Opinion
No. 5-068 / 04-0215
Filed February 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, John S. Mackey, Judge.
James Nelson appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, and Karen Kaufman, County Attorney for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
James Nelson appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.206(4)(b) and 124.401(5) (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
According to the minutes of testimony, on July 24, 2003, Iowa State Patrolman Joe Scott went to Nelson's residence in Forest City, Iowa, in an attempt to execute an arrest warrant for Nelson's son. Nelson confirmed that his son was living with him, but told Scott that his son was not at home. The next day Scott returned to Nelson's residence and again asked if Nelson's son was there. "At that time [Nelson] looked over his right shoulder and hesitated for just a second and he said `no, he [the son] didn't come home the previous night and he was in Woden.'" Once Scott told Nelson he did not believe him, Nelson conceded that his son was home and he would get him. Scott then followed Nelson into the living room where his son was at and observed in plain view a brass pipe with residue inside, and a "snort tube type ink pen" on a table. After placing Nelson's son under arrest and transporting him to the county jail, Scott applied for and executed a search warrant on Nelson's residence, which uncovered a vial of methamphetamine in a pair of jeans Nelson was wearing at the time of his son's arrest, and a bag of methamphetamine in a cardboard box in the basement.
On August 5, 2003, the State charged Nelson by trial information with the aforementioned offense. Nelson filed a motion to suppress on September 26, 2003, arguing Scott entered his residence without his consent to execute the arrest warrant for his son. The court denied the motion finding in part that:
In this case, the factual circumstances reflect that the defendant had attempted to protect his son from arrest on this occasion and did not promptly comply with Trooper Scott's demand for his son to be produced for service of the warrants. Additionally, Trooper Scott, it appears, was already inside the residence at the time of the service of the warrants and, in the opinion of the court, reasonably followed defendant up the steps into the living room area to ascertain the presence of defendant's son. The court finds and concludes that Trooper Scott's intrusion into defendant's residence was reasonably necessary for purposes of serving the warrants given defendant's initial recalcitrance and therefore defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
On January 14, 2004, the court found Nelson guilty after a trial on the minutes of testimony and thereafter sentenced him to serve two days in jail, ordered him to pay attorney fees, court costs, and surcharges, and required that he obtain a substance abuse evaluation. Nelson appeals.
On appeal, Nelson raises the following issues for review:
I.WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING MR. NELSON'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
II.WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND/OR POSSESSION ON THE PART OF MR. NELSON.II. Standard of Review
Because Nelson raises issues implicating his constitutional rights, our review of the district court's ruling on Nelson's motion to suppress is de novo. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). We review Nelson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 2003).
III. Arrest Warrant
Nelson's appeal is limited to whether Scott's entrance into Nelson's residence violated his constitutional rights and thus necessitates the exclusion of all evidence later obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree. He argues Scott should not have followed him into his residence because he was complying with the request to retrieve his son. The State believes that Scott was justified in following Nelson because Nelson's "actions and statements of the previous day, as well as on the day of the search, reflected such evasion that the officer reasonably could fear that if he merely waited at the front door, the son might escape."
"[A]n arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1388, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 661 (1980). Iowa Code section 804.15 provides:
If a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person whom the officer is authorized to arrest is present on any private premises, the officer may upon identifying the officer as such, demand that the officer be admitted to such premises for the purpose of making the arrest. If such demand is not promptly complied with, the officer may thereupon enter such premises to make the arrest, using such force as is reasonably necessary.
However, "[w]hen the suspect attempts to comply with the demands of police and exits [his] room, police may not force [him] back inside to the make the arrest." State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914, 923 (Iowa 2001) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). Compliance by the suspect, absent exigent circumstances or some other exception, destroys the authority to enter the residence to make an arrest. Id. Nelson maintains that according to the holding in Kubit, Scott improperly followed him into his residence. We disagree.
In Kubit, the court found the officers were not constitutionally justified in pushing a suspect back into her motel room to arrest her when she was attempting to exit. Id. at 924. Compliance by the suspect destroyed the right of the officers to enter the room under Iowa Code section 804.15. Id. at 923. In our case, however, Nelson failed to comply with Scott's request.
As previously mentioned, when Scott arrived for the second time at Nelson's residence and asked if his son was home, Nelson "looked over his right shoulder and hesitated for just a second and he said `no, he didn't come home the previous night and is in Woden.'" After Scott told Nelson he didn't believe him, Nelson conceded that his son was there and told Scott he would get him. Scott's demand was not "promptly complied with" because of Nelson's deceit and hesitancy. Accordingly, Scott was justified in entering the residence to effectuate the arrest. See Iowa Code § 804.15. We find no error in the trial court's denial of Nelson's motion to suppress.
IV. Sufficient Evidence
Nelson asserts there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the State failed to demonstrate that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found at his residence. We disagree.
A guilty verdict is binding upon us unless we conclude the record lacks substantial evidence to support such a finding. State v. Bush, 518 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Iowa 1994). Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993); State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The State must prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime with evidence that raises a fair inference of guilt. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d at 334. While a verdict can rest on circumstantial evidence alone, it must at least raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime. Id.
To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the defendant either actually or constructively possessed a controlled substance. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 569. Actual possession occurs when a defendant has "direct physical control" over the drugs. Id. Constructive possession is found when the State shows the defendant "maintained control or a right to control" the illegal drugs. Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 76 (citation omitted).
[W]here the accused has not been in exclusive possession of the premises but only in joint possession, knowledge of the presence of the [contraband] on the premises and the ability to maintain control over [the contraband] by the accused will not be inferred but must be established by proof. Such proof may consist either of evidence establishing actual knowledge by the accused, or evidence of incriminating statements or circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the accused of the presence of the [methamphetamine] on the premises.
Id. at 78-79 (citing State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Iowa 1973)).
Here, the State sought to prove Nelson constructively possessed the methamphetamine because the methamphetamine was not found on his person, but was instead found in the pocket of a pair of jeans and in a cardboard box in the basement. Based on our review of the record, we find there is substantial evidence from which the judge could infer that Nelson had knowledge of and control over the methamphetamine found in his residence. As previously noted, a vial of methamphetamine was found in a pair of jeans Nelson had been wearing when Scott arrived to execute the arrest warrant. Moreover, the methamphetamine found in the cardboard box was in close proximity to several of Nelson's prescription bottles. These circumstances provide a clear link establishing Nelson's knowing possession of the methamphetamine discovered at his residence. See Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 571 (discussing the factors utilized in determining constructive possession). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.