Opinion
No. 33640-5-II.
May 9, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 05-1-01256-1, John F. Nichols, J., entered August 3, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Lisa Elizabeth Tabbut, Attorney at Law, 1402 Broadway St, Longview, WA 98632-3714.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Michael C. Kinnie, Attorney at Law, 1200 Franklin, PO Box 5000, Vancouver, WA 98666-5000.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Houghton and Bridgewater, JJ.
Ronald Dupree Raymond appeals his sentence for cocaine possession. He argues that the sentencing court erred in imposing community custody conditions that he could not possess alcohol or be in a place where alcoholic beverages are sold. The State concedes this error. In a statement of additional grounds for review, Raymond also argues that his juvenile first degree manslaughter adjudication should have contributed only one-half point, not the one point that the trial used in calculating his offender score.
Because Raymond's present conviction is for a non-violent offense, we hold that the trial court correctly added one full point to his offender score for his prior violent juvenile felony. See RCW 9.94A.525(7). Accepting the State's concession, we remand to the trial court to strike the community custody conditions prohibiting possession of alcohol or being in a place that sells alcohol. We otherwise affirm the sentence.
FACTS
The State charged Ronald Dupree Raymond with a single count of possessing cocaine. The circumstances of this crime did not involve alcohol.
Following a jury trial conviction, the trial court imposed a standard-range sentence of 13 months with 9-12 months of community custody. In calculating Raymond's offender score totaling four points, the trial court added one point for Raymond's juvenile first degree manslaughter adjudication.
The trial court also included certain conditions of community custody, including that Raymond not (1) consume or possess alcohol, or (2) be in a place where alcoholic beverages are sold by the drink for consumption or are the primary sale item. These conditions prohibited Raymond from patronizing restaurants that sell alcohol.
Raymond appeals, challenging his offender score and the latter two conditions of community custody, but not the condition that he cannot consume alcohol while on community custody supervision.
ANALYSIS I. Alcohol-Related Community Custody Conditions
Raymond argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from possessing alcohol or being in a bar, liquor store, or restaurant that serves alcohol as conditions of community custody. The State concedes that this part of Raymond's sentence is inappropriate. We accept the State's concession.
We review imposition of crime-related prohibitions for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if the decision is manifestly unreasonable. State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). A community custody condition is manifestly unreasonable if it is beyond the court's authority to impose. See State v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 207-08, 76 P.3d 258 (2003) (striking the condition pertaining to alcohol counseling because the trial court lacked authority to order such condition).
The Legislature requires trial courts to impose lawful conditions of community custody as part of a sentence for cocaine possession. RCW 9.94A.715(1), (2)(a); RCW 9.94A.700(4), (5); RCW 69.50.4013(1). As a part of any terms of community placement, the trial court may order the offender not to consume alcohol, regardless of whether alcohol related to the offense. RCW 9.94A.700(5)(d); Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 206-07. In addition, the court may order the offender to comply with `any crime-related prohibitions.' RCW 9.94A.700(5)(e). There need be no causal link between the condition imposed and the crime committed so long as the condition relates to the circumstances of the crime. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992).
Raymond accepts, and does not challenge, the condition that he may not consume alcohol while on community custody supervision.
Where the condition does not relate to the circumstances of the crime, however, such condition is unlawful. See Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 207-08 (error to mandate alcohol counseling without evidence to indicate the requirement of alcohol counseling was crime related). Nothing in the record shows that alcohol contributed to Raymond's offense or that the trial court's prohibitions of possessing alcohol and being in places that sell alcohol were `crime-related.' Therefore, we agree with Raymond and the State that (1) the community custody conditions prohibiting him from possessing alcohol and patronizing an establishment that sells alcohol neither related nor contributed to the circumstances of his cocaine possession; and (2) these two conditions must be stricken from his judgment and sentence.
II. Offender Score
Raymond next challenges the trial court's calculation of his offender score, arguing that his prior violent felony juvenile adjudication should have counted as only half a point instead of a whole point. We disagree.
When a defendant is sentenced for a nonviolent offense (excluding convictions for felony traffic offenses or non-possession drug offenses), the sentencing court calculates his offender score by adding one point for each prior violent felony juvenile adjudication and one-half point for each prior nonviolent felony juvenile adjudication. See RCW 9.94A.525(7). Raymond's present conviction is for possession of cocaine, a non-violent offense. Former RCW 9.94A.030(29), (45) (2004).
Former RCW 9.94A.030(29), (45) (2004) have been recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(30), (48), effective July 1, 2005.
Raymond does not dispute that he has a 1993 first degree manslaughter juvenile adjudication, committed when he was 12 years old. Manslaughter in the first degree is a `violent offense.' Former RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a)(iii). Therefore, the trial court properly added one point to his offender score for this prior violent felony juvenile adjudication.
We remand to the trial court to vacate the following two conditions of Raymond's community custody prohibiting him from possessing alcohol and being in an establishment that sells alcohol. We otherwise affirm Raymond's sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, P.J. and BRIDGEWATER, J., concur.