Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4073-12T1
02-06-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MUSTAFAA MUHAMMAD, a/k/a MUJTABAA MUHAMMAD, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jeffrey P. Mongiello, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Guadagno and Leone. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 12-02-0225. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jeffrey P. Mongiello, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Mustafaa Muhammad was arrested based on a police officer's mistaken belief that he was his twin brother, Mujtabba Muhammad, who was the subject of an arrest warrant. The issue presented is whether the officer's action was so unreasonable that drugs found in defendant's car should have been suppressed.
I.
On July 26, 2011, Officer James Ramsey of the Shrewsbury Borough Police Department was conducting random license plate checks from his marked police vehicle equipped with a mobile data terminal (MDT) computer. At approximately 9:30 p.m., Ramsey observed a Buick sedan, driven by defendant pull into a nearby service station. Two other passengers were in the Buick. An MDT check of the license plate indicated that there was an active arrest warrant for the registered owner of the car.
There is some confusion as to the specific information that was transmitted on the initial MDT report as it could not be printed from the terminal in Ramsey's vehicle. Ramsey testified that the warrant was for Mujtabba Muhammad but indicated that he was also known as Mustafaa Muhammad. The actual warrant was for Mujtabba Muhammad, but his name was mistakenly spelled "Mustaba."
To check the accuracy of the information displayed on the MDT, and to confirm that the warrant was still active, Ramsey contacted his dispatcher. While awaiting confirmation, the Buick began to leave the service station and Ramsey executed a traffic stop. Ramsey approached the Buick and asked for defendant's license and registration. Ramsey told defendant that he was investigating a warrant for Mujtabba Muhammad. Defendant told Ramsey that he was Mustafaa and Mujtabba was his brother. Defendant was aware of an outstanding warrant for his brother's arrest.
After returning to his police vehicle, Ramsey's dispatcher verbally confirmed that there was an active warrant for Mustaba Muhammad. The driver's license provided by defendant was in the name of Mustafaa Muhammad and was valid with no outstanding warrants. Ramsey questioned the two other occupants of the Buick as to defendant's identity and they did not answer, which further heightened his concern.
Confused as to the true identity of the driver, Ramsey called for backup. Officer Matt Ehrenreich, from the neighboring Red Bank Police Department, responded and told Ramsey he knew Mujtabba Muhammad and would be able to identify him. Ehrenreich walked up to the Buick, and after he returned, mistakenly told Ramsey that the driver was Mujtabba.
Intending to arrest defendant on the warrant, Ramsey and Ehrenreich approached the Buick. Standing by the passenger side, Ramsey smelled marijuana and asked the passenger to step out. Ramsey then noticed a glassine bag with pills on the seat where the passenger had been sitting. Ramsey then arrested defendant on the warrant and told him he would be taken to the police station and fingerprinted to determine his true identity. After placing defendant in his police car, Ramsey returned to the Buick and observed a rolled cigar in dark paper on the transmission hump between the front driver and passenger seats. At this point, Ramsey ordered the last passenger out of the car. Once he got out of the car, Ramsey noticed multiple glassine bags on the floor of the car. The two other passengers were also arrested and transported with defendant to the Shrewsbury police station.
After defendant was fingerprinted, Ramsey learned that he was not Mujtabba. Before questioning him as to the drugs, Ramsey advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Ramsey testified that, after the Miranda warnings, defendant did not specifically request an attorney but, at one point, he stopped answering questions and stated that he was unsure as to whether he should answer further questions. At this point, Ramsey presented defendant with a second Miranda waiver form, which defendant signed. Defendant then acknowledged that the drugs found in the Buick were his. Defendant testified at the motion to suppress that he requested an attorney.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The motion judge found the testimony of Ramsey and Ehrenreich to be candid and truthful. He also found that when Ehrenreich mistakenly identified defendant as Mujtabba, he was wrong but Ramsey did not know he was wrong and relied on his mistaken identification. The judge found that portions of defendant's testimony were not credible. He denied defendant's motion to suppress the drugs, finding that "in light of the facts known to Ramsey at the time, his determination to arrest defendant on the warrant was objectively reasonable." Similarly, he found that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights "not once but twice . . . and . . . he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights."
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance and was sentenced to a one-year suspended probationary term and ordered to pay a mandatory $155 fine.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FINDING THAT THE ARREST WARRANT WAS "INACCURATE AS FAR AS NAMES" SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN SUPPRESSION BECAUSE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES WHEN THE POLICE ACT UNREASONABLY BY RELYING ON A DEFECTIVE ARREST WARRANT WITH THE WRONG NAME OF THE WANTED PERSON AND ERRONEOUS INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THEM BY THE POLICE DISPATCHER AND/OR MONMOUTH COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT THAT RESULTED IN AN UNREASONABLY EXTENDED SEIZURE AFTER THE DEFENDANT PROVIDED OBJECTIVE PROOF OF HIS IDENTITY BY WAY OF HIS LEGAL DRIVER'S LICENSE AND OTHER IDENTIFICATION THAT PROVED HE WAS NOT THE WANTED PERSON. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. IV, XIV AND N.J. CONST. ART. I, PAR. 10.
