Opinion
C. A. S21C-03-017 FJJ
01-24-2023
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, UPON THE RELATION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff, v. MELPAR, LLC, 1,7761995 SQUARE FEET (0.0408 ACRES) OF LAND, 711.9788 SQUARE FEE (0.0163 ACRES) OF LAND, 3,598.7712 SQUARE FEET (0.0826 ACRES) PART OF TAX MAP AND PARCEL NUMBER 234-23.00-269.14 SITUATE IN INDIAN RIVER HUNDRED. Defendant.
Bradley Eaby, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware, Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, The Abbott Law Firm, Hockessin, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant Melpar, LLC.
Submitted: January 12, 2023
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion for Reargument DENIED.
Bradley Eaby, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware,
Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, The Abbott Law Firm, Hockessin, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant Melpar, LLC.
ORDER
FRANCIS J. JONES, JR., JUDGE
This 24th day of January, upon consideration of the Motion for Reargument brought by Defendant Melpar, LLC ("Melpar"), it appears to the Court that:
1. The Court issued an Opinion and Order in this condemnation case resolving Melpar's Motion for Fees and Costs on December 28, 2022. Melpar now moves for reargument of the December Opinion. Upon careful review, the Motion must be DENIED.
The Court carefully reviewed the parties' written submissions and arguments. The State requested permission to file its Response later than the date prescribed by the scheduling order. Melpar did not oppose the request, so the Court considered the State's Response in Opposition to the Motion, as well. See In re Dingee, 316 A.2d 555 (Del. 1974).
2. Here, Melpar submits the Court misread the operative language of 10 Del. C. § 6111(2), which awards a prevailing party costs and fees "actually incurred because of the condemnation trial." According to Melpar, the Court narrowly interpreted the language as a restrictive clause, as opposed to a nonessential clause that merely provides examples of litigation expenses.
3. The Court will only grant reargument when it has overlooked controlling precedent or legal principles, or misapprehend the law or facts in a way that would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision. Reargument is not an opportunity for a party to revisit arguments already decided by the Court.
See Peters ex rel. Peters v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 2012 WL 1622396, at *1 (Del. Super. May 7, 2012), aff'd, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013), as revised (Jan. 9, 2013).
See id.
4. The Court did not overlook a controlling precedent or legal principle, or misapprehend the law or facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision. Nor did the Court misinterpret the language of 10 Del. C. § 6111(2).
5. Therefore, Melpar's Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.