Opinion
LLICR13143597S
12-29-2015
State of Connecticut v. Niraj Patel
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT
John A. Danaher, III, J.
By motion dated October 8, 2015, the defendant seeks to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement authorities, or their agents, after he retained counsel to represent him relative to a June 12, 2012 arrest. The state objected to the motion by memorandum dated November 30, 2015. This matter came before the court and was heard on December 23, 2015. The motion is denied.
A. Factual and Procedural History
On June 12, 2012, the defendant was arrested by officers of the Torrington Police Department and charged with operating without a license, traveling unreasonably fast, attempt to possess more than four ounces of marijuana, tampering with physical evidence, interfering with an officer, and use of drug paraphernalia. The defendant claims that he retained Attorney Paul McCarty of New Haven " relative to these charges from June 2012 up until" the defendant retained his current attorney on January 7, 2014.
The defendant also claims that on August 7, 2012, Connecticut State Police (" CSP") trooper Thomas Kiely conducted a telephone interview of the defendant relative to the homicide of Luke Vitalis. The trooper asked the defendant, inter alia, about the defendant's relationship with the victim; the defendant's interactions with the victim on August 5, 2012, and the defendants whereabouts on August 6, 2012. On October 3, 2012, Trooper Kiely prepared a report relative to the interview.
B. The Parties' Positions
The defendant argues that Trooper Kiely failed to obtain a waiver of counsel from the defendant prior to the August 7, 2012 interview. The defendant contends that, once he retained counsel in June 2012, he could not be questioned by law enforcement authorities without a valid waiver of counsel. The defendant relies on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) for the foregoing proposition. The defendant claims that when Trooper Kiely interviewed the defendant on August 7, 2012, he knew or should have known that the defendant was already represented by counsel.
The state opposes the motion, arguing that the sixth amendment right to counsel is " offense specific." The state relies on Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) for the foregoing proposition, and also argues that Maine v. Moulton, when properly analyzed, actually supports the state's position.
C. Discussion
It is well established that the sixth amendment right to counsel is " offense specific." That right does not extend to uncharged offenses, even if the uncharged offenses arise from the same set of circumstances that resulted in the defendant's initial retention of counsel. In Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), the defendant confessed to a burglary, but denied having information about individuals who had been in the burglarized house but who were missing. Thereafter, that defendant told his father that he had killed the missing victims. In a subsequent interview with law enforcement authorities, that defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murders. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's responses given in the later interview did not violate his sixth amendment right to counsel because that interrogation was about " different offenses, " as that phrase is defined in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (" where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not").
The Supreme Court, in Texas v. Cobb, reversed a lower court decision that, once the sixth amendment right attaches, it attaches to " any other offense that is very closely related factually to the offense charged." The Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not extend to crimes that are " factually related" to those that had actually been charged. Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. 167. The Court also recognized that Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) " expressly referred to the offense-specific nature of the sixth amendment right to counsel." Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. 170.
Our Supreme Court has clearly, and similarly, rejected the " derivative right to counsel" theory. In State v. Piorkowski, 243 Conn. 205, 218, 700 A.2d 1146 (1997), the court reaffirmed an earlier ruling that there is no state constitutional violation when " at the time of interrogation, the police knew that the defendant was represented by counsel on an unrelated matter." Id.
In this case, the defendant was unable to even establish that Trooper Kiely knew that the defendant was represented by counsel, for any reason, prior to the August 7, 2012 interview. At the December 23, 2015 hearing, the defendant called the two Torrington police lieutenants involved in the June 2012 arrest and established that neither lieutenant ever told Trooper Kiely that the defendant was represented by counsel relative to the June 2012 arrest. The defendant accepted the state's representation that Trooper Kiely did not know that the defendant had counsel at the time of the August 7, 2015. More significantly, the defendant also acknowledged that the homicide-related charges that were brought relative to the August 7, 2015 interview are all different, for purposes of a Blockburger analysis, than the charges that were brought in June 2012 and for which the defendant initially retained the services of Attorney McCarty.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to suppress the defendant's statements, dated October 8, 2015, is denied.
So ordered.