Opinion
No. CR09-239695
June 1, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
The court previously made an oral ruling on the motion from the bench, and indicated that it would issue a written decision at a later time.
Before the court is the defendant's motion to suppress evidence, dated March 10, 2011. The state filed a memorandum in opposition thereto, dated March 16, 2011. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on March 16, 2011, and the court finds the following facts.
On December 7, 2008, at approximately 7:30 p.m., members of the Bridgeport police department responded to the scene of a shooting in the vicinity of 135-137 Ash Street in Bridgeport. They found two individuals within a car at that location, each of whom had been shot numerous times. One victim, Desmond McFarland, was dead and the second victim, Debbie Brown, was mortally wounded and died soon thereafter.
The police immediately began an investigation into the shooting deaths in an effort to determine and locate the person responsible for the killings. The investigation was conducted by several members of the detective bureau including Detective Christopher Barona, who had arrived shortly after the shootings. Barona spoke to Cheryl Wilson, who stated that she and Debbie Brown were roommates residing at 135 Ash Street. Wilson told Barona that Brown had had a tumultuous relationship with a former boyfriend that she knew as "Jimmie," or "Donald Davis," that Davis had been following Brown and calling her at home, and that Brown was terrified of him. Wilson was also able to provide Barona with Davis' phone number, which she was able to retrieve from the home phone on Ash Street. That phone number was (203) 526-2139.
The police were able to determine that Sprint Nextel (Sprint) was the provider of phone service for this number. As part of the investigation, at approximately 7:30 p.m. Detective Joseph Sherbo contacted Sprint, and he faxed it a request for certain information regarding this number. Sherbo used a form provided by Sprint captioned "Mandatory Information For Exigent Circumstance Requests." Sherbo certified on the form that he had been granted authority by the Bridgeport police department "to determine and declare an exigent situation involving . . . immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person . . ." and that the exigency was because the customer of the phone number was a "suspect in [a] double homicide . . . ongoing danger." Sherbo requested that Sprint provide the police with "subscriber information, call detail records (within the last week)" and "precision location of mobile device (GPS Location)."
In response to the request, at approximately 10:30 p.m. Sprint faxed the police information that identified Donald Davis as the subscriber of the phone number, with an address of 2238 Haviland Avenue in the Bronx. Sprint also provided call records for the one full week prior to December 7. Based upon the subscriber information, Detective Barona and other officers went to the Haviland Avenue address in the Bronx, arriving there at about 1:00 a.m. on December 8. They met an individual, Mark Stewart, who lived at that address. Stewart stated that he was Davis' friend and that, although Davis did not live there, he had given him permission to have his phone bills sent to Stewart's Haviland Avenue home. Stewart also provided the officers with Sprint billing statements in Davis' name. These statements showed three phone numbers listed to Davis. These were (203) 526-2139, the number which the police had obtained previously, and two additional numbers, (325) 726-9741 and (623) 340-7204. Stewart also took the officers to an apartment building on Castle Hill Avenue in the Bronx where Stewart said Davis lived, although Stewart did not know which apartment belonged to Davis. After a short while there without sighting Davis, the officers returned to Bridgeport.
In the course of the investigation, the police also found a woman's pocketbook in the car in which Brown and McFarland had been shot. In the pocketbook there was a written application for relief from abuse. Attached to it was a handwritten affidavit in support of the application. The application and affidavit were undated, the affidavit was unsigned, and there was no indication they had been presented to a court for consideration. However, the applicant was named as "Debbie Salomie Brown" of 135 Ash Street in Bridgeport. The respondent was named as "Donald Davis a/k/a Mark Stewart" of 2238 Haviland Avenue, Bronx, New York, having a telephone number of (203) 526-2139. The application also represented that Davis was a former spouse of Brown, and a person with whom she had a dating relationship and had cohabited.
Gen. Stat. § 53a-217c.
