Opinion
110,867.
12-12-2014
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Luke REED, Appellant.
Sean M.A. Hatfield and Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant. Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Sean M.A. Hatfield and Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., BRUNS and SCHROEDER, JJ.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Luke Reed appeals from the summary denial of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–260 and K.S.A. 60–2606. Reed contends that instead of denying the motion summarily, the district court should have appointed counsel and held a hearing. Reed also argues that the district court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nevertheless, we find that Reed filed his motion under civil statutes that do not apply to collateral attacks on a criminal conviction and sentence. Moreover, we find that the issue presented is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Thus, we affirm.
On September 15, 1982, a jury convicted Reed of rape and aggravated kidnapping. The sentencing court imposed consecutive sentences of 15 years to life imprisonment for the rape conviction and life imprisonment for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Reed's conviction on December 2, 1983. State v. Reed, No. 55,225, unpublished Supreme Court opinion filed December 2, 1983. Since that time, Reed has filed numerous motions challenging his convictions, including at least eight motions under K.S.A. 60–1507. See Reed v. State, No. 104,127, 2011 WL 3795471, at *1 (Kan.App.2011) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 293 Kan. 1107 (2012).
On April 3, 2013, Reed filed a motion for relief from final judgment under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–260 and K.S.A. 60–2606. Reed argued that he was entitled to relief from judgment because the jury instruction that discussed liability for crimes of another reduced the State's burden of proof. The State responded, arguing that the district court could summarily deny the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing because Reed could have raised the jury instruction issue on direct appeal. The State also argued that the district court did not have authority to grant relief in this criminal action using civil procedure statutes.
On June 11, 2013, the district court denied Reed's motion on a minute sheet order that stated: “Issue raised was issue from appeal and cannot be raised in this type of motion. Trial court has no authority to grant relief at this point.” Thereafter, Reed timely appealed to this court.
On appeal, we conclude that the district court properly denied Reed's motion for two reasons: (1) Reed filed his motion under civil procedure statutes that do not apply to collateral attacks on criminal convictions and sentences, and (2) the jury instruction issue he attempts to assert is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, 899, 326 P.3d 1083, 1086 (2014). Both of these defects present questions of law subject to unlimited review by this court. 299 Kan. at 899.
In Kingsley, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a district court's summary denial of a postconviction motion filed pursuant to K.S.A.2011 Supp. 60–260(b)(4), K.S.A.2011 Supp. 60–260(b)(6), and K.S.A. 60–2606. 299 Kan. at 898. Our Supreme Court found that K.S.A.2011 Supp. 60–260(b) and K.S.A. 60–2606 cannot be used by a criminal defendant to obtain postconviction relief. 299 Kan. at 899–900 (citing State v. Mitchell, 297 Kan. 118, 118–19, 298 P.3d 349 [2013] ). Moreover, in affirming the district court's decision, our Supreme Court noted that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata provides that ‘where an appeal is taken from the sentence imposed and/or a conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised, and those issues that could have been presented, but were not presented, are deemed waived .’ “ 299 Kan. at 901 (quoting State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, 140–41, 795 P.2d 362 [1990] ). As such, our Supreme Court concluded that “Kingsley's direct appeal from his convictions obviously involved the same parties, and it resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Further, the current action involves the same claims as those which were or could have been raised in his direct appeal.” 299 Kan. 901.
Accordingly, we conclude that the procedure Reed attempts to use in the present case is inappropriate and that his motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As a result, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Reed's motion without appointing counsel or conducting a hearing.
Affirmed.