Opinion
No. 108,429.
2013-06-14
STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Robert MORSE, Appellee.
Appeal from Reno District Court; Trish Rose, Judge. Daniel D. Gilligan, assistant district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, for appellee.
Appeal from Reno District Court; Trish Rose, Judge.
Daniel D. Gilligan, assistant district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., PIERRON, J., and JAMES L. BURGESS, District Judge Retired, assigned.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The State appeals from the district court's suppression of the statements Robert Morse made after he invoked his right to remain silent. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Morse with making false information, felony theft, and theft by deception, in connection with a radiator stolen from a crane and sold to a scrap yard in Hutchinson, Kansas.
Detective Levi Blumanhorst of the Reno County Sheriff's Department interviewed Morse before the charges were filed. Blumanhorst began the interview by explaining he had just inputted Morse's name and found a warrant. Morse said he did not know about the warrant. Blumanhorst said because of the warrant, Morse was in custody. Blumanhorst proceeded to read Morse his Miranda rights. Morse said he understood his rights, agreed to talk to Blumanhorst, and signed a waiver form.
Blumanhorst's tone was relaxed when he started questioning Morse. He asked Morse to tell him about the radiator. Morse said he did scrap work, had been working along the Arkansas River, and was a regular customer of Midwest Iron and Metal scrap yard. He had pulled the radiator out of the river near Mount Hope last week, using his removable truck winch which was currently in his garage. Then Blumanhorst asked Morse if he had cleaned the radiator before selling it, which prompted the following exchange:
“MORSE: Of course I did.
“BLUMANHORST: Of course you did. Where did you do that at?
“MORSE: Uh, right there in the river [inaudible] it's bone dry. You know, it's not, there wasn't, it didn't have antifreeze [inaudible]. You know, it wasn't attached to anything, it was full of water.
“BLUMANHORST: [pause] Really?
“MORSE: Yeah, I mean, pretty much. It wasn't attached to anything, I know that. I guarantee that. You know, you, I don't, I don't understand what you're trying to get at. You, you, you accusing me of stealing it? Obviously, where did I steal it from?
“BLUMANHORST: Off a crane.
“MORSE: Off of a crane? Where is this at?
“BLUMANHORST: It's not down by Mount Hope.
“MORSE: Well then I don't
“BLUMANHORST: This, this matches up, is bent in exactly the same way, and I know the date this was stolen.
“MORSE: In the same way as what?
“BLUMANHORST: As the piece of equipment it was taken off of.
“MORSE: Bent, I don't understand, bent. Well it didn't come off anything, I know that for a fact.
“BLUMANHORST: How long do you think it had been down in the river?
“MORSE: Um [pause] I have no idea. I, I don't do forensics.
“BLUMANHORST: [shakes head, raises voice, and leans back in chair] Oh no, you work in a river, this is where you do your stuff, you say you always go down to the river
“MORSE: You know, I think [waves arm] I think we're done here . You know, I mean, you guys, if you guys had, you guys want to arrest me for this, then arrest me for this but you, you got nothing. It, it doesn't, it's completely legit, I make sure everything's legit, 100% [takes drink].
“BLUMANHORST: Okay, so then, if, if it's legit how long do you think it was down there?
“MORSE: I couldn't tell you, I couldn't tell you [inaudible] I mean, half the shit down there, I couldn't tell you where [raises arms above head] a week, 2 weeks, a month, a year, I don't know.” (Emphasis added.)
Blumanhorst continued questioning Morse for approximately 30 more minutes. Approximately 1 minute after saying, “I think we're done here,” Morse asked Blumanhorst, “Do you ever go looking in junk piles?”
Before trial, Morse filed a motion to suppress. The only evidence introduced was a video recording of Morse's interview with law enforcement. In granting the motion, the district judge made the following finding:
“In my review of the interview the defendant after answering questions for a time of approximately 10 minutes, I believe makes the statement, I think we're done here. The detective goes on and questions the defendant, and he does go on answering questions but the crucial statement is, I think we're done here, and I believe that questioning should have stopped at that point. The defendant was indicating his right to remain silent.”
The State filed a motion to reconsider suppression. In denying the motion, the district judge made this finding:
“[A]fter the defendant said what he said about I think we're done here, the detective immediately came back with, so if it's legitimate, how long do you think it had been down there? A very terse, fairly, what I would say a bit louder and abrupt statement, I think. And he also made the statement you work in the river. To me the interview changed at that point. What should have happened is the interview should have ceased because I do believe the defendant invoked his right to remain silent at that point,”
The district judge also clarified that Morse's interview was custodial and “his statements were involuntary after the point at which he said, I think we're done here.”
