Opinion
CR130143598T
06-20-2017
State of Connecticut v. Hiral Patel
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT
Hon. John A. Danaher, III, J.
By motion dated March 24, 2017, the defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the guilty verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. The state did not file a written objection to the motion but objected to the motion when it was heard on April 24, 2017, the date of sentencing. The state objected to this motion for the same reasons that it objected to the motion for judgment of acquittal.
DISCUSSION
The defendant calls upon this court's " inherent power" to set aside a verdict, relying upon the principles expressed in State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 456-57, 423 A.2d 118 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 667, 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980). In Avcollie, the state asserted that " the trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to hear and grant such a motion because Practice Book, 1963, § 255 which controlled at the time, required a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence." Id., 455. However, our Supreme Court held that the " trial court has inherent power to set aside the verdict, even though no motion has been made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The Avcollie court held that, if the trial court " finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is [the court's] duty to set aside that verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Avcollie, supra, 178 Conn. 456. The Supreme Court also held that " the trial court is obligated to overturn the jury's verdict when it is based on physically impossible conclusions: a verdict should be set aside [w]here testimony is thus in conflict with indisputable physical facts, the facts demonstrate that the testimony is either intentionally or unintentionally untrue, and leave no real question of conflict of evidence for the jury concerning which reasonable minds could reasonably differ . . . The final test is whether the jury could reasonably have concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 457-58.
The Avcollie court further held that, in the absence of the foregoing bases for setting aside a verdict, issues of credibility are " to be determined by the jury as trier of fact . . . The choice of the more credible evidence [is] for them to make . . . The evidence must be given a construction which is most favorable to the sustaining of the jury's verdict." (Citations omitted.) State v. Avcollie, supra, 178 Conn. 461. The latter principle is the same one that the trial court must apply when assessing a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Butler, 296 Conn. 62, 76, 993 A.2d 970 (2010).
In the present case, the defendant relies on, in summary, the following claims: that he was with his sister in Boston when the murder took place; that the mother of the victim believed that Calabrese was accompanied by Shyam Patel; that the cell phone evidence showed that Shyam Patel was assisting the other codefendants on the day of the murder; and that the evidence of vehicles near the scene of the murder " did not match the description of the Hiral Patel vehicle."
The defendant is not arguing that the jury was governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption, or partiality. Nor is the defendant arguing that the jury's verdict was based on physically impossible conclusions; that is, he does not claim that the state's evidence is in conflict with indisputable physical facts, leaving no real question of conflict of evidence for the jury concerning which reasonable minds could reasonably differ. Instead, he appears to be arguing that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case because it did not credit the evidence that favored him.
The foregoing argument is in direct conflict with our Supreme Court's reminder in Avcollie, as well as in many other cases, that deciding which witnesses to credit is to be determined by the jury as trier of fact and that the evidence must be given a construction which is most favorable to the sustaining of the jury's verdict. As was summarized in this court's ruling denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal, there was substantial evidence introduced by the state that, if credited by the jury, established the defendant's guilt on all eight counts beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is, in effect, inviting this court to commit the same error that led the Supreme Court to reverse the Avcollie trial court's decision to set aside the verdict in that case. The court declines that invitation.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the motion to set aside the verdict must be, and is, denied.
So ordered.