Opinion
No. 1-822 / 00-1318
Filed October 30, 2002
Appeal from the District Court for Black Hawk County, George L. Stigler (trial) and Jon Fister (motion to suppress), Judges.
Steven Peterson appeals his conviction, judgment, and sentence for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Steven Peterson appeals his conviction, judgment, and sentence for first-degree murder, contending the district court should have suppressed statements he made to law enforcement officers. We find Peterson's statements should have been suppressed, but conclude any error in admitting his statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Eighty-three year old Howard Smith was single and lived alone. Smith loved people and would often entertain neighborhood children. Unfortunately, Smith was sometimes taken advantage of by others. The defendant and his friends, including Jesse Billington, Ruben Howard, Denise Cervantes, and Ashley Cobb, regularly visited Smith. Peterson, Howard, and Billington would sometimes steal from Smith when they were at his house.
In September 1997, Smith's car was stolen. Two months later, he was repeatedly stabbed in his home, and died as a result. Peterson pled guilty to the car theft and began serving time at the Newton Correctional Facility.
Meanwhile, the State charged Peterson with first-degree murder. See Iowa Code §§ 707.2(1), (2) (1997). Waterloo police officers Moller and Holms went to the Newton prison to arrest Peterson on that charge.
Before serving the arrest warrant and without first warning Peterson about his right to counsel, Officer Moller attempted to interview him about Smith's death. Peterson denied any involvement and said he would not talk further without an attorney. Moller did not stop the interview. Instead, he began to tell Peterson details about the murder investigation. Peterson asked what others had said about him and reiterated that he did not commit the crime and wanted an attorney. The officers then arrested him for first-degree murder.
As Peterson was leaving the interview room, Officer Moller said, "Well I'd still maybe like to talk to you more about this." Peterson responded, "[w]ell maybe when we get back to Waterloo I'll talk to you."
Correctional Officer Jack Holder then proceeded to escort Peterson to his living unit. While crossing the prison yard, Peterson yelled to another inmate that he was being charged with first-degree murder. Officer Holder asked him what he had to say about that. Peterson responded that he did not remember anything because he had been using methamphetamine for a month. He retrieved his belongings and was escorted back to meet the Waterloo police officers. Holder told the officers about his conversation with Peterson.
The Waterloo officers placed Peterson in the back seat of their car. Officer Moller seated himself next to Peterson. After engaging Peterson in small talk, Officer Holms asked him whether drugs were available in the prison. Peterson responded he did not use drugs but indicated he had used methamphetamine in the past and could not remember anything. At that point, Officer Moller told Peterson he wanted to talk to him more but would first need to have him sign a waiver of his Miranda rights. Peterson signed the waiver form and proceeded to discuss Smith's death with the officers.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-76, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-29, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723-25 (1966) (requiring police to tell persons subject to custodial interrogation the following: (1) they have the right to remain silent; (2) anything they say can be used against them in a court of law; (3) they have the right to the presence of an attorney; and (4) if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed prior to questioning, if they desire).
When the officers arrived at the Waterloo police station, they typed a statement, which Peterson signed. Peterson also provided police with an oral, videotaped statement.
Peterson moved to suppress all the statements made to law enforcement authorities that day. The district court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial. A jury found Peterson guilty as charged, the court entered judgment and sentence, and this appeal followed.
Peterson contends his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Our review of these constitutional issues is de novo. State v. Evans, 495 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 1993).
II. Suppression Ruling
A. Fifth Amendment. Although we believe Peterson's Sixth Amendment claim is key to resolution of this case, we will first address Peterson's Fifth Amendment challenge, as it sets the stage for the alleged Sixth Amendment violation.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require police to inform a suspect of certain constitutionally guaranteed rights, including the right to counsel, before beginning a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-76, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-29, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723-25 (1966). If a suspect requests counsel, police must suspend the interrogation until counsel is made available. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981).
1. Custody. The key question here is whether Peterson was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. The fact that Peterson was an inmate at a prison does not automatically answer this question. State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994). "[T]here must be some added restriction on the inmate's freedom of movement stemming from the interrogation itself." Id. Relevant factors to consider in determining whether such an added restriction is present include "the language used to summon the individual, the purpose, place and manner of the interrogation, the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and whether the defendant is free to leave the place of questioning." Id.; State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557-58 (Iowa 1997).
