Opinion
No. 106,107.
2013-01-18
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Deborah MEEKS, Appellant.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; John J. McNally, Judge. Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; John J. McNally, Judge.
Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ATCHESON, P.J., BUSER and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Deborah Meeks appeals from her conviction by ajury of second-degree intentional murder. She alleges the district court denied her due process and violated her right to a fair trial by refusing her request to establish a claim of self-defense based on battered-woman syndrome. She further alleges that the district court committed reversible error by granting the State's motion in limine precluding the introduction into evidence of the victim's violent acts toward Meeks. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Facts
On December 21, 2009, Meeks left work, planning to meet up that evening with her boyfriend, Larry Williams. Around this time, Meeks received a text message from her former boyfriend/common-law husband, Wesley Smith, asking her to bring him some food.
Meeks and Smith had a long-standing, tumultuous relationship. Meeks had a daughter from a previous relationship, and Meeks and Smith had a daughter together. Smith was controlling as well as physically and emotionally abusive toward Meeks and her extended family. For example, just days before the murder, Smith demanded that Meeks spend the night and have sex with him in exchange for his lending her a car while hers was inoperable. At the time of the murder, Meeks and Smith were living separately, although both of Meeks' daughters lived with Smith.
On December 21, Meeks brought the food Smith requested to his house. They got into an argument because Smith complained the food was cold. While Meeks was at Smith's house, Williams arrived at her house. After arguing for some time with Smith, Meeks left the house but told Smith she would come back. She testified that she felt she had to return after their argument because otherwise he would have come to her house.
Meeks then received a text message from Williams, who had waited half an hour for her to come home. Williams stated he felt he was not a priority with her and, as a result, he was leaving. Once home, Meeks was upset and took a shower. She started to think about and heard “voices” talking about a gun given to her by Smith that she kept in a box beneath her bed. She eventually took out the gun and then tried to lie down and rest, but could not and left with the gun.
Meeks testified that she went to Smith's house with the gun to scare him the way he scared her. Entering the house through the garage door, she went to a bathroom and cocked the gun, at which point one of the bullets fell out. Meeks put the bullet in her pocket and continued upstairs towards Smith's bedroom. She found Smith sitting on his bed, raised the gun in his direction, and pulled the trigger. The gun did not fire and a bullet fell out. Meeks testified that Smith gave her a funny look that made her think it was either him or her at this point and she had to defend herself. The record reflects that the police found two handguns within arm's reach of Smith in his bedroom, although he was not reaching for them when Meeks was shooting at him. The record does not reflect, however, whether Meeks was aware these guns were in the room. Nevertheless, Meeks then manipulated the slide on the gun and pulled the trigger several more times until the gun finally fired and a bullet struck Smith in the chest.
Smith then tried to run toward the bathroom, but he dropped to the floor. Meeks walked out of the bedroom, past one of her daughters, and called 911. During that call, when asked why she shot Smith, Meeks stated that she was “tired of his threats and his ways .” The 911 operator then told her to put the gun in the mailbox and stand across the street, which Meeks did until she was arrested by responding officers.
Prior to trial, Meeks filed a motion requesting the appointment of an expert witness to give testimony regarding battered-woman syndrome. The State's response noted that Meeks had not alleged that she was claiming self-defense or that she suffered from a mental disease or defect, so battered-woman syndrome was not a valid defense. At the motion hearing, Meeks' attorney referenced the State's response and stated that he “can't disagree with anything that's in there.” Nonetheless, the court allowed the expert to examine Meeks.
The expert's report determined that Meeks was a battered woman. The expert found that Smith was escalating the violence in the relationship during the 2 weeks preceding his death, at several points telling her: “I am trying to keep from killing you. You don't know how bad I just want to kill you,' and ‘You don't know what you are doing to me.’ “ The report also described interviews with members of Meeks' family and friends, in which they described numerous acts of violence, threats, and abuse by Smith toward Meeks.
