Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2382-13T3
03-12-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WILLIAM B. MIRANDA, Defendant-Appellant.
Michael C. Woyce argued the cause for appellant (Murphy & Woyce, attorneys; Mr. Woyce, on the briefs). Catherine A. Foddai, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Foddai, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ostrer and Sumners. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Accusation No. 96-04-0590. Michael C. Woyce argued the cause for appellant (Murphy & Woyce, attorneys; Mr. Woyce, on the briefs). Catherine A. Foddai, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Foddai, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the trial court's order denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant asserts that the trial court amended and increased his sentence after it was completely served, in violation of the double jeopardy clause. See U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 11. We disagree, and affirm.
I.
Defendant, a music teacher, pleaded guilty in April 1996 to five counts of second-degree sexual assault of five young girls who were his private piano pupils. In connection with his plea, defendant signed a three-page form, entitled "Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses." He acknowledged that he would be subject to community supervision for life (CSL), see L. 1994, c. 130, codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, as well as registration and community notification requirements. At the plea hearing, the judge highlighted defendant's registration requirement under Megan's Law, and referred to community notification. She then stated, "I'm encapsulating the three pages you filled out here, do you understand?" Defendant answered in the affirmative. The judge then asked "And you went over the additional questions with your lawyer on Megan's Law?" Defendant said he did.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 was significantly amended by L. 2003, c. 267, and clarified that "community supervision for life" was a form of parole; consequently, the law thereafter used the term, "parole supervision for life."
Pursuant to his plea agreement, on August 2, 1996, the court sentenced defendant as if he were a third-degree offender, to five concurrent five-year terms. The judgment of conviction (JOC) stated, "Megan's Law Applies." His sentence was to be served at the New Jersey Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center at Avenel (Avenel). During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the court to sentence defendant to State prison, instead of Avenel. The court declined, noting that if defendant were sentenced to a prison term, he would be eligible for adult parole after little over a year. The court noted defendant would likely serve a longer term in custody based on an Avenel sentence. At one point, during the defense argument in favor of a State prison sentence, defense counsel asserted that parole would require defendant to attend treatment for as long as deemed necessary. The court noted in response that "Megan's Law does apply."
Defendant was finally discharged from Avenel on August 31, 1999, after serving slightly over three years. He was not subject to regular adult parole, nor did the Parole Board immediately commence CSL. Instead, on October 20, 1999, the Chairman of the Parole Board wrote to the sentencing judge for a clarification as to "whether the sentence imposed by you was required to include a special sentence of community supervision for life pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4." The chairman copied the attorney who represented defendant at his sentencing, but may not have sent a copy directly to defendant.
Apparently in response to the letter, the trial court, by a different judge, entered an amended JOC, which stated, "Megan's Law Applies. Defendant is sentenced to community supervision for life." The new JOC was signed and dated February 17, 2000. A month later, the Division of Parole advised defendant to "contact in regards to community supervision for life component of your sentence." Defendant did so without objection. He signed a document on April 7, 2000, acknowledging his understanding that he was subject to CSL, and accepting the pertinent general conditions.
There is no indication from the record that the trial court provided notice to defendant before amending the JOC. The appropriate course would have been for the court to advise defendant, and to provide him with an opportunity to show cause why the court should not clarify the JOC.
Over twelve years later, defendant filed his first petition for PCR. Relying on the Court's recent decision in State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295 (2012), defendant argued that CSL was imposed upon him after he completed his sentence, and violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause. Eventually, the trial court denied the petition, holding (1) the petition was time-barred under Rule 3:22-12; and (2) the petition lacked merit because defendant had not completed his sentence when the JOC was amended, because he served slightly over three years of a five-year term.
Defendant presents the following points on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL DETERMINATIONS AS TO WHETHER MR. MIRANDA HAD COMPLETED HIS SENTENCE AND WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF A SPECIAL SENTENCE OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR LIFE AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE SENTENCE VIOLATED DOUBLE JEOPARDY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY DEFERENCE AND THE APPELLATE COURT'S REVIEW IS PLENARY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONE[OUS]LY DETERMINED THAT MR. MIRANDA HAD COMPLETED ONLY HIS CUSTODIAL SENTENCE, NOT HIS ENTIRE SENTENCE, BECAUSE MR. MIRANDA ONLY RECEIVED A CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ON HIS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.
POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. SCHUBERT, 212 N.J. 295 (2012), IS DETERMINATIVE IN THIS MATTER AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED THAT THE STATE CAN NOT AMEND AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE TO INCLUDE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR LIFE AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAS FINISHED SERVING THE SENTENCE ORIGINALLY IMPOSED.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THE PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WAS TIME BARRED.
II.
As the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we exercise de novo review of the trial court's factual inferences from the documentary record. State v . Harris, 181 N . J . 391, 420-21 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U . S . 1145, 125 S . Ct . 2973, 162 L . Ed . 2d 898 (2005). Consequently, we may "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id . at 421.
Here, we affirm the trial court's denial of PCR, but we do so for reasons other than those provided by the trial court. See State v. DeLuca, 325 N.J. Super. 376, 389 (App. Div. 1999) (stating that an appellate court may affirm the trial court's order for reasons other than those of the trial court), aff'd as modified, 168 N.J. 626 (2001).
We recognize, as the Court held in Schubert, supra, a court may not enhance a defendant's sentence after he has completed his service of it. 212 N.J. at 313. To do so violates the defendant's rights under the double jeopardy clause. Ibid. In Schubert, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault in 2000. Id. at 299. Although his conviction subjected him to a sentence of CSL, the sentencing court neglected to check the designated box in the JOC form in use at the time, to indicate imposition of that aspect of his sentence. Id. at 301. The oversight was not discovered until defendant was discharged from probation. Id. at 300-01. Although the failure to impose CSL was "illegal," inasmuch as it was a mandatory aspect of the sentence of Schubert's crime, the Court held that once defendant finished serving his sentence, it was too late to correct the error without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 313.
Defendant argues the same reasoning applies here. We disagree. Defendant's petition is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of his sentence — that is, that his original sentence did not include CSL. The JOC referred generally that "Megan's Law Applies." In doing so, the court indicated that defendant would be subject to the package of laws known as "Megan's Law," including L. 1994, c. 130, which established CSL. As the Court explained in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12 (1995), "Megan's Law" referred to the group of bills concerning sex offenders that became law on October 31, 1994, in the wake of the abduction, rape, and murder of the girl after whom the laws were named. Included in that group was L. 1994, c. 130, codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, pertaining to community supervision. Doe, supra, 142 N.J. at 25, n.6. See also Cannell, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, Comment N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 (2015) (stating that section 6.4, including CSL and later parole supervision for life, "was adopted . . . as part of 'Megan's Law'").
Defendant's argument that his original JOC "included Megan's Law Registration" but did not include community supervision, is belied by the text of the JOC. Nothing in the JOC restricted the application of Megan's Law to the provisions pertaining to registration. Defendant was sentenced less than two years after enactment of "Megan's Law." The Administrative Office of the Courts had not yet promulgated a JOC form that included a specific section for designating imposition of a CSL sentence. In other words, there was no blank box — as there was in Schubert — from which one could conclude an omission of a CSL sentence. Instead, there was the general provision that "Megan's Law Applies."
The Criminal Practice Committee proposed a revised JOC form in its 1994-1996 Report issued on February 19, 1996, and the Supreme Court approved the form on September 25, 1996. The new form included check-off boxes for CSL and for a finding regarding "a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior." The boxes were intended to make those dispositions "clearly identifiable in future cases." Report of the Committee on Criminal Practice, 1994-96 Term.
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Consequently, we view the Parole Board Chairman's letter as a request for a clarification. The trial court amended the JOC to expressly describe an aspect of the sentence that was already imposed by the general reference to "Megan's Law" in the original JOC — defendant was required to serve CSL.
Given our interpretation of defendant's original JOC, we need not address defendant's remaining arguments.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION