Opinion
No. 107,762.
2013-04-5
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Diane Kay RIDEAU, Appellant.
Appeal from Seward District Court; Clint B. Peterson, Judge. J. Patrick Lawless, Jr., of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Don L. Scott, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Seward District Court; Clint B. Peterson, Judge.
J. Patrick Lawless, Jr., of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Don L. Scott, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BUSER, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In accordance with a plea agreement, Diane Kay Rideau pled no contest to possession of drug paraphernalia. She moved to withdraw her plea before sentencing, but the district court denied the motion after a nonevidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing with directions to reconsider Rideau's motion.
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Kansas filed a three-count criminal complaint against Rideau, charging her with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and no tax stamp. According to an affidavit, the charges arose when Rideau was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on U.S. Highway 54 following a traffic violation. The district court appointed counsel for Rideau, and she waived her preliminary hearing.
When Rideau appeared for arraignment, the prosecutor and Rideau's counsel announced the plea agreement. This agreement provided that Rideau would “enter a plea to the amended complaint, which charges possession of drug paraphernalia. The State will, then, dismiss the remaining counts.... [T]here's no agreement as to sentencing.” The district court accepted Rideau's no contest plea, finding it was “freely and voluntarily made, with a full understanding of its consequences, not out of ignorance, fear, inadvertence, or coercion.” Rideau was adjudged guilty.
The presentence investigation report showed that Rideau had one prior person felony, two prior nonperson felonies, and 11 prior nonperson misdemeanors. Her criminal record began in 1978, with numerous convictions for misdemeanor theft in Kansas City, Missouri. This lengthy record placed her in criminal history category C, with presumptive prison as the punishment for her present conviction.
Rideau moved to withdraw her plea before sentencing. She asserted an “understanding of both parties” that she “would receive probation,” and she asserted further that she had “entered into a plea to get out of jail in order to obtain life saving medical treatment.” She pointed out that the driver of the vehicle had “accepted full responsibility,” and she claimed generally that “[t]he facts of the case do not support the ... conviction.”
The district court considered Rideau's motion to withdraw plea immediately prior to the sentencing hearing. Rideau's counsel advised the district court that he had believed Rideau would be eligible for probation based on her criminal history. Counsel said that “[w]hen [Rideau] entered into this plea, she did so with the intent to get out of jail. Her health was failing her. And in fact, immediately upon leaving jail, she was rushed into the ER.” Counsel alleged Rideau had kidney failure but “was ... denied treatment while in jail, and she knew she needed to get out.”
Defense counsel also claimed that the driver of the vehicle “told the judge upon first appearance and other moments that my client ... had no knowledge of the drugs.” Counsel asserted generally that the “facts of the case ... do not support her inprisonment.” Rideau's counsel concluded by stating his “fear that if we proceed with sentencing, this would be a miscarriage of justice simply because she was unable to bond out because of her indigent status, and I believe an innocent person took a plea to get medical treatment.” The State declined to comment on the motion.
The district judge said he would take the matter under advisement to review caselaw “and other facts,” adding, “I am going to order [Rideau] submit to a UA at this time pending my decision.” The district court placed the hearing “in recess waiting to get the results of the UA,” but before leaving the district court went back on the record to receive this statement from Rideau's counsel: “My client informs me that she does not need to take a UA, that she would not pass it.” When asked by the district court, counsel specified that Rideau would test positive for marijuana. The district court then stated, “Okay, thank you. Motion to withdraw plea denied.”
The district court then proceeded to sentencing. Speaking on her behalf, Rideau claimed “I'm not guilty” and explained she was “dirty” because “I don't do nothing but stay at home and take care of my son. I haven't been in any trouble. And my pleasure is just smoking a joint a week.” After discussing these allegations with Rideau, the district judge stated:
“For whatever reason, you came to court ... and entered a no-contest plea to ... this charge. I went over with you what the consequences of that plea [were], and you indicated that you understood what the consequences were. If you entered that no-contest plea just so you could get out of jail, that was a very foolish thing to do, but you did it. You did it knowingly, and you did it voluntarily, and now you have to suffer the consequences of your actions.”
