Summary
holding that, where the prostitution statute provides for specific sentencing “[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary,” the trial court lacks the power to grant a deferred acceptance of guilty plea in prostitution cases
Summary of this case from State v. Casugay-BadiangOpinion
NO. 8627
January 28, 1983
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, HONOLULU DIVISION HONORABLE MELVIN K. SOONG, JUDGE.
LUM, ACTING C.J., NAKAMURA, PADGETT AND HAYASHI, JJ., AND RETIRED JUSTICE MENOR, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
Keith M. Kiuchi, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for appellant.
Arthur E. Ross, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and John M. Conte, law student intern, on the brief, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a conviction of prostitution. A single point is raised on appeal. Appellant pled guilty to the charge of prostitution and her attorney made an oral motion for a deferred acceptance of guilty plea under § 853-1, HRS. The trial court held that under § 712-1200(4), he could not grant such a plea. Subsection 4 was added by Act 110 of the Session Laws of 1981. It provides:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a person convicted of committing the offense of prostitution shall be sentenced as follows:
(a) For the first offense, a fine of $500. . . .
Since the last amendment to § 853-1, HRS, was by § 42 of Act 232 of the Session Laws of 1980, we think that § 853-1, HRS, is "any other law to the contrary" and that the court below therefore correctly construed § 712-1200(4) as taking away his power to grant deferred acceptance of guilty pleas in prostitution cases.
Affirmed.