POINT II
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
POINT III
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF THE ERRORS DEPRIVED THE JUVENILE OF JUSTICE.
Defendant was thirty-two at the time of his arrest and not a juvenile.
II.
A.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we "'must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 336 (2010) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "defer to the trial court's findings that are substantially influenced by [its] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case," and may make our own factual findings only if the trial court's findings "are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction . . . ." Id. at 336-37 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We owe no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and apply the law as we understand it. Id. at 337.
An investigatory stop is valid "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A reviewing court must assess whether the police conduct was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, which is a fact-sensitive inquiry. Mann, supra, 203 N.J. at 338.
Through the license plate inquiry, Ramsey learned of an active warrant for Mujtabba Muhammad, but the information indicated that Mujtabba was also known as Mustafaa Muhammad. When Ramsey approached the vehicle, and defendant provided identification indicating that he was Mustafaa Muhammad with the same date of birth, surname, and race as the subject of the warrant, Ramsey was unsure of the true identity of the driver of the car he had just stopped.
When Ramsey requested backup, Officer Ehrenreich arrived and told him he was familiar with Mujtabba Muhammad. Even though Ehrenreich mistakenly identified defendant as his twin brother, Ramsey's reliance on this misidentification was reasonable as was his decision to detain defendant until fingerprinting could conclusively establish his identity.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Ramsey's confusion as to defendant's identity was understandable and the length of time defendant was detained to determine his identity was reasonable.
In support of his argument that Ramsey acted unreasonably, defendant relies on our decision in State v. Handy, 412 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd, 206 N.J. 39 (2011). In Handy, the officer stopped the defendant for violating a city ordinance. Id. at 495. After Handy provided the officer with his name, date of birth, and address, the police dispatcher informed the officer that there was an outstanding warrant for Handy's arrest. Ibid. During a search incident to the arrest, the officer found marijuana and cocaine. Ibid. After arriving at the police station, the officer found that the warrant was for a different individual named "Handy," who had a different address and date of birth. Id. at 495-96.
Handy filed a motion to suppress, which was denied. Id. at 496. We reversed, finding that the actions of the police dispatcher were unreasonable in providing incomplete and inaccurate information to the arresting officer. Id. at 504.
Unlike Handy, there was no inaccurate reporting by the police dispatcher. The warrant here was valid, although Mujtabba's name was misspelled as Mustaba. The original information provided to Ramsey via the MDT indicated that the subject was also known as Mustafaa, the name on defendant's license. Moreover, defendant and his brother shared the same birthdate, although Ramsey did not know at the time of the arrest that they were twins. Therefore, defendant's reliance on Handy is misplaced.
The facts here are more analogous to State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 1999). In Green, two investigators were assigned to execute an arrest warrant for Corey Lovett, but mistakenly arrested the defendant, whose appearance matched Lovett's description. Id. at 349. When the investigators approached the defendant, he discarded a bag containing ninety small plastic vials of cocaine. Ibid.
In affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, we determined:
[T]here is no dispute concerning the validity of the warrant for Lovett's arrest, and we are satisfied that the arresting officer reasonably believed that defendant was Lovett. Defendant's appearance closely matched the description of Lovett set forth on the warrant identification card; the two men were substantially the same height, weight, age, race and complexion. Moreover, the investigators found defendant standing
directly in front of the house which the card indicated was Lovett's residence, and when the investigators identified themselves, defendant ran into that house. Therefore, the record amply supports the trial court's finding that the arresting officer's belief that defendant was the person named in the warrant was reasonable in light of the facts known to him at the time.
[Id. at 352.]
Like Green, given the close physical resemblance between defendant and his brother, the same dates of birth, and the alias his brother apparently used, Ramsey's belief was reasonable in light of the facts known to him at the time. We find no error in the denial of the motion to suppress.
B.
Defendant next argues that the police unlawfully obtained a confession despite repeated requests for counsel. Additionally, defendant argues that the trial judge did not apply the correct burden of proof in finding that his waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
"[F]or a confession to be admissible as evidence, prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances." State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000) (citing State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 534 (1996)). However, "unsuccessful challenges to statements and Miranda violations cannot be raised on appeal after a guilty plea, pursuant to R. 3:5-7(d)." State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495, 500 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 216 (1998). Because defendant pled guilty, he is not permitted to raise the Miranda claim on appeal.
An appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure, however, is an exception to the general rule of waiver following a guilty plea R. 3:5-7(d).
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C.
Defendant's remaining contention that the cumulative effect of errors requires reversal is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Before a new trial will be ordered, legal errors must be of "such magnitude as to prejudice the defendant's rights or, in their aggregate have rendered the trial unfair[.]" State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954). Incidental errors that do not prejudice the rights of a defendant cannot be invoked to reverse a valid conviction. Ibid. Defendant cites no authority extending the cumulative error doctrine to suppression hearings.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION