Opinion
2017-UP-138
04-05-2017
The State, Respondent, v. Tykeem Kalani May, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2014-001827
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted January 1, 2017
Appeal from Orangeburg County Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge.
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("[T]he State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges . . . is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause."); State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 312, 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In the typical appeal from the granting or denial of a Batson motion, the appellate courts give deference to the findings of the trial court and apply a clearly erroneous standard."); State v. Kelley, 319 S.C. 173, 176, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) ("In a Batson hearing, the [State] must present a racially neutral explanation for the challenges." (footnote omitted)); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) ("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [State]'s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion))); Cochran, 369 S.C. at 318, 631 S.E.2d at 300 ("The employment status of a prospective juror is a race-neutral reason for using a peremptory challenge."); Kelley, 319 S.C. at 176, 460 S.E.2d at 370 ("The defendant has the burden to prove the [State]'s allegedly neutral reasons are pretext."); Cochran, 369 S.C. at 315, 631 S.E.2d at 298 ("This burden is generally established by showing similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury."); State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 629, 515 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1999) ("Whether a party's proffered reason for exercising a peremptory strike is discriminatory must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."); id. at 630, 515 S.E.2d at 91 ("The composition of the jury panel is a factor that may be considered when determining whether a party engaged in purposeful discrimination."); Kelley, 319 S.C. at 177, 460 S.E.2d at 370 (finding the State provided a racially neutral explanation for why it did not strike a juror with similar characteristics to one previously stricken).
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.