. Mr. Rivard turned himself in, was handed his Notice of Rights and Bail (State's Exhibit 3), looked at that notice and read it and then signed it. The defendant was processed, printed, photographed and put in a cell. There is no evidence whatsoever that he was under the influence of any illicit substance. Trooper Collins noted no odor of drugs or alcohol and stated that the defendant acted and answered appropriately. The defendant did not ask for an attorney. No promises were made to the defendant by Collins or by anyone else to his knowledge. No threats were made to the defendant. The defendant said he wanted to tell the truth and amend his original statement. The defendant testified that even though he remembers this statement (State's Exhibit 4), he claims the police told him what to write and told him what to sign. This Court does not find the defendant's testimony credible.
In sum, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the state has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that both of Mr. Rivard's statements to the troopers, the first statement on January 6, 2006, and the second on January 11, 2006, were voluntary.
B. Staleness of Defendant's Second Statement
The defendant argues that the second statement (State's Exhibit 4), which was taken on January 11, 2006, five days after his first statement (State's Exhibit 2) is stale due to the time lapse between the first and second statements, and that because of this lapse, the defendant should have been given his Miranda warnings again, prior to the taking of the second statement. "The courts have generally rejected a per se rule as to when a suspect must be readvised of his rights after the passage of time or a change in questioners." State v. Marshall, 83 Conn.App. 418, 426, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 904 (2004), citing United States v. Andaverde, 64F.3d 1305, 1312 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1164 (1996); see also Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 49 (1982). "Courts have held that the mere passage of time between when a defendant is advised of his Miranda rights and when he gives a statement does not necessarily render the confession involuntary, even if the defendant is not readvised of his rights prior to giving a statement." United States v. Banner, 356 F.3d 478, 480-81 (2d Cir, 2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom; Forbes v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005); see also Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 950 (1976).
There is no requirement that an accused be continually reminded of his rights once he has intelligently waived them. State v. Marshall, supra at 426, citing United States v. Anthony, 474 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1973). In this case, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights on January 6, 2006. (State's Exhibit 1.) He then proceeded to give his initial statement to the police. (State's Exhibit 2.) On January 11, 2006, the defendant was taken into custody. At that time, he was given his Notice of Rights and Bail. (State's Exhibit 3.) He then gave a second statement amending his first statement. (State's Exhibit 4.) The initial Miranda warnings given to the defendant were adequate, rendering new warnings unnecessary. Trooper Muriel had reviewed the defendant's rights with him to ensure that he understood them and, subsequently, the defendant signed and initialed the waiver form, thus, waiving his rights. At that time, there is no evidence that the defendant asked questions regarding his constitutional rights during the course of the giving of this second statement. See State v. Marshall, supra at 427. There is no evidence that the defendant had any difficulty understanding instructions. Accordingly, this Court finds that the mere lapse of time is not sufficient to negate the validity of the defendant's second statement.
III. CONCLUSION
The defendant, Curt Rivard, Jr., contests the validity of both his statements provided to the authorities and moves to have them suppressed. After having weighed the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds that the state has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's statements were voluntary, given after a proper and clearly understood waiver of his rights. No credible promises or threats were made to induce the defendant to give each of these statements. The lapse of time between the advisement of Miranda rights and the second statement does not compromise the admissibility of the second statement, nor make it involuntary.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.