After the expert examined Meeks and submitted his report, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion seeking a ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding battered-woman syndrome. The district court ultimately held that expert testimony and reports on the issue of battered-woman syndrome were not admissible because neither Meeks' expert nor the psychologists performing an earlier competency examination found Meeks had any mental disease or defect and there was no indication of self-defense. Meeks' attorney admitted at that hearing that there was no defense of mental illness or self-defense in this case. The district court also determined that evidence regarding the guns found in Smith's bedroom and evidence of specific instances of domestic abuse by Smith toward Meeks also were inadmissible. The court noted, however, that “some basic background” about the relationship between the parties would be admissible.
After a jury trial, Meeks was convicted of second-degree intentional murder and was sentenced to 155 months in prison and 36 months of postrelease supervision.
Analysis
Meeks argues on appeal that the district court denied her due process right to put on a defense at trial by refusing to allow her expert to testify regarding battered-woman syndrome. She further asserts that the district court erred in refusing to allow the jury to hear evidence of specific instances of Smith's abusive conduct.
When reviewing a district court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence, an appellate court first determines whether the evidence is relevant. All relevant evidence is admissible unless statutorily prohibited. K.S.A. 60–407(f); State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, 382, 204 P.3d 578 (2009). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.” K.S.A. 60–401(b). There are two elements of relevant evidence: a materiality element and a probative element. State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 261 –62, 213 P.3d 728 (2009). Evidence is material if the fact is “ ‘ “significant under the substantive law of the case and properly at issue.” ‘ “ State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). Evidence is probative if it has “any tendency in reason to prove” a material fact. K.S.A. 60–401(b); 286 Kan. at 505. The issue of whether evidence is probative is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, whereas the materiality of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 586, 243 P.3d 352 (2010).
But even if evidence is both probative and material, the trial court must still determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for producing undue prejudice. Appellate courts review this determination for abuse of discretion. State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1227, 221 P.3d 561 (2009).
Once relevance is established, the district court must then apply the statutory rules controlling the admission and exclusion of evidence. These statutory rules are treated either as a matter of law or as an exercise of the trial court's discretion, depending upon the rule in question. Therefore, the standard of review that is applicable on appeal will depend upon which rule the court applied to determine the admissibility of the evidence at issue. Riojas, 288 Kan. at 383. Whether the trial court complied with specific statutory requirements for admitting evidence requires interpretation of a statute, which appellate courts review de novo. State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 80, 145 P.3d 18 (2006).
1. Expert Testimony Regarding Battered–Woman Syndrome
Meeks first claims that the district court's decision to prevent her expert from testifying to her opinion that Meeks was a battered woman deprived her of her right to assert a claim of self-defense based on battered-woman syndrome, which in turn denied her a fair trial, in violation of her constitutional right to due process of the law.
When a constitutional right is involved, the discretion of the district court is limited. Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 544, 216 P.3d 158 (2009); State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 82, 201 P.3d 673 (2009). An exercise of discretion that results in an error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be found to be harmless unless the court is willing to declare the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 520, 174 P.3d 407 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012).
Under the United States and Kansas Constitutions, a defendant is entitled to present the theory of his or her defense, and excluding evidence that is an integral part of that theory violates a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 102, 62 P.3d 220 (2003). The right of a defendant in a criminal trial to due process is in essence the right to a fair trial opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial is violated if the court excludes relevant, admissible, and noncumulative evidence that is an integral part of the theory of defense. State v. Patton, 280 Kan. 146, 156, 120 P.3d 760 (2005), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 38, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). The trial court must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the theories of both the prosecution and the accused when there is competent supporting evidence. State v. Hickey, 12 Kan.App.2d 781, 784, 757 P.2d 735,rev. denied 243 Kan. 781 (1988). The right to present a defense, however, is subject to statutory rules and caselaw interpretation of the rules of evidence and procedure. State v. Thomas, 252 Kan. 564, 573, 847 P.2d 1219 (1993).
