Opinion
No. 5-207 / 04-0405
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon Fister, Judge.
Roosevelt Matlock appeals from the sentences imposed by the district court upon his convictions for two counts of willful injury and two counts of going armed with intent. SENTENCES VACATED AND CASES REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kim Griffith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer J. and Brown, S.J.
Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
Roosevelt Matlock appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the district court following his convictions for two counts of willful injury and being a habitual offender, and two counts of going armed with intent and being a habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.4, 708.8, and 902.9 (2003). He claims the sentencing court erred when it took into consideration the appellate reversal of his prior civil commitment. We vacate Matlock's sentences and remand for resentencing.
In re Matlock, No. 01-1094 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 12, 2003).
On January 28, 2004, a district court judge found Matlock guilty of one count of willful injury and one count of going armed with intent following a bench trial in Black Hawk County case No. 117741. That same day, the court also found Matlock guilty of one count of willful injury and one count of going armed with intent following a bench trial in Black Hawk County case No. 116785. Each of the four counts alleged that Matlock was subject to sentencing as a habitual offender because of his prior record of convictions.
The charges in case number 117741 were filed as a result of an attack on Moses Childs which occurred August 26, 2003.
The charges in case number 116785 were filed as a result of an attack on Fred Burnside which occurred on September 7, 2003.
On February 26, 2004, Matlock appeared before the court for sentencing for the above-mentioned convictions and for additional convictions of one count of willful injury and one count of going armed with intent in Black Hawk County case No. 118993. The court sentenced Matlock to two fifteen-year concurrent terms in case No. 116785, and to two fifteen-year concurrent terms