Officer Moller advised staff at the Newton prison that he would be coming to serve Peterson with a warrant. At the facility, Correctional Officer Holder summoned Peterson from the kitchen where he was working and escorted him to a small room segregated from the general prison population. He shut the door and remained on guard outside. Officer Holms stood next to the door on the inside. Officer Moller and Peterson sat in chairs approximately two feet apart from each other. When Peterson stood up at one point, Moller told him to sit down. By his own admission, Moller began telling Peterson about the murder investigation in order to elicit information from Peterson. He testified that Peterson could not have voluntarily left to return to his kitchen job.
Under these circumstances, we conclude the prison interview was a custodial interrogation. See Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 791. Therefore, the officers were required to give Peterson Miranda warnings and were required to stop the interrogation after he asserted his right to counsel. Officer Moller ignored both prescriptions. Therefore, his conduct was in violation of Peterson's Fifth Amendment right to counsel. See State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 196 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999) (holding police did not scrupulously honor Astello's right to cut off questioning). Cf.U.S. v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (informing suspect of progress of investigation is permissible as long as the communication is truthful, and "is not designed, nor is it likely to elicit, an incriminating response").
2. Suppression of Statements. The State nevertheless contends that a Fifth Amendment violation during the prison interview is meaningless "[b]ecause there were no statements to suppress." We disagree. Police may not "reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386-87. While it is true Peterson said nothing incriminating during the first interview, he did make incriminating statements less than an hour later. Those statements should have been suppressed.
B. Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to counsel after adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 436 (1977). Once the right attaches, the State has an "affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel." Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 160, 106 S.Ct. 471, 477-79, 88 L.Ed.2d 481, 482-83 (1985). Accord State v. Newsom, 414 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Iowa 1987). The right does not turn on a defendant's request for counsel. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d at 436-38.
The State concedes that Peterson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time of his initial interview with the Waterloo police officers. See State v. Nelsen, 390 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1986) (right attaches on filing of complaint and issuance of summons); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 432 (Iowa 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 848, 103 S.Ct. 106, 74 L.Ed.2d 95 (1982) (right attaches when complaint is filed and warrant procured). The question then becomes whether the police violated that right. In deciding this question, we will examine: (1) the circumstances of the first interview and (2) Officer Moller's prior dealings with Peterson's counsel. We will also consider the State's contention that Peterson voluntarily relinquished his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
1. Circumstances of First Interview. When Officer Moller arrived at the Newton Correctional Facility, he did not immediately serve the warrant or inform Peterson of his right to counsel but proceeded to "share" evidence he had amassed against Peterson with a view to obtaining an inculpatory statement. Moller acknowledged he might have told Peterson to speak to police immediately and he might have specifically said:
the decent thing to do is talk about that, that's happened, and it's up to him now if he wanted to conduct himself, and if he wanted to talk to me that was the day to talk to me, not six months down the road, seven months down the road or a year down the road.
This attempt to interrogate Peterson outside the presence of counsel violated Peterson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1340, 149 L.Ed.2d 321, 324-25 (2001).
In Cobb, the Court held that police, outside defense counsel's presence, could question a defendant indicted for burglary about a related murder with which the defendant had not been charged. Id. However, the Court expressly limited its holding to interrogation concerning other uncharged crimes. Id., 532 U.S. at 170, 121 S.Ct. at 1342, 149 L.Ed.2d at 321-22. (emphasis added). The court specifically stated, "[i]n seeking evidence pertaining to pending charges, the Government's investigative powers are limited by the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused." Id. (emphasis in original).
Here, Moller interrogated Peterson after the murder complaint was filed and the arrest warrant procured, placing his actions squarely within the type of conduct prohibited by Cobb and its predecessors . See also Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. at 479, 88 L.Ed.2d at 496 (stating "knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity"); Williams, 430 U.S. at 399, 97 S.Ct. at 1240, 51 L.Ed.2d at 436-37 (stating detective "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as and perhaps more effectively than if he had formally interrogated him."); accord Nelsen, 390 N.W.2d at 593 (finding violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel where probation officer confronted the defendant with incriminating evidence, creating a situation "likely to elicit incriminating statements").
