Opinion
I.D. No. 9904019131.
Submitted: May 2, 2000.
Decided: October 16, 2000.
On Defendant Angela Okafor's Motion to Dismiss Indictment. Denied.
Daniel R. Miller, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 820 N. French Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State.
John X. Denney, Jr., 919 Market Street, 1701 Mellon Bank Center, P.O. Box 955. Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant Angela Okafor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The issue raised in defense's motion to dismiss the indictment is whether Angela Okafor, a New Jersey Correctional Officer, (the "defendant") is exempted from the licensing requirements set forth in 11 Del. C. § 1441 as a "peace officer." The Court finds that while there is no jurisdictional limitation relating to "peace officer" under 11 Del. C. § 1441 (g), whether the defendant fits within this definition remains a factual question for the jury. As such, the motion is denied.
On April 17, 1999, the defendant, who is a resident of Delaware but employed as a New Jersey Correctional Officer, was allegedly found intoxicated and asleep in her car in Wilmington with a loaded firearm in her purse. As a result, she was charged with violating 11 Del. C. § 1442, Carrying a Concealed Weapon. According to this statute, "a person is guilty of carrying a concealed deadly weapon when the person carries concealed a deadly weapon upon or about the person without a license to do so as provided by § 1441 of this title." Section 11 Del. C. § 1441 of Title 11 sets forth the licensing requirements and subsection (g) grants an exemption to "the police or other peace officers" who are carrying their usual weapon. Because the defendant did not have a license to carry a concealed deadly weapon as required by 11 Del. C. § 1441, she was charged with the above offense.
The issue now raised by this motion is whether the defendant is a "peace officer" under 11 Del. C. § 1441 (g), which would exempt her from the licensing requirements. As a New Jersey Correctional Officer, even off-duty, the defendant argues that she constitutes a "peace officer" within 11 Del. C. § 1441 (g), and in the alternative, the statute is unconstitutional in that it fails to give her fair warning that her conduct would be improper. To the contrary, the State argues that the legislative intent of the statute was to only exempt Delaware officers from the licensing requirements and that the defendant is not a "peace officer" because she does not hold her position within the State of Delaware.
Even though it was provided an opportunity, the State failed to file a supplemental brief regarding the issues presented in this motion. As such, the Court only has the State's responsive pleading to the motion to rely upon.
Section 11 Del. C. § 1441 of Title 11 was created to address the concerns that there would be substantial danger to the public safety if unrestricted possession of concealed weapons were allowed in the State. As such, the General Assembly set up a hierarchy of individuals in 11 Del. C. § 1441 to whom certain licensing requirements apply. This statute places the most restrictions on citizens, less restrictions on former Delaware police officers, and no restrictions on the present police community. This is a logical progression relative to the training, experience, and needs of each group. Since, we, as a society, have moved past the days of the Wild West, it is logical to now require significant justification before allowing a citizen to possess a concealed weapon, who others would not expect to be armed. At the opposite extreme, because the law enforcement community is given the responsibility to protect its citizens and is issued a weapon as a standard part of their job, the General Assembly decided that requiring them to be licensed would be foolish and inappropriate. Simply put, the possession of weapons by the police community does not raise the same concerns as possession by ordinary citizens, and therefore, the licensing requirements are different. Using this structure as a framework, the Court must now determine whether the defendant fits within the classification of individuals who are exempt from the licensing requirements.
In re Ware, Del. Supr., 474 A.2d 131, 133 (1984).
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court must give a statute its plain meaning and avoid judicial interpretation if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. In construing a statute, a Court first must look to the text of the statute in its context to determine if it is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it "is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations." "Ambiguity may also arise from the fact that giving a literal interpretation to words of the statute would lead to such unreasonable or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction that they could not have been intended by the legislature."
Wilmington Finishing Co. v. Leary, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-06-00l, Babiarz, J. (March 8, 2000) (ORDER).
Snyder v. Andrews, Del. Supr., 708 A.2d 237, 241 (1998).
DiStefano v. Watson, Del. Supr., 566 A.2d 1, 4 (1989) ( citing Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Del. Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985)).
DiStefano, 566 A.2d at 4 ( quoting Coastal Barge Corp., 492 A.2d at 1246).
