Summary
holding officer had reasonable suspicion when the car substantially matched the description provided by the dispatcher
Summary of this case from Puente v. StateOpinion
No. 05-02-01359-CR.
Opinion Issued April 16, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MB01-16946-B. Reversed and Remanded.
Before Justices MORRIS, WHITTINGTON, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
The issue in this State's appeal is whether a police officer was justified in stopping Timothy Martin Mercer after observing his car weaving in traffic. In a single issue, the State contends the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop. We agree and reverse the trial court's order granting appellee's motion to suppress. The arresting officer received a dispatch call describing a possibly intoxicated driver. The dispatcher said that an anonymous caller had reported a white male in a gold pickup truck weaving in the westbound lanes of Belt Line Road. After receiving the call, the officer located a gold pickup truck that generally fit the description. He fell in behind the truck to observe the driver. On two occasions, despite heavy traffic on the road, the wheels of the pickup crossed the dotted lines between the right lane and the center lane and then returned to the right lane. Other vehicles near the pickup seemed to be slowing down to avoid contact with it. The officer was concerned about the safety of the other drivers. He admitted, however, that the other vehicles may also have slowed so they would not pass his police car. Because he believed appellee had violated traffic laws by failing to maintain a single lane of traffic and failing to signal a lane change, the officer stopped appellee. Appellee challenged the stop in a motion to suppress, which was granted by the trial court. We must now determine whether the trial court erred in granting the motion. A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigation if the officer, in light of his experience, reasonably believes that criminal activity may be afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Reasonable suspicion may be demonstrated by showing specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably suspect the person has engaged in or is engaging in criminal activity. See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). The subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant; as long as an objective basis exists for the stop under the totality of the circumstances, it will be upheld. See id. In deciding whether the State has demonstrated an objective basis for the stop, we use a bifurcated standard of review. We give almost total deference to the trial court in determining what the actual facts are and then review de novo whether those facts were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion. See id. The trial judge in this case verbally indicated that appellee's crossing the dividing line only two times was insufficient to justify the stop. Therefore, we know the trial court accepted the officer's uncontroverted testimony about appellee's actions, at least as to the weaving of his car, but thought appellee's actions did not give the officer reasonable suspicion for the stop. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (holding that unless trial court expresses its rationale for granting a motion to suppress either verbally or in writing, where uncontroverted testimony adds up to probable cause, appellate court must defer almost entirely to trial court's decision). When the arresting officer located a truck matching the dispatcher's description of a possibly intoxicated driver, he saw appellee weave out of his lane two times without signaling, despite the fact that he was in heavy traffic. The officer noticed other drivers avoiding contact with appellee's truck, and he feared for their safety. We conclude the totality of the circumstances in this case objectively amount to a reasonable suspicion that appellee was driving while intoxicated. See Dowler v. State, 44 S.W.3d 666, 670-71 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. ref'd). Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellee, the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion to suppress. We resolve the State's sole issue in its favor. We reverse the trial court's order and remand the case for further proceedings.