Finally, the admission of expert testimony generally lies within the trial court's sound discretion, and its decision will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 831, 190 P.3d 207 (2008). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied132 S.Ct. 1594 (2012). a. Meeks did not make a self-defense claim for the district court to exclude
Meeks argues that the district court denied her a fair trial in violation of her constitutional right to due process of the law by not allowing her to establish a self-defense claim. Meeks' argument, however, puts the cart before the horse because, as Meeks herself acknowledges, she never asserted a claim of self-defense to the charges brought against her.
At the hearing on Meeks' application to appoint the expert on battered-woman syndrome, her attorney stated that he could not disagree with anything in the State's response, a response in which the State argued that Meeks was not claiming self-defense. At the hearing on the State's motion to determine the admissibility of the expert's testimony, Meeks's attorney stated, “[T]here's not going to be what you would consider a classic self-defense defense in this case.” And, when the court later noted at that hearing that there was “no indication of self-defense” based on “facts as counsel are giving me,” Meeks' attorney did not argue otherwise. Finally, Meeks' response to the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior acts of violence by Smith toward Meeks specifically stated that “the State accurately indicates that there is no evidence and will be no defense of ‘diminished capacity,’ ‘battered women's syndrome,’ ‘mental disease or defect,’ ‘self-defense,’ or ‘compulsion.’ “ That response also noted that Meeks “did not act in self defense at the time the gun discharged.” Because Meeks never asserted a claim of self-defense, and in fact repeatedly acknowledged that she was not asserting such a defense, the district court simply could not have prevented her from establishing a self-defense claim.
Instead of making a self-defense claim, Meeks repeatedly argued that evidence of battered-woman syndrome and Smith's prior abuse was relevant to show Meeks' state of mind, which would explain why she stayed in the relationship with Smith and why she returned to Smith's house with a gun that day. Meeks argued that she brought the gun both to scare Smith and, knowing Smith's propensity for violence, to defend herself should it be necessary.
But Kansas law is clear that battered-woman syndrome does not “in and of itself operate[ ] as a defense to murder.” State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 646, 763 P.2d 572 (1988); see also, e.g., State v. Coleman, 19 Kan.App.2d 412, 415, 870 P.2d 695,rev. denied 255 Kan. 1004 (1994). Our Supreme Court held in Stewart that “ [w]here self-defense is asserted, evidence of the deceased's long-term cruelty and violence towards the defendant is admissible. [Citations omitted.] In cases involving battered spouses, expert evidence of the battered woman syndrome is relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of danger. [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) 243 Kan. at 646. Even the dissent in Stewart observed that “[e]vidence of the syndrome is admissible only because of its relevance to the issue of self-defense.” 243 Kan. at 654. Our Supreme Court further clarified this concept in State v. Crawford, 253 Kan. 629, 640–41, 861 P.2d 791 (1993), noting that the court
“has very clearly stated that the battered woman syndrome, which it has recognized and about which it permits expert testimony, is not a defense. [Citation omitted.] Self-defense is the defense. Evidence about the battered woman syndrome is admitted for the purpose of aiding the jury in determining whether the defendant's fear and defense claim are reasonable. [Citation omitted.]”
Therefore, the district court here did not err in denying Meeks' expert testimony on battered-woman syndrome, because evidence of Smith's long-term cruelty and violence toward Meeks is admissible only “[w]here self-defense is asserted,” which Meeks herself repeatedly acknowledges she did not assert. See Stewart, 243 Kan. at 646. Because the court's refusal was reasonable and based on correct law, it was not an abuse of discretion and thus did not deny Meeks due process or violate her right to a fair trial. b. Insufficient Evidence of Self–Defense
Even if Meeks had attempted to raise self-defense, the district court could not have admitted the expert testimony. The claim of self-defense was not available under the facts of this case, so evidence of battered-woman syndrome was not relevant to the theory of defense.
A claim of self-defense under K.S.A. 21–3211(b) requires that a defendant reasonably believe that his or her use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction if there is any evidence to support it, even though the evidence consists solely of the defendant's testimony. State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 78, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987). In order to instruct a jury on self-defense, there must be some showing of an imminent threat or a confrontational circumstance involving an overt act by an aggressor close to the time of the killing. There is no exception to this requirement where the defendant has suffered long-term domestic abuse and the victim is the abuser. Stewart, 243 Kan. at 646. The test for self-defense is two-pronged. First, the court uses a subjective standard to determine whether the defendant sincerely and honestly believed it was necessary to kill in order to defend himself or herself. Second, the court uses an objective standard to determine whether the defendant's belief was reasonable—specifically, whether a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary. 243 Kan. at 649.
In Stewart, the defendant shot her husband while he was asleep, despite the fact that she had access to car keys and two vehicles in the driveway. The husband had just brought the wife home the previous day after her attempt to run away and told her he would kill her if she tried to run away again. She had found a loaded gun in the house on the day of the murder, and her husband had also made threatening comments to her all day that indicated he intended to kill her. An expert testified that the defendant was suffering from battered-woman syndrome and the violence in the relationship was escalating prior to the murder. The court held that “[w]hen a battered woman kills her sleeping spouse when she is in no imminent danger, the killing is not reasonably necessary and a self-defense instruction may not be given.” 243 Kan. 639, Syl. ¶ 6. The court distinguished the case from three Kansas cases where battered women shot their husbands because in those cases the women were “clearly threatened in the moments prior to the shootings.” 243 Kan. at 646.
In this case, there is no evidence to support a theory of self-defense, even from Meeks herself, because there was no evidence of any imminent danger to Meeks at the time she shot Smith. Although she and Smith had an argument earlier that day, Meeks had already left Smith's house safely. She testified that when she returned to the house and walked into the bedroom, Smith was simply sitting on the bed. Like the husband in Stewart, Smith was not acting violently, threatening her, or even speaking to her.
Meeks argues that whether she had a reasonable belief of imminent harm was a question for the jury, but this argument ignores the two-prong test for reasonable belief in a self-defense claim. Under that test, the defendant's belief that self-defense was necessary is judged both subjectively and objectively. See Stewart, 243 Kan. at 649. Here, there was no showing of an imminent threat or a confrontational circumstance in which a reasonable person in Meeks' circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary. Moreover, Meeks herself never argued she had a sincere and honest subjective belief that it was necessary to kill Smith to defend herself See 243 Kan. at 649. Consequently, the self-defense cases Meeks cites in which a physical altercation took place or the defendant believed the victim was dangerous are inapposite under these facts. The facts instead support the district court's finding that there was “no indication of self-defense.” Without any evidence to support a theory of self-defense, expert testimony regarding battered-woman syndrome would not have been relevant or admissible.
The district court's decision to exclude the expert testimony was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, nor was it based on an error of law or fact. Therefore, even if Meeks had attempted to raise the theory of self-defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Meeks' fundamental right to a fair trial by excluding the testimony.
2. Evidence of Smith's Prior Abuse
Meeks next asserts that by excluding evidence of Smith's prior abuse against her, the court prevented her from pursuing a claim of self-defense based on battered-woman syndrome. She contends that this was reversible error and, in the event of a new trial, specific instances of Smith's conduct would be relevant and admissible to prove the reasonableness of Meeks' perception of danger.
As discussed above, Meeks never raised the issue of self-defense; thus, evidence of battered-woman syndrome was neither material nor relevant. In battered-woman syndrome cases, evidence of the deceased's long-term cruelty and violence toward the defendant is admissible only “[w]here self-defense is asserted.” Stewart, 243 Kan. at 646;State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 464, 693 P.2d 475 (1985) (“ when self-defense is asserted, evidence of the cruel and violent nature of the deceased toward the defendant is admissible” [Emphasis added.] ). As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the relationship evidence to be admissible but the specific instances of Smith's prior abusive conduct to be inadmissible.
Affirmed.