Opinion
A15-0407
02-08-2016
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Joshua Bruce Monson, Appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent) Lee M. Orwig, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). Affirmed
Reyes, Judge Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34CR12611 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent) Lee M. Orwig, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
On appeal from his DWI conviction, appellant argues that the stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional and that he was denied the right to present a complete defense at trial. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 29, 2012, at approximately 11:51 p.m., a deputy was travelling west on County Road 10 in Spicer. As he approached the intersection of County Road 10 and Highway 23, he noticed appellant Joshua Bruce Monson's vehicle travelling north on Highway 23. Appellant signaled a right turn to head east on County Road 10. The deputy observed appellant make a wide right turn, where the driver's side tires crossed the centerline. The deputy then made a U-turn and followed appellant's vehicle into the parking lot of a nearby restaurant and bar. The deputy did not have to initiate a traffic stop because he apprehended appellant after he had parked his vehicle.
While speaking to appellant, the deputy noticed signs of intoxication, including watery eyes and the odor of alcohol on appellant's breath. Appellant performed poorly on standard field sobriety tests, and a preliminary breath test revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.099. The deputy arrested appellant for driving while intoxicated. Appellant was taken to jail and read the implied-consent advisory. The deputy administered a breath test, which showed an alcohol concentration of 0.10.
Appellant was charged with one count of driving while impaired, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2010), and one count of driving while impaired with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 within two hours of driving, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2010). At a contested omnibus hearing, the deputy and appellant testified. In addition, the state introduced the deputy's squad-car video into evidence. Following the hearing, the district court concluded that the stop was constitutional and that the evidence of appellant's alcohol concentration was admissible. Appellant proceeded to trial before a jury pro se. The state dismissed the driving-while-impaired count. The jury found appellant guilty of third-degree driving while impaired with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 within two hours of driving. This appeal follows.
The parties do not dispute whether a "stop" occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes. --------
DECISION
I. The district court's finding that appellant violated traffic laws is not clearly erroneous.
Appellant asserts that he did not commit the alleged driving infraction of making a wide right-hand turn, and therefore, the stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional, and all evidence seized as a result of the stop must be suppressed. We disagree.
When reviewing a district court's pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). "A [district] court's finding is erroneous if this court, after reviewing the record, reaches the firm conviction that a mistake was made." State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983). In addition, "[d]eterminations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the trial court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous." State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).
"Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle." State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 1 (2010), provides that "a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway." Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) (2010), provides that "both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway." The district court found that appellant violated both Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 1, and Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a). The deputy testified that appellant made a wide right-hand turn. Appellant testified that he did not make a wide turn. The district court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the evidence before it and found the deputy's testimony more credible. This court defers to the district court's credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012). Moreover, the squad-car video supports the deputy's testimony. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that appellant made a wide right-hand turn.
Appellant claims that Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a), allows a person to make a wide turn if necessary, and the state failed to prove that appellant's wide turn was not made out of necessity. Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) provides, "When necessary to accommodate vehicle configuration, a driver is permitted to make a right turn into the farthest lane of a roadway with two or more lanes in the same direction in order to make a U-turn at a reduced-conflict intersection, if it is safe to do so." But soon after the deputy observed appellant make the wide turn, appellant did not make a U-turn but turned into the parking lot of a local establishment to pick up a friend who was too intoxicated to drive. Thus, appellant did not make a wide turn in order to make a U-turn at a reduced-conflict intersection, and the statutory exception is not applicable.
Appellant further contends that the district court misinterpreted his testimony at the omnibus hearing. Appellant testified that, in response to the deputy's question about making a wide turn, he apologized. In his testimony, appellant was clear that his apology was not intended to communicate his agreement with the deputy's assertion regarding the wide turn but that appellant did not want to argue with the deputy. Based on this testimony, the district court made the following factual finding: "The [appellant] testified that he did not know he had made a wide, right-hand turn and crossed the center line with his tires. He also stated that he had agreed with [the deputy] that he had crossed the double yellow line with his front tires to avoid conflict." We discern no error in the district court's order following the omnibus hearing. When read in context, the district court's finding accurately portrays appellant's testimony that he did not agree that he made a wide right-hand turn and crossed the centerline. He simply agreed with the deputy to avoid conflict.