2. Circumvention of Attorney Demand. Although we have found a Sixth Amendment violation based on the attempted prison interrogation alone, we feel compelled to comment on an additional aggravating factor. Officer Moller initiated the interview fully aware that Peterson's attorney in the theft case had told him not to discuss the murder investigation with Peterson in his absence. While Peterson's attorney formally ended his representation in the theft case two months before the murder complaint was filed, he specifically told an officer he believed to be Moller that he was also representing Peterson in connection with the pending murder investigation. Moller did not deny that this conversation took place. Notably, the attorney appeared in the murder case the day after the complaint was filed.
We believe this effort to end run the admonition from Peterson's attorney renders Moller's conduct more egregious. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 404-05, 97 S.Ct. at 1242-43, 51 L.Ed.2d at 440 (holding Davenport police violated Williams's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when they spoke to him about related but unfiled charge after two attorneys expressly admonished them not to). Accord Newsom, 414 N.W.2d at 358 (holding State could not undermine counsel's representation of accused).
3. Asserted Waiver of Right to Counsel. The State does not focus on the police conduct described above but instead argues Peterson waived his right to counsel when he spoke to the officers on his way to Waterloo. Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d at 440; accord Jackson, 380 N.W.2d at 424. To establish a waiver, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant understood his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and (2) intentionally relinquished it. Id.
The State does not argue Peterson's general comments during the first interview amounted to a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The State also does not argue Peterson's comments to Correctional Officer Holder amounted to a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The State met its burden of establishing that Peterson understood he had a right to counsel, as Peterson invoked the right on his own, without any instruction or warning from the police. The State did not prove that Peterson intentionally relinquished the right. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296, 108 S.Ct. 2387, 2397, 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 275 (1988).
In Patterson, the Court held that, generally:
[a]n accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.Id. However, the Court noted that its analysis would change if the accused had requested counsel. 487 U.S. at 290 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. at 2393, 101 L.Ed.2d at 271. The Court further stated a written Miranda waiver would be valid as a matter of law only if it was first determined "that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced." Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296, 108 S.Ct. at 2397, 101 L.Ed.2d at 275 quoting from Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 423, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986). The State failed to satisfy these essential predicates.
Peterson twice asked for an attorney on his own. Both requests for counsel were ignored. At the end of the prison interview, Officer Moller asked Peterson to talk to him at a later date, without alluding to Peterson's request for an attorney. In the car, when Moller asked Peterson to waive his Miranda rights, he again did not make reference to Peterson's earlier requests for counsel or explain the implications of those requests, despite the fact that less than an hour had elapsed since Peterson's second demand for counsel.
As for the coercion element, we note the conversation in the car was initiated by the police rather than by Peterson. See Newsom, 414 N.W.2d at 357-58. According to Officer Holms, the conversation was as follows:
Q. Did the subject of drugs in prison come up?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. How did that come up?
A. We got to talking about it and I asked him if drugs were available in prison, can you get them there, and he said they are available. He said — I asked him if he used them — or Moller asked him if he used them, and he said no, he didn't use them.
Q. Then what happened?
A. I think he said he was working out hard now instead of using anything like that.
Q. Okay. Did he say anything else?
A. There was a short pause and then that's when he made a similar statement to what was — what was said to Jack Holder about that he'd been banging a lot of meth back then and he couldn't remember anything.
With the exception of the length of the "short pause", Officer Moller did not dispute this testimony. He further conceded that had he not planted "seeds of information" with Peterson, Peterson "probably would not have" spoken to him about the death of Smith. Under these circumstances, we conclude Peterson did not voluntarily relinquish his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As the statements were obtained in violation of that right, they should have been suppressed.
Holmes testified the pause was about a minute. Officer Moller testified it was two or three minutes.
Peterson also raises his suppression challenge as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in the event we conclude he failed to preserve error on this challenge. The State concedes he preserved error. Therefore, we need not address his claim in this context.
III. Harmless Error
The State finally argues that, even if the inculpatory statements were obtained in violation of Peterson's constitutional rights, the violations amount to harmless error. "In order for a constitutional error to be harmless, the court must be able to declare it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Iowa 2001) quoting from State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Iowa (1994). "If substantially the same evidence is in the record, erroneously admitted evidence is not considered prejudicial." Id.
The State was required to prove that Peterson killed another person "willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation" or "while participating in a forcible felony." Iowa Code §§ 707.2(1), (2). Even if Peterson's incriminating statements are removed from the record, overwhelming evidence remains that he murdered Howard Smith on November 11, 1997.
