Opinion
IK99-09-0494-R1
March 5, 2001
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Upon Defendant's Motion For Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ANDREA MAYBEE FREUD, Commissioner
Marie O'Connor Graham, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware.
Mr. Alexander Odom, pro se.
The Defendant, Alexander Odom ("Odom") pled guilty on January 31, 2000 to one count Delivery of Cocaine, 16 Del. C. § 4751. Odom had also been charged with one count of Delivery of Cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, 16 Del. C. § 4767. If Odom had been convicted of all the charges, he faced a substantial period of incarceration. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State nolle prossed the remaining count. The Court proceeded to sentence Odom according to the Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreement to 20 years incarceration suspended after fifteen years, minimum mandatory, followed by probation. Odom did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the State Supreme Court, instead he filed the instant motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In his motion, Odom alleges two grounds for relief. First, Odom alleges that the Court abused it's discretion when it failed to inquire into Odom's statement that he was dissatisfied with his counsel's representation and by not appointing substitute counsel. Second, Odom claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate the case fully.
Under Delaware Law this Court must first determine whether Odom has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. This is Odom's first motion for postconviction and it was filed within three years of his conviction becoming final, so the requirements of Rule 61(i)(1) — requiring filing within three years — and (2) — requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in initial Rule 61 motion — are met. Neither of Odom's claims were raised at the plea, sentencing or on direct appeal, therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3) absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. Only Odom's second contention is based on ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have raised this issue earlier. Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to this claim at this point should Odom demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
In his first ground for relief, Odom claims that the Court abused it's discretion by failing to inquire into his dissatisfaction with his counsel. This claim is meritless, as a review of the plea colloquy clearly shows that the Court did in fact inquire into this issue and Odom eventually, under oath, stated he was satisfied with his counsel. This claim is clearly belied by the record and is meritless.
Transcript of plea at 46-56, 60-62.
Odom's remaining ground for relief is that his counsel did not represent him effectively. This contention superficially raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Odom must meet the two prong test of Strickland v. Washington In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires that a defendant show: 1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
466 U.s. 668 (1984) (" Strickland"); Larson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 200, 1994, Hartnett, J. (June 23, 1995) (ORDER); Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53 (1988), Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Accord Larson v. State, supra, at 3-4; Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER) Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d at 1172; Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 58.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556; Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., No. 318, 1993, Holland, J. (March 31, 1994)(ORDER).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 689); see also Larson v. State, supra, at 4; Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 at 753 (1990).
Id. at 754.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, including the affidavit of Odom's former counsel, it is abundantly clear that Odom has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find counsel's affidavit, in conjunction with the record, more credible than Odom's contention that counsel did not effectively represent him. Odom was facing trial on multiple charges. Due to his prior record, Odom was facing a lengthy period of mandatory jail time if convicted of all the offences. Odom's counsel was able to negotiate a plea with the state which limited Odom's amount of incarceration. Odom and his attorney discussed the case prior to the entry of the plea. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Odom. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Odom entered his guilty plea, he eventually stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Odom has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.
Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER); Mapps v. State, Del. Supr., No. 3, 1994, Holland, J. (March 17, 1994) (ORDER) (citing Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo that counsel's representation of Odom was somehow deficient, Odom must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. Odom simply asserts that his counsel didn't do enough in an attempt to show prejudice. Odom does not suggest what more counsel could have done. This statement is insufficient to establish prejudice. Odom has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from counsel's representation.
Larson v. State, supra, at 5; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Odom filled out a Guilty Plea Form and signed it. Odom wrote that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement. Odom is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, I confidently find that Odom entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that this ground for relief is completely meritless.
Hickman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 298, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 11, 1994) (ORDER); Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 465, 1989, Walsh, J. (January 4, 1990) (ORDER). See also Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 938 (1994) (ruling the fact that defendant filled out Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in defendant's own handwriting supported the Superior Court's conclusion that defendant's decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary).
I find that Odom's counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner and that Odom has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Odom's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. As to Odom's remaining claims, it is barred by Rule 61(i)(3). I recommend that the Court deny Odom's motion for postconviction relief.