Opinion
COA23-174
11-07-2023
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEWART LAVON MCLEOD, Defendant
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Zachary Padget & John Payne, for the State. The Sweet Law Firm, PLLC, by Kaelyn N. Sweet, for Defendant-Appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 October 2023.
Appeal by Defendant from orders entered 22 July 2022 and 13 October 2022 by Judges Craig Croom and Bryan Collins, respectively, in Johnston County Nos. 21 CRS 1337, 52858, 52861 Superior Court.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Zachary Padget & John Payne, for the State.
The Sweet Law Firm, PLLC, by Kaelyn N. Sweet, for Defendant-Appellant.
CARPENTER, Judge.
Stewart Lavon McLeod ("Defendant") appeals from judgment after pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and one count of attaining habitual-felon status. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence obtained at a traffic stop. After careful review, we disagree and affirm.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
This case began with a traffic stop on 10 July 2021, where police stopped Defendant. On 4 October 2021, a Johnston County grand jury indicted Defendant for one count of possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. On 14 July 2022, concerning the traffic-stop seizure, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop. On 25 July 2022, concerning the search of his vehicle and person, Defendant filed an additional motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the searches.
Evidence at the suppression hearings tended to show the following. On 10 July 2021, the Johnston County Sheriff's Office surveilled an area known for narcotic sales in Benson, North Carolina. Officer Michael Wilson observed a Chevrolet Camaro idling in the area, so he called his partner, Officer Joshua Barbour, to run the Camaro's tag number.
Officer Barbour obtained an address for the Camaro's registered owner and identified people associated with that address, including Defendant. Officer Barbour reviewed Defendant's criminal history and learned that he had "previous meth convictions along with paraphernalia."
Officer Barbour arrived at the surveillance area and observed the Camaro enter the parking lot of the Dollar General and the IGA, circle around the lot, pull into a parking space for a short period of time, then leave the parking lot. Based on Officer Barbour's training and experience, these actions indicated someone trying to make sure they were not being followed. When the Camaro left the scene, Officer Barbour followed in his unmarked cruiser.
Officer Barbour saw the Camaro go left of center of the road, so he engaged his blue lights and pulled the Camaro over. Officer Barbour observed that Defendant, who was driving, and his passenger had what Officer Barbour believed to be "track marks on their arms." Officer Wilson then arrived and advised Officer Barbour that both Defendant and his passenger were on active probation. Officer Barbour told Defendant, "I see that you are on probation, and on probation, you are subject to warrantless searches. With that in mind, would you mind if I search the vehicle to see if there's anything illegal in the car." Defendant said, "he did not mind."
Defendant exited the Camaro, and Officer Barbour asked for consent to search Defendant's person. Defendant consented. In Defendant's pockets, Officer Barbour found an unopened pack of lithium batteries and a small notebook with ingredients which, based on Officer Barbour's training and experience, were consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Officer Barbour also knew from his training and experience that lithium from stripped batteries was an item typically used in the production of methamphetamine. After searching the driver's side of the vehicle, Officer Barbour found what he believed to be items used to manufacture methamphetamine, including drain cleaner, cold packs, tubing, side cutters, and pliers. Also during the search, dispatch notified the officers that Defendant had an active warrant for his arrest. The officers placed Defendant into custody and transferred him to the Johnston County Sherriff's Office.
On 22 July 2022, the Honorable Craig Croom denied Defendant's initial motion to suppress, which concerned the traffic stop. On 12 October 2022, the Honorable Bryan Collins denied Defendant's second motion to suppress, which concerned the vehicle and body searches. Defendant pleaded guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of 70 to 96 months in prison. Defendant orally appealed in open court following the entry of judgment.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021).
III. Issue
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motions to suppress.
IV. Analysis
Defendant challenges the trial court's legal conclusions that Officer Barbour did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when Officer Barbour: (1) stopped Defendant's vehicle; and (2) searched Defendant's vehicle and person. After careful review, we agree with the trial court.
"'The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.'" State v. McCrary, 237 N.C.App. 48, 51-52, 764 S.E.2d 477, 479 (2014) (quoting State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011)). Thus, we review the trial court's Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In other words, reasonable searches and seizures are constitutional. See id. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures within their vehicles. See State v. Mackey, 209 N.C.App. 116, 124, 708 S.E.2d 719, 724 (2011).
A. The Traffic Stop
When an officer stops a vehicle, the stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996). A traffic stop is reasonable "where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d at 95. A traffic stop is also reasonable when police have "reasonable suspicion" that a traffic violation has occurred. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396-97, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680, 686 (2014). An officer's subjective motive for stopping a vehicle is irrelevant, so long as the stop was objectively reasonable. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. at 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97-98.
The reasonable-suspicion standard is lower than the probable-cause standard; reasonable suspicion requires less evidence than probable cause. State v. Wainwright, 240 N.C.App. 77, 84, 770 S.E.2d 99, 105 (2015). "[R]easonable suspicion exists when 'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture' supports the inference that a crime has been or is about to be committed." Id. at 84, 770 S.E.2d at 105 (quoting State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008)). Driving on the left of the centerline of a road, or stated differently, failing to maintain lane control, is a violation of the traffic laws in North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(a) (2021).
Here, Officer Barbour observed Defendant drive left of the center of the road, so he stopped Defendant. Stopping Defendant was a seizure. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10, 116 S.Ct. at 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d at 95. The seizure was reasonable, however, because Officer Barbour had reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. See Wainwright, 240 N.C.App. at 84, 770 S.E.2d at 105.
In other words, because Officer Barbour witnessed Defendant drive his car over the center of the road, Officer Barbour had enough to support an inference that Defendant violated section 20-146, regardless of Officer Barbour's subjective motive for stopping Defendant. See id. at 84, 770 S.E.2d at 105; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(a); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. at 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97-98. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's initial motion to suppress because Officer Barbour lawfully stopped Defendant.
B. The Vehicle Search and Body Search
A search is reasonable if the person to be searched voluntarily consents to the search. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 306, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 1137, 188 L.Ed.2d 25, 38 (2014). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(14), as a regular condition of probation, a defendant must "[s]ubmit to warrantless searches by a law enforcement officer of the probationer's person and of the probationer's vehicle, upon a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaged in criminal activity . . . ." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(14) (2021).
Here, as a condition of active probation, Defendant consented to searches of his body and vehicle where police officers have reasonable suspicion "that [Defendant] is engaged in criminal activity" while on probation. See id. Officer Barbour saw Defendant in an area known for drug trafficking, saw Defendant use evasive driving maneuvers, and upon stopping Defendant's car, saw "track marks" on Defendant's arms, indicating intravenous drug use to Officer Barbour. Further, Officer Barbour knew of Defendant's "previous meth convictions."
These factors "support[ed] the inference that a crime ha[d] been or [was] about to be committed," as it was reasonable for Officer Barbour to suspect that Defendant's time in the drug-trafficking area indicated Defendant was buying or selling drugs, it was reasonable for Officer Barbour to suspect Defendant's maneuvers were intended to avoid the police, and it was reasonable for Officer Barbour to suspect that the track marks indicated recent drug use. See Wainwright, 240 N.C.App. at 84, 770 S.E.2d at 105.
Therefore, as a condition of his probation, Defendant consented to a vehicle and body search because Officer Barbour had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(14). The searches were lawful, and the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's second motion to suppress. See Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 306, 134 S.Ct. at 1137, 188 L.Ed.2d at 38.
V. Conclusion
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress because both the stop and the searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
AFFIRMED.
Judges TYSON and HAMPSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).