Section 11 Del. C. § 1441(g) of Title 11 specifically states that "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply to the carrying of the usual weapon by the police or other peace officers." There are no conditions or limitations placed on these terms, and the legislature does not limit peace officers to those within the jurisdictional limitation of the State of Delaware as it has in other sections of the code. Consequently, the Court finds that 11 Del. C. § 1441 (g) is unambiguous and that an application of the literal meaning of its words would not be unreasonable. Here, a literal reading of the language in 11 Del. C. § 1441 (g) does not limit its application to only Delaware police or peace officers. If the General Assembly intended the exemption to be restrictive, then it would have used language to clearly set forth that intent.
See 11 Del. C. § 1912; 11 Del. C. § 1004.
See DiStefano, 566 A.2d at 4.
The State would want this Court to adopt an interpretation that before a plain clothes, out-of-state police or peace officer steps foot into the State of Delaware, he or she must leave their service weapon in their home state. The Court does not believe that the General Assembly would ever intend such a result or that such an interpretation is warranted by the language in the statute. The State's interpretation would mean that every time a detective from Pennsylvania, Maryland or New Jersey crossed the border to confer with its Delaware counterparts about a case, they would be in violation of the law unless they left their service weapon at home. Arguably, every time a special agent in charge of the FBI or Secret Service visited their Wilmington office from their headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, they would be prohibited from carrying their firearm. The Court can find no reasonable justification for establishing such a requirement and believes that it would create chaos and confusion in the law enforcement community. If the State believes that such a restriction is appropriate, then their recourse is to seek an amendment of the statute through the legislative process. This Court will not impose one.
The Court recognizes that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest are much different than the professional interaction set forth above and finds her possession of a weapon in an intoxicated condition outside of her employment context to be unprofessional and inappropriate. Having the authority to possess a weapon places a unique responsibility upon that individual to insure it is possessed only when appropriate and to adjust one's personal conduct to insure the safety of others. The defendant is simply lucky she was not shot when the officers approached her in an intoxicated state with a loaded weapon in her purse. While it is tempting to hold the defendant accountable under these circumstances, to do so would only inappropriately develop bad law simply because of bad facts. The Court's obligation is to interpret the plain language of the statute and not to recreate or adjust or selectively enforce it whenever unique facts may justify the end result.
In making the above decision, the Court recognizes that in the context of Chapter 19 of Title 11 entitled, "Arrest and Commitment; Fresh Pursuit," others decisions have interpreted "peace officer" to only apply to peace officers located within the State of Delaware. But, the, context in which those statutes were interpreted is totally different than that now presented to the Court. The "Arrest and Commitment; Fresh Pursuit" statutes deal with the authority to detain and pursue individuals. As such, the ability and appropriateness of out-of-state officers to arrest and detain citizens in Delaware raise significant issues of public safety and the legality of police interaction with the public. Those concerns are simply not present in the actions attempted to be prohibited by 11 Del. C. § 1441. As such, the Court believes that those decisions are distinguishable and do not affect this ruling. The Court further notes that the present opinion is limited only to 11 Del. C. § 1441 (g) and should not be read any broader.
See United States v. Moderacki, D. Del., 280 F. Supp. 633 (1968). The District Court of Delaware addressed the applicability of the definition "peace officer" provided in 11 Del. C. § 1901 (2), which states, `peace officer' is any public officer authorized by law to make arrests in a criminal case." The Court observed that the phrase, "public officials," used in the definition has been applied exclusively to Delaware public officials in the context of Chapter 19, entitled "Arrest and Commitment; Fresh Pursuit," which deals with the authority to detain and pursue individuals. See also State v. Hodgson, Del. Super., 200 A.2d 567 (1964).
While the Court finds that the term, "other peace officers," in Section 1441(g) includes out-of-state peace officers, the factual question as to whether the defendant meets that definition remains one for the jury to decide. As such, at trial, the Court will instruct the jury that there is no jurisdictional limitation regarding the definition of "peace officers" within Section 1441(g), which would exempt the defendant from the statute if her job description fits within the definition. In addition, the Court will define "peace officer" as "any public officer authorized by law to make arrests in a criminal case," and the jury will decide whether the defendant's position fits within that definition.
11 Del. C. § 1901 (2). The Court finds that the use of the definition is reasonable for this limited purpose even though it is found in 11 Del. C. § 1901 (2) and has been interpreted to exclusively apply to Delaware public officials in the context of arrest and commitment.
Based upon the above, the defendant's motion is DENIED, and the matter will proceed to trial presently scheduled for November 8, 2000.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ________________________________ Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.