The State filed an interlocutory appeal.
ANALYSIS
The State argues that Morse did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent by saying “I think we're done here.”
An appellate court uses a bifurcated standard when reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress. The factual underpinnings of the suppression decision are reviewed under a substantial competent evidence standard, and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. An appellate court does not reweigh evidence. When the facts are undisputed, an appellate court exercises unlimited de novo review of the district court's legal conclusion. State v. Edgar, 296 Kan. 513, 519–20, 294 P.3d 251 (2013).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides defendants in criminal prosecutions with protection from self-incrimination, protection that includes the right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 80, 201 P.3d 673 (2009). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant indicates “in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” 384 U.S. at 473–74. The Kansas Supreme Court has further held that the invocation of the right to remain silent cannot be ambiguous or equivocal. See State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 617–19, 102 P.3d 406 (2004); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (“The Court has not yet stated whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal, but there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel.”).
Under Miranda, a suspect must make an unambiguous statement so that a reasonable police officer would understand it to be an invocation of the right to remain silent. When a suspect makes a statement which may be ambiguous as to whether he or she is asserting his or her right to remain silent, the interrogator may, but is not required to, ask clarifying questions or may continue the interrogation. State v. Cline, 295 Kan. 104, 113, 283 P.3d 194 (2012). An interrogator who forgoes clarification risks a ruling that the invocation was unambiguous, which renders the suspect's subsequent statements inadmissible. See State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 70–71, 183 P.3d 801 (2008). In determining whether an invocation of the right to remain silent was clear and unambiguous, only the defendant's prior statements and alleged statement of invocation maybe be considered. The defendant's post-invocation statements are irrelevant. Cline, 295 Kan. at 114.
The district court's decision to suppress the statements Morse made after he said “I think we're done here” is supported by caselaw. The Kansas Supreme Court has deemed certain alleged invocations ambiguous outright. See State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 924, 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (“I think that might be all for you”), cert denied537 U.S. 834 (2002); State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 975–76, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994) (“I'm not sure what I want to do”).
Kansas appellate courts have also offered the reasoning behind their findings of ambiguity. In State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 273, 979 P.2d 1239 (1999), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 204 P.3d 585 (2009), our Supreme Court found the statement “[s]o that's all I[got] to say” to be ambiguous since it could have been interpreted to mean the defendant had finished explaining the matter. See also State v. Birth, 37 Kan.App.2d 753, 772–73, 158 P.3d 345 (“Let's leave it at that” was ambiguous since it could have been interpreted to mean the defendant had said all he was going to say about the bullet allegedly found in his car.), rev. denied 284 Kan. 947 (2007).
Furthermore, Kansas appellate courts have deemed certain alleged invocations ambiguous where law enforcement immediately sought clarification and the defendant agreed to keep talking. In Holmes, our Supreme Court found the statement “I think I'll just quit talking, I don't know” to be ambiguous since it could have been interpreted to mean the defendant did not want to talk about the details of the shooting at that moment and did not know if he should. The court went on to find that because the statement could also have been interpreted as an invocation of the right to remain silent, the officers properly sought clarification and the defendant expressed his desire to talk about something else. 278 Kan. at 617–20; see State v. Morfitt, 25 Kan.App.2d 8, 13–15, 956 P.2d 719 (“You all are scaring me I think, yeah, I shouldn't say anymore” was equivocal and defendant expressed his desire to keep talking after detectives sought clarification), rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998).
In this case, a reasonable police officer would have understood Morse's statement taken in tandem with the physical act of waving his arms to be an invocation of the right to remain silent. Rather than saying “I think we might be done here” or “I'm not sure if we're done here,” Morse interrupted Blumanhorst's new and harsh line of questioning by saying, “I think we're done here.” As he spoke, Morse waved his arm as if to cut off further questioning from Blumanhorst. Morse did make an additional statement after invoking his right to remain silent, but he was professing his innocence in response to Blumanhorst's accusatory suggestion that he knew how long the radiator had been in the river. Instead of ending the interrogation, Blumanhorst pressed Morse for an answer to his last question.
Therefore, the district court did not err by granting Morse's motion to suppress on the basis that he had invoked his right to remain silent.
Affirmed.