Opinion
No. COA98-232
Filed 16 February 1999
Evidence — impeachment — victim's juvenile adjudications
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution which resulted in an indecent liberties conviction by excluding evidence of the victim's juvenile adjudications where the court stated that N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609 had been considered and found that the probative value of the evidence was far outweighed by the prejudice and the creation of ancillary issues. Despite the language used by the court, it is clear from the record that the court understood the standard to be applied under Rule 609 and believed that the evidence was not necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
Judge GREENE dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 12 September 1997 by Judge James D. Llewellyn in Pender County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 1999.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Amy R. Gillespie, for the State.
Nora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellant.
Defendant was charged with first-degree kidnapping, first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties with a child. Evidence was presented at trial by the State as follows:
The prosecuting witness testified that on 28 November 1996, she went to a friend's house where she encountered defendant. Defendant pushed her onto the floor, forced her to remove her clothes, placed his "private part" next to hers, touched her private part with his hand, and placed his finger in her "private part."
Other witnesses testified that the prosecuting witness recounted the incident to her mother, a police officer, and medical personnel at the hospital. Evidence was also presented showing that the prosecuting witness had been an "A/B" student prior to the attack and that her grades had dropped since the attack.
A jury found defendant guilty of taking indecent liberties with a minor but not guilty of rape or sexual offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of thirty-nine months and a maximum of forty-seven months in prison. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim's juvenile adjudications. He contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard in making its ruling, abused its discretion, and denied him his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. We disagree.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking the production of juvenile files pertaining to the prosecuting witness. The trial court initially denied the motion. During the trial, defendant requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling and allow him to cross-examine the prosecuting witness concerning any juvenile adjudications. The trial court reversed its prior ruling to the extent that it would allow defendant to cross-examine the prosecuting witness concerning the juvenile adjudications. Further argument of counsel, however, revealed that the offenses for which the prosecuting witness was adjudicated delinquent occurred after she was sexually assaulted by defendant. Therefore, the trial court again reversed itself and ruled that defendant would not be allowed to cross-examine the prosecuting witness about the adjudications.
Rule 609(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides as a general rule that "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than 60 days confinement shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination or thereafter." N.C.R. Evid. 609(a). However, Rule 609(d) provides an exception to the general rule:
Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
N.C.R. Evid. 609(d). While evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible, the trial court may admit evidence of juvenile adjudications of a witness if the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult, and the trial court is satisfied that admission of the evidence is necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence. The final decision is within the discretion of the trial court as to whether admission of the evidence is necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence. State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 383 S.E.2d 911 (1989).
In making its ruling in this case, the trial court stated that Rule 609 had been considered and found "that the probative value of the evidence of the juvenile petitions and convictions is far outweighed by the prejudice that may be committed and the creation of ancillary issues." Despite the language used by the trial court in making the ruling, it is clear from an examination of the record that the trial court understood the standard to be applied under Rule 609 and that the trial court believed the evidence was not necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
Furthermore, defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the juvenile adjudications. The offenses for which the prosecuting witness was adjudicated delinquent were committed after she was sexually assaulted and after she had made her initial accusations against defendant. The trial court's decision to exclude the evidence was reasonable in light of the fact that at the time the victim made her initial accusations, she was a thirteen-year-old child with good grades and no history of criminal activity.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal trial to confront the witnesses against him. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). "However, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process[.]" State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 36, 269 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1980). Indeed, there is no right to ask a witness irrelevant questions. Id.
In Davis, the defendant sought to cross-examine the witness concerning his juvenile court probation and the possibility that the state of Alaska had some power over him as a result of his probationary status. The United States Supreme Court held that the trial court denied the defendant's right to confront witnesses by refusing to allow the cross-examination. See also State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997) (holding that the trial court erred by refusing to let the defendant ask a witness for the State about pending criminal charges and whether the witness expected or was promised anything in regard to the charges in exchange for his testimony).
In this case, defendant was not attempting to show that the State had any power over the prosecuting witness or that she was biased against him. Instead, he sought to simply impeach her credibility with evidence of offenses committed well after the commission of the offense for which he was charged and well after she made her initial accusations against defendant. The trial court's determination that the evidence was not necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence was essentially a determination that the evidence was not relevant. See N.C.R. Evid. 401 (stating that "relevant evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). Since he had no right to elicit irrelevant evidence on cross-examination, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. The trial court did not err by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine the prosecuting witness about her juvenile adjudications.
We hold that defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judge HUNTER concurs.
Judge GREENE dissents.