Summary
holding the defendant's guilty plea waived any right to raise speedy-trial issues including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
Summary of this case from State v. PirtleOpinion
No. 5-266 / 04-1285
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Martha L. Mertz, Judge.
Leland Pearson appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Todd Miler of Miler Law Firm, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Terry E. Rachels, County Attorney, and Doug Eichholz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
Leland Pearson appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
The State charged Pearson by trial information on October 24, 2003, with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, to wit: more than five grams of methamphetamine. Pearson pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine on May 14, 2004, and the court later sentenced him to an indeterminate ten-year term of imprisonment, revoked his driver's license for 180 days, suspended a $1000 fine, and ordered him to pay applicable court costs and surcharges. Pearson appeals.
On appeal, Pearson raises the following issues for review:
I. WHETHER PEARSON WAS PROVIDED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
II. WHETHER THE SENTENCING JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO RECUSE HERSELF DUE TO HER PRIOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH PEARSON.
II. Speedy Trial
Pearson argues he was denied his right to a speedy trial and that his attorney was ineffective in failing to move to dismiss the trial information based on that ground. The State contends Pearson waived any speedy trial issues including his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by pleading guilty. Alternatively, the State argues that any delay in bringing Pearson to trial was attributable to Pearson.
"A guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently made by a defendant constitutes an admission of guilt and when accepted by the court constitutes a conviction of the highest order." State v. McGee, 211 N.W.2d 267, 268 (Iowa 1973). Accordingly, a guilty plea "waives all defenses and irregularities except that the information or indictment charges no offense and the right to challenge the plea itself." Id. Our supreme court has held a guilty plea "waives all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel `except those that bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea.'" Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 2002). Only those objections and defenses that are intrinsic to the plea itself are not waived. Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000). We hold that by pleading guilty, Pearson waived his right to raise any speedy trial issues including his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id.; see also State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2000) (holding defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to conflict of interest was waived by his guilty plea).
III. Recusal of Sentencing Judge
Pearson claims the judge who sentenced him should have recused herself because she represented Pearson in a December 2000 probation revocation proceeding. He also claims his attorney was ineffective in failing to raise this issue at or prior to sentencing. The gist of Pearson's argument is "where the sentencing judge has previously represented the defendant in other criminal matters, and the judge does not sua sponte disqualify herself, the defendant is faced with a constitutionally impermissible dilemma, either disclose confidential matters on the record, or preserve his right to counsel and the attorney-client privilege."
In State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002), our supreme court stated:
There is a constitutional right to have a neutral and detached judge. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994). "A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . ." Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1). Before recusal is necessary, actual prejudice must be shown. McKinley, 542 N.W.2d at 827. "The test is whether a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality". Id. Speculation is not sufficient, and "there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is." Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532 (citation omitted). The burden of showing grounds for recusal is on the party seeking it. Id.
Even if we accept as true Pearson's claim that the sentencing judge formerly represented Pearson or that his attorney knew of that relationship, his recusal theory fails. There is nothing in the record indicating that the sentencing judge had any prior knowledge of the matter for which Pearson was to be sentenced. Furthermore, Pearson makes no claim suggesting the sentencing judge had any information that was not disclosed by the presentence investigation report or adduced at the sentencing hearing. In making her sentencing decision, the judge had access to Pearson's lengthy presentence investigation report disclosing approximately twenty-two convictions, including kidnapping, robbery, and at least three convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Pearson is simply unable to establish the requisite prejudice supporting his recusal theory and his contrary claims are no more than speculative.
We have carefully considered all of Pearson's arguments on appeal, and find they are either without merit or controlled by the foregoing. We therefore affirm Pearson's conviction.