Barona and other officers returned to the Castle Hill apartment building later that same day, December 8, around 9:00 p.m. This time they saw Davis. The officers approached him, and Davis made certain oral statements to them. Davis was not arrested for the Bridgeport homicides at this juncture, and the police left after talking with him.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Barona identified the defendant as the person known to be Davis.
The investigation into the shootings continued. On December 11, 2008 the police applied for a search and seizure warrant for Sprint to produce all cell phone records for the three phone numbers, for the period between December 1 and December 11. The application sought records of subscriber information and for originating and terminating call numbers, including cell site activation. It also requested all text messages for these numbers for any period before and after December 11. The court granted the application and issued the warrant on the same date. Although a signed return or inventory was not produced at the hearing, both counsel agree that this warrant was served on Sprint, and that Sprint produced the records, including text messages involving the phone numbers.
On December 4, 2009 the defendant, Sheldon Reynolds, was arrested for two counts of murder in violation of Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of Gen. Stat. § 29-35(a), in connection with the shooting deaths of Desmond McFarland and Debbie Brown on December 7, 2008. The defendant has moved to suppress "all illegally seized evidence and any evidence that was obtained as a direct consequence of that action, 1) [s]tatements of the defendant that were made to police in New York on December 8, 2008; 2) [e]vidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant dated December 11, 2008."
The defendant has raised several grounds in support of his motion to suppress. The crux of the defendant's argument, simply stated, is that the information obtained from Sprint on December 7, 2008 (in particular, the subscriber's name and address) was done so in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution, the federal "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act" (the "Stored Communications Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and also in violation of Gen. Stat. § 54-47aa. The defendant claims that any information the police received by going to the Haviland Avenue address and in speaking to Mark Stewart concerning the defendant's additional phone numbers and his whereabouts, as well as the use of such information to obtain a search and seizure warrant for Sprint records on December 11, were all tainted by the primary illegality of receiving the Sprint records on December 7, and should be suppressed. The court will take up the defendant's arguments in turn, and will state further findings of facts as may be necessary to address the claims of the parties.
CT Page 12700
I. THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
The defendant initially claims that the production of his subscriber information and the logs of dialed and received phone calls, which production was made by Sprint to the police on December 7, 2008, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution."The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures . . ." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). The Fourth Amendment ". . . protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). "[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable . . ." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). "The ultimate question . . . is whether ones claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-153, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
In the present case, there is no evidence, direct or otherwise, that any information divulged by Sprint interfered with a possessory interest that the defendant may have had in that information. Therefore, there can be no claim of an unlawful seizure; the only relevant inquiry is whether there was an unlawful search.
An individual does not have a constitutionally-protected expectation of privacy in basic subscriber information and phone logs which are in the possession of a telephone carrier. In United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 167 (9th Cir. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 801, 94 S.Ct. 16, 38 L.Ed.2d 38 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S.Ct. 1945, 40 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974), the court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement officials obtained the names and addresses of the subscribers to certain numbers from a telephone company, prior to the issuance of a subpoena. The records in question included toll and billing records showing the dates and times of long-distance telephone calls, and the numbers of the calling and receiving telephones. "Telephone subscribers are fully aware that records will be made of their toll calls." United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 542 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879, 90 S.Ct. 150, 24 L.Ed.2d 136 (1969), rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 929, 90 S.Ct. 897, 25 L.Ed.2d 110 (1970). The records do not represent ". . . anything other than records normally kept in the ordinary course of business on all customers' phones . . ." and, as such, they do not enjoy fourth amendment protection. Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1044 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848, 91 S.Ct. 47, 27 L.Ed.2d 85 (1970). While there is generally an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment that attaches to the content of a telephone conversation, it does not attach to the fact that a conversation took place. United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1971).
In the present case, any subscriber information that the defendant may have provided to Sprint, and which Sprint provided to the police, has no Fourth Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has emphasized that ". . . the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). "It is well settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information . . ." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). Likewise, our own Supreme Court has noted the distinction, for purposes of fourth amendment analysis, between information contained within an individual's cell phone, and information possessed by the cell phone carrier. "[W]e understand the cases to stand for the proposition that the government can obtain information that the defendant has provided to a third party from that third party without implicating the defendant's fourth amendment rights. For example, . . . if the police had obtained the defendant's cell phone number . . . from the cell phone carrier, there would have been no fourth amendment violation . . . because the defendant could have no reasonable expectation that . . . the carrier would not reveal the information." State v. Boyd, 295 Conn. 707, 723, 992 A.2d 1071 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1474, 179 L.Ed.2d 314 (2011).
The defendant had no constitutionally-protected privacy interest in records maintained by Sprint relating to subscriber information and phone logs. Therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the disclosure of information made by Sprint to the police on December 7, 2008.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY CLAIMS A. THE "STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT," 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
The defendant also claims that the disclosure of information by Sprint violated provisions of the federal Stored Communications Act. More specifically, the defendant argues that the disclosure was unlawful because there was not a court order which authorized its release. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). The state concedes that the Bridgeport police did not obtain any compulsory process of the nature described therein, which would have thereby required Sprint to produce the information. The state maintains, however, that the information was lawfully disclosed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4). It is the state's contention that Sprint, based upon the information within the "Mandatory Information For Exigent Circumstance Request" submitted by the police, did ". . . in good faith, believe that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person require[d] disclosure without delay of information relating to the emergency . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4). The defendant claims that there was not an adequate basis for disclosure under this subsection.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) states:
(c) Records Concerning Electronic Communication Service or Remote Computing Service —
(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the governmental entity —
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure;
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 of this title); or
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).
(2) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose to a governmental entity the —
(A) name;
(B) address;
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations;
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number), of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under paragraph (1).
(3) A governmental entity receiving records or information under this subsection is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer.
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) states:
(c) Exceptions for Disclosure of Customer Records —
A provider [of an electronic communication service to the public] may divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2)) —
CT Page 12707
. . . (4) to a governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of information relating to the emergency . . .
[Brackets added.]
It is not necessary for this court to decide whether the requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) were, in fact, met. This is because the remedies for any nonconstitutional violation of the Stored Communications Act do not include suppression of evidence that has been garnered by law enforcement from an electronic communication service.
The provisions of the Stored Communications Act "appl[y] to the service provider and not to the government. See Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 693 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[t]he language of § 2703(c) does not prohibit any governmental conduct, and thus a governmental entity may not violate that subsection by simply accessing information improperly")." Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 339 (6th Cir. 2001) (civil action for claimed violation of § 2703(c)). Further, the act provides that a person aggrieved by any violation thereof may pursue a civil action against the person or entity which engaged in that violation. The aggrieved party may obtain relief of an equitable or declaratory nature, as well as damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) and (b). "The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter [Chapter 121] are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter." [Brackets added.] 18 U.S.C. § 2708. Therefore, ". . . exclusion of the evidence is not an available remedy for a violation of the [Electronic Communications Privacy Act] see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2708. The remedy for such a violation, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2707, lies in a civil action against the person or entity who violated the statute (citation omitted)." [Brackets and footnote added.] United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F.Sup.2d 1271, 1279 (D.Kan. 2007). The exclusionary rule is not a remedy for a non-constitutional violation of the Stored Communications Act. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1051, 123 S.Ct. 2120, 155 L.Ed.2d 1095 (2003); United States v. Ferguson, 508 F.Sup.2d 7, 10 (D.C. 2007).
Section 1 of Pub.L. 99-508 provided that: "This Act [enacting sections 1367, 2521, 2701 to 2710, 3117, and 3121 to 3126 of this title, amending sections 2232, 2511 to 2513, and 2516 to 2520 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 2701 and 3121 of this title] may be cited as the `Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.'"