The record reveals Peterson and his friends regularly visited Smith and stole from him. Peterson and Jesse Billington stole Smith's car in September 1997 and destroyed it at a local sand pit. Peterson eventually confessed to the theft, pled guilty, and was imprisoned for his role in the offense. Peterson's friends, Ruben Howard and Billington, testified against him under grants of immunity at his murder trial. The jury heard evidence they accompanied Peterson when he returned to Smith's house on November 11, 1997 to borrow money. Both testified Smith argued with Peterson over a previous theft. Smith was upset because he believed Peterson had previously stolen his wallet. Both testified Peterson pulled out a knife and stabbed Smith to death. Both described the manner in which Smith's body was removed from the living room and placed in a bed. Both confirmed property was stolen from Smith's house. Howard testified he had previously seen the knife Peterson used to stab Smith on Peterson's bedroom dresser. Howard observed Peterson cleaning blood off the knife by sticking it in the ground outside Smith's home. Although the testimony given by Billington and Howard contains some inconsistencies, on balance it points squarely and unequivocally at Peterson's guilt.
Several weeks after the murder, Jeremy Weekly heard Peterson admit that Peterson hit an old man and stuck him. When Peterson's acquaintance, Ashley Cobb asked Peterson if he had anything to do with Smith's death, Peterson responded that it was none of her business and that he was not going to tell her anything. He told Cobb that she shouldn't have anything to do with it. Angered by the inquiry, Peterson threatened to throw a microwave oven through the window of Cobb's car.
In view of this and other evidence, we find Peterson's statements to police were cumulative of other compelling evidence and that the verdict would have been the same even if the statements were excised from the record. We conclude any error in the admission of Peterson's statements to the police was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. Disposition
We affirm Peterson's first-degree murder conviction.
AFFIRMED.
Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer, J. concurs, Vaitheswaran, J. concurs in part and dissents in part.
I concur with the majority's constitutional analysis but respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the constitutional violations committed by Officer Moller amounted to harmless error. To establish harmless error in this context, the State must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995). The inquiry "is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 189 (1993) (emphasis in original).
Although the State's evidence was extensive, the only untainted witnesses who definitively implicated Peterson in Smith's murder were accomplices Ruben Howard and Jesse Billington. Howard gave contradictory testimony on the extent to which he was able to see the room in which the stabbing took place, whether the knife that was retrieved from the scene was the knife Peterson had that evening, and the number of times Smith was stabbed. When asked by the State whether there was "any question" in his mind that Peterson stabbed Smith that night, Howard responded, "I think he did."
Billington's testimony had fewer internal inconsistencies than Howard's. However, he disagreed with Howard on the number of times Smith was stabbed and the location of the accomplices in Smith's home.
More importantly, the corroboration of both these accomplices' testimony was tenuous at best. See State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 198 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999) (accomplice testimony must be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the commission of the offenses and corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances). Although a host of Peterson's friends were called to testify about statements he made to them following Smith's death, none of these people directly implicated Peterson in the stabbing. Jeremy Weekly, for example, testified he overheard Peterson state "[s]omething about hitting an old man" and "[t]hat he stuck him" but noted Peterson "always used 'sticking him' as 'punching'." Denise Cervantes testified she overheard someone asking Peterson if he killed Smith, as well as Peterson's joking response that he did not but wished he had. Ashley Cobb testified she asked Peterson if he had anything to do with Smith's death. Peterson told her it was none of her business, she should not have anything to do with it, and Billington had the knife. Cobb conceded Peterson never told her he was responsible for Smith's death and she never saw him with a long knife of the type used to stab Smith. Loria Howard testified she asked Peterson if he killed Smith and Peterson "just laughed."
There was also no forensic evidence tying Peterson to the crime. His fingerprints were not on the knife or anywhere in the house and a shoeprint and eleven strands of hair found at the scene were not tested.
In contrast to this abundant but qualitatively weak untainted evidence, Peterson's statements to law enforcement officers placed him squarely at the scene of the stabbing with knife in hand and with an anger level that was "twelve" "on a scale of one to ten." See State v. Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 1998); State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Iowa 1995) (weighing untainted evidence against defendant's tainted statements). Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that the jury's verdict was "surely unattributable" to Peterson's confession. State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Iowa 1997) (finding tainted evidence "immeasurably strengthened" State's case against the defendant, preventing court from saying "with confidence" that the jury's verdict was not attributable to the error). Accord State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 1999). Accordingly, I believe the constitutional violations did not amount to harmless error.