Appellant cites State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1983) and asserts that, unless a wide turn is "especially egregious," more is required for the traffic stop to be valid. Admittedly, in Schinzing, there were additional driving infractions supporting the stop. Id. But appellant fails to acknowledge that the stop of his vehicle was also supported by the additional violation of crossing the centerline, the determination of which is not discretionary. Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 1.
Appellant further cites unpublished authority and argues that allowing traffic stops based solely on wide turns creates a risk that law enforcement officers will be permitted to conduct arbitrary stops. First, unpublished opinions are of limited value in deciding an appeal. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (stating that "[u]npublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential"). Moreover, appellant's argument regarding the risk of arbitrary stops based on minor traffic violations are foreclosed by precedent. See State v. Wagner, 637 N.W.2d 330, 335-36 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing several cases where one or more minor driving infractions provided the basis for a stop).
Therefore, we conclude that the district court's factual findings regarding appellant's driving conduct are supported by the record. Because the deputy observed appellant's vehicle make a wide turn and cross over the centerline, the district court did not err in finding that the stop was constitutional.
II. The district court's conclusion that the squad-car video was irrelevant at trial was not an abuse of discretion.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to introduce the squad-car video at trial. Appellant further claims that the exclusion of the video violated his right to present a complete defense. We are not persuaded.
Evidentiary rulings "will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). "On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced." Id. Additionally, "[e]very criminal defendant has a right to fundamental fairness and to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. App. 1995) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996). "The right to present a defense includes the opportunity to develop the defendant's version of the facts, so the jury may decide where the truth lies." Id. But this right is not without limits, and the defendant must comport with the rules of evidence. See State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 195 (Minn. 1992). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Minn. R. Evid. 401. But, otherwise relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Appellant argues on appeal that the squad-car video is relevant because it goes to the date, time, and location of the offense. But at trial, appellant sought to introduce the video to prove that he did not admit to making a wide turn and crossing the center line. Because appellant did not present the date, time, and location argument to the district court, we need not address it on appeal. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) ("This court generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court."); see also State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 2015). Nevertheless, appellant's argument is unavailing.
While the video does prove that appellant was in Kandiyohi County at approximately 11:51 p.m. on June 29, 2012, it is cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial that also supports this finding, namely trial testimony by both the deputy and appellant. Minn. R. Evid. 403. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that considerations of waste of time and needless presentation of cumulative evidence outweighed any probative value of the video. See State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 109 (Minn. 2009) (holding that the failure to admit video evidence was harmless in part because it was "largely redundant"); State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 551 (Minn. 1988) (holding no abuse of discretion where excluded evidence was duplicative and thus cumulative and delaying).
Appellant also asserts that the squad-car video should have been admitted to rebut the deputy's testimony regarding the level of appellant's intoxication. Appellant did not object to the deputy's testimony at trial. Thus, we need not address this argument on appeal. Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357; Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d at 278. Nonetheless, appellant's argument is without merit.
Appellant argues that the deputy's testimony regarding appellant's conduct on the night of the incident was irrelevant because the breath test established precisely how intoxicated appellant was at the time of the arrest. Appellant therefore asserts that he should have been allowed to introduce the squad-car video to rebut the deputy's irrelevant testimony. But the squad-car video is itself irrelevant because it cannot rebut the breath-test evidence. "Evidence must be relevant to be admissible, and there is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence." State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 615 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014).
Finally, even if we were to assume that the district court erred in excluding the squad-car video at trial, any error was harmless because it would not have influenced the verdict. State v. Woelfel, 621 N.W.2d 767, 774 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2001). As previously discussed, substantial evidence supported appellant's conviction. In particular, the results from the breath test conclusively established appellant's alcohol concentration on the night of the offense. And appellant admitted at trial to driving the vehicle on June 29, 2012 in Kandiyohi County. Therefore, we conclude that "a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict even if the excluded evidence had been admitted," and the decision to exclude the squad-car video was harmless. Id.
Affirmed.