"The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (`ECPA') amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, commonly known as the federal wiretap law. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub.L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1999). The ECPA was divided into Title I, commonly known as the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510- 2522, and Title II, commonly known as the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2711." United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 200 (1st Cir. 2004), different result reached on other grounds after rehearing en banc, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
The Wiretap Act pertains to the interception of wire, oral and electronic communications during the process of transmission. These modes of communication are defined separately. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. No part of the contents of any wire or oral communications, or of evidence derived therefrom, may be received in evidence in any federal or state trial or other proceeding, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of the provisions of Ch. 119. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. The remedy provided for by § 2515 does not include intercepted electronic communications. The Stored Communications Act pertains both to the disclosure of the contents of wire or electronic communications while they are in electronic storage with, inter alia, providers of electronic communication services, and to records and other information relating to a service subscriber.
Finally, the record supports a finding that the Bridgeport police acted in good-faith in the manner in which they obtained information from Sprint on December 7. They contacted Sprint in the near-immediate aftermath of their discovery of the homicides. They complied with Sprint's directive to complete and submit the request for information. They accurately represented that the subscriber of the cell phone number provided to them was a "suspect in [a] double homicide . . ." The precise meaning of "ongoing danger" may be somewhat less clear, but it is not unfounded. Good-faith reliance by the authorities on the Stored Communications Act has been held sufficient to defeat application of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 292 (6th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, there was no violation of the Stored Communications Act by the police regarding the disclosure of information made by Sprint on December 7, 2008.
B. EX PARTE COURT ORDER, GEN. STAT. § 54-47aa
The defendant's final claim is that the Bridgeport police received the information from Sprint on December 7, 2008, without first obtaining a court order under Gen. Stat. § 54-47aa.
Gen. Stat. § 54-47aa states the following in relevant part:
Sec. 54-47aa. Ex parte court order to compel disclosure of certain telephone and Internet records.
(a) For the purposes of this section:
1) "Basic subscriber information" means: (A) Name, (B) address, (C) local and long distance telephone connection records or records of session times and durations, (D) length of service, including start date, and types of services utilized, (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any assigned Internet protocol address, and (F) means and source of payment for such service, including any credit card or bank account number;
(2) "Call-identifying information" means dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber or customer by means of any equipment, facility or service of a telecommunications carrier;
(3) "Electronic communication service" means "electronic communication service" as defined in 18 USC 2510, as amended from time to time;
(4) "Law enforcement official" means the Chief State's Attorney, a state's attorney, an inspector with the Division of Criminal Justice, a sworn member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or a sworn member of an organized local police department;
(5) "Remote computing service" means "remote computing service" as defined in section 18 USC 2711, as amended from time to time; and
(6) "Telecommunications carrier" means "telecommunications carrier" as defined in 47 USC 1001, as amended from time to time.
(b) A law enforcement official may request an ex parte order from a judge of the Superior Court to compel (1) a telecommunications carrier to disclose call-identifying information pertaining to a subscriber or customer, or (2) a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose basic subscriber information pertaining to a subscriber or customer. The judge shall grant such order if the law enforcement official states a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed or that exigent circumstances exist and such call-identifying or basic subscriber information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. The order shall state upon its face the case number assigned to such investigation, the date and time of issuance and the name of the judge authorizing the order. The law enforcement official shall have any ex parte order issued pursuant to this subsection signed by the authorizing judge within forty-eight hours or not later than the next business day, whichever is earlier.
(c) A telecommunications carrier shall disclose call-identifying information and a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose basic subscriber information to a law enforcement official when an order is issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
(d) Not later than forty-eight hours after the issuance of an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the law enforcement official shall mail notice of the issuance of such order to the subscriber or customer whose call-identifying information or basic subscriber information is the subject of such order, except that such notification may be delayed for a period of up to ninety days upon the execution of a written certification of such official to the judge who authorized the order that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the order may result in (1) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual, (2) flight from prosecution, (3) destruction of or tampering with evidence, (4) intimidation of potential witnesses, or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing the investigation. The law enforcement official shall maintain a true copy of such certification. During such ninety-day period, the law enforcement official may request the court to extend such period of delayed notification. Such period may be extended beyond ninety days only upon approval of the court.
