Opinion
No. 59072-3-I.
June 2, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-1-05568-0, Michael S. Spearman, J., entered October 23, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey Rean was convicted of second degree escape and sentenced to 25 months in prison. On appeal, he argues that the State failed to prove that he escaped from a detention facility, an essential element of second degree escape. He also argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court included juvenile adjudications in calculating his offender score. We affirm.
Background
Jeffrey Rean was in the custody of the City of Redmond from March 20, 2006, until May 31, 2006, on a charge for fourth degree assault, domestic violence. During this period, he was held alternately at Issaquah Jail and Yakima County Jail. From May 26, 2006, through May 31, 2006, Rean was confined in the Issaquah Jail. On May31, 2006, Rean was transported from Issaquah Jail to Northeast District Court for a court appearance. Rean was escorted by two transport support officers. He was wearing jail-issued navy blue clothing and plastic sandals and was restrained by handcuffs connected to a waist chain, which held his wrists at his hips. As the officers escorted Rean and another inmate out of the courthouse toward the transport vehicle, Rean suddenly ran away from the officers. One officer radioed for backup and the other officer repeatedly ordered Rean to stop running. Rean continued to flee, and both officers pursued him on foot. They apprehended him in a parking lot a few blocks away and were met by additional officers who responded to the call for backup. Rean was placed in the back of a patrol car and taken to the Redmond police department booking area. Later that day, he was booked into King County Jail for escape.
Discussion
Escape
Rean challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for second degree escape. Specifically, he argues that the court erred in deciding that he escaped from a "detention facility." Because we hold that a detention facility includes any place where an inmate is permitted to go according to the terms of his confinement, we affirm.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we must determine, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 336, 150 P.3d 59 (2006).
A person commits the crime of escape in the second degree if "he or she knowingly escapes from a detention facility." Rean's assignment of error turns upon a proper interpretation of "detention facility" as defined in RCW 9A.76.010(2):
"Detention facility" means any place used for the confinement of a person (a) arrested for, charged with or convicted of an offense, or (b) charged with being or adjudicated to be a juvenile offender as defined in RCW 13.40.020 as now existing or hereafter amended, or (c) held for extradition or as a material witness, or (d) otherwise confined pursuant to an order of a court, except an order under chapter 13.34 RCW or chapter 13.32A RCW, or (e) in any work release, furlough, or other such facility or program.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
Rean argues that the "place" used for his confinement was the Issaquah Jail and because he was not at the Issaquah Jail when he escaped, he did not escape from a detention facility. However, the statute defines "detention facility" as " any place used for the confinement of a person arrested for, charged with or convicted of an offense." Thus, as this court previously has held, a detention facility is not limited to the four walls of a jail or other detention facility, but "encompasses any area in which a person is permitted to go or remain" as part of his or her detention.
RCW 9A.76.010(2)(a) (emphasis added).
State v. Peters, 35 Wn. App. 427, 431, 667 P.2d 136 (1983).
In State v. Peters, a juvenile was properly convicted of second degree escape from a detention facility when she ran from a pizza parlor where her counselor hadtaken her for an "off campus" celebration. Another juvenile was properly convicted of second degree escape from a detention facility when she failed to return to a juvenile detention facility after having been released on a pass in State v. Norlund, a case consolidated with Peters. This court held that Peters' pizza parlor outing and Norlund's pass were equivalents to "furloughs" under RCW 9A.76.010(2)(e), and because the appellants were not where they were authorized to be, they each had escaped "from a detention facility."
35 Wn. App. 427, 667 P.2d 136 (1983).
Peters, 35 Wn. App. at 429.
35 Wn. App. 427, 428-29, 667 P.2d 136 (1983).
Peters, 35 Wn. App. at 430-31.
Rean argues that the Peters court applied an incorrect definition of "furlough" and, in any case, that the reasoning employed by the Peters court does not apply to him because he was not on furlough when he ran away from his police escorts. We need not address the court's interpretation of furlough because we agree with Rean that he was not on furlough at the time this offense was committed.
Although Rean was not on furlough as described in RCW 9A.76.010(2)(e), he was being confined at Issaquah Jail as described in RCW 9A.76.010(2)(a). As this court held in Peters, the term "place" as used in RCW 9A.76.010(2), "encompasses any area in which a person is permitted to go or remain according to the terms of his work release, furlough or comparable program" under subsection (e). Likewise, the term "place" encompasses any area in which a person is permitted to go or remain according to the terms of his confinement under subsection (a). Because Rean was Page 5 being confined based on his being "arrested for, charged with or convicted of an offense," and he was authorized to accompany the transport officers to Northeast District Court, he was in a "place" used for his confinement until he ran away from the transport officers.
Peters, 35 Wn. App. at 431.
RCW9A. 76.010(2)(a)
We affirm Rean's conviction for escape in the second degree.
Offender Score
Rean argues that his constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process of law were violated because the trial court considered juvenile adjudications as prior convictions in calculating his offender score. Because our Supreme Court rejected the same argument in State v. Weber, we affirm.
159 Wn.2d 252, 264-65, 149 P.3d 646 (2006).