The district court subsequently filed a journal entry. After the recitation of appearances, the journal entry read:
“[Rideau] enters a motion to withdraw her plea. State stands silent. [Rideau] was ordered to take a U.A. before the Court decides whether to grant the ... motion. [Rideau] admitted she had smoked marijuana and would test positive for THC.
“THEREFORE, the Court denies motion to withdraw.
“IT IS SO ORDERED, motion denied.”
Rideau appeals.
Analysis
Rideau contends the “district court provided no legal analysis whatsoever” but “relied entirely upon the results of UA testing.” She claims this was the wrong legal standard and argues in a separate issue that she did not “knowingly enter[ ] her no contest plea.” The State does not address the district court's apparently exclusive reliance on Rideau's admission that she would fail a drug test.
“It is a fundamental principle that a guilty plea must be freely, knowingly, and understandingly made to be valid. [Citation omitted.]” Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 356, 172 P.3d 10 (2007). Hence “[a] guilty plea may be withdrawn for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court at any time before the sentence is adjudged.” State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, Syl. ¶ 1, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012); see K.S.A.2012 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1).
“ ‘Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.’ “ Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 836 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 [2011],cert. denied132 S.Ct. 1594 [2012] ).
Stated another way, while “[g]enerally, a district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion, [citation omitted,]” an “application of the wrong legal standard” is a “particular type of abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Garcia, 295 Kan. 53, 61, 283 P.3d 165 (2012). “To the extent we [must] review whether the district court's discretionary determination was guided by erroneous legal conclusions, we exercise unlimited review. [Citation omitted.]” 295 Kan. at 61.
With regard to the legal standard, “Kansas courts generally consider the three ‘ Edgar factors' when evaluating whether a defendant has presented the requisite good cause.” Garcia, 295 Kan. at 62–63 (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 [2006] ). These factors are: “(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.” State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511, 231 P.3d 563 (2010). “While the Edgar factors are ‘viable benchmarks for judicial discretion,’ they should not be mechanically applied and should not be relied on to the ‘exclusion of other factors.’ “ Garcia, 295 Kan. at 63 (quoting Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 512).
In the present case, the district court made no mention of the Edgar factors. Rideau cites Aguilar in this respect, but we think Garcia provides better guidance. In Garcia, our Supreme Court reversed a district court which cited a Kansas case dealing with allegations of innocence and discussed that factor but did not cite other cases clarifying that such an allegation was not required. Despite the district court's discussion of the Edgar factors, our Supreme Court was not “reassured enough” to “discount or disregard the possibly inappropriate emphasis” on the case dealing with allegations of innocence. 295 Kan. at 63. Because “the district judge's decision may have been guided by an erroneous legal conclusion,” the “uncertainty” was enough to “reverse the district judge's denial ... and remand for another hearing [to] apply the appropriate legal standards.” 295 Kan. at 63–64.
Because the district court in the present case did not mention the Edgar factors or any similar factors, we are uncertain about the legal standard the district court applied below. By all appearances, the district court relied upon Rideau's admission that she had used marijuana in the days leading up to the hearing as the primary rationale for denial of her motion to withdraw plea. Neither of the parties cites a case where an admission to using drugs in the days leading up to a hearing was relevant to a determination of the merits on a motion to withdraw plea. We are unaware of any such legal precedent.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of Rideau's motion to withdraw plea and remand for an evidentiary hearing on her motion. In the interest of fairness and to avoid any claim of partiality upon remand, the motion to withdraw plea should be reconsidered by a newly assigned district judge. At this hearing, the district judge should consider the relevant Edgar factors and any other relevant factors relating to the merits of the motion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.