The Stored Communications Act states that a provider of an electronic communication service may divulge (§ 2702(c)) or be required to disclose (§ 2703(c)) a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer to a "governmental entity." For purposes of the act, "governmental entity" is defined as "a department or agency of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4). Therefore, state and local law enforcement agencies are included within the meaning of "governmental entity" under the act.
The Stored Communications Act provides several means by which a governmental entity may require the provider to disclose the customer record or information. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) through (E). One method is a court order for disclosure under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). However, this subsection specifically provides that it may not be utilized by a state governmental authority "if prohibited by the laws of such State . . ." Thus, Congress did not preempt the states from preserving or promulgating legislation which would disallow a court order otherwise permitted by § 2703(d). See Bansal v. Russ, 513 F.Sup.2d 264, 283 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Until more recently, Connecticut had no law which mirrored § 2703(d). State and local law enforcement could seek to compel the production of evidence only through the existing search warrant process. Gen. Stat. § 54-33a. However, in 2005 the legislature enacted Gen. Stat. § 54-47aa. This statute allows a "law enforcement official," § 54-47aa(4), to request an ex parte order from the Superior Court that requires an electronic communication service to disclose basic subscriber information.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) states in relevant part:
Requirements for Court Order-A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or
(c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State . . .
(Emphasis added.)
"Basic subscriber information," as defined in Gen. Stat. § 54-47aa(a)(1), is virtually identical to the information obtainable only with an administrative, grand jury or trial subpoena under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
The defendant's claim that the Bridgeport police were required to obtain an ex parte order under § 54-47aa, is incorrect. The statute unambiguously provides that a local law enforcement official ". . . may request an ex parte order . . . to compel . . ." basic subscriber information (emphasis added). The statute does not require the police to compel the information. Its use is clearly permissive. Should state or local authorities seek to compel an electronic communication service provider to produce information, § 54-47aa furnishes a means for doing so. The court should interpret the statute to give effect to its plain meaning where, as here, its language is clear and unambiguous. Bailey v. State, 65 Conn. App. 592, 603-04, 783 A.2d 491 (2001) (noting distinction between the permissive term "may" and the mandatory term "shall").
This result effectively leads the court full circle to conclude that Sprint's voluntary disclosure of information did not violate § 54-47aa. As stated previously, a local law enforcement agency is included within the meaning of a "governmental entity" under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4), and an electronic communication service may voluntarily disclose information to the agency under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c). Also, the Stored Communications Act existed prior to the time the legislature enacted § 54-47aa. The court's conclusion is supported by the principle that the legislature is presumed to know existing statutes, their judicial interpretation, and the effect that its action or nonaction could have on them. Enquist v. General Datacom, 218 Conn. 19, 34, 587 A.2d 1029 (1991); also, State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 719, 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1970). If the legislature had intended to proscribe 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) as it applied to state and local law enforcement agencies, it could have readily done so. It did not.
Again, the remedy of suppression is not available for a non-constitutional violation of the act (pg. 11, infra). The court need not address the claims that the state has advanced, in the alternative, for denying the motion to suppress. These claims are based upon the "inevitable discovery" exception and the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule.
Therefore, there was no violation of Gen. Stat. § 54-47aa relating to the information the police received from Sprint on December 7, 2008.
In conclusion, there was no constitutional or statutory violation by the police relating to the disclosure of information made to them by Sprint on December 7, 2008. Therefore, any information which may have been subsequently derived therefrom, as well as the use of such information to obtain a search and seizure warrant for Sprint records on December 11, 2008, were not the product of any such illegality.
The defendant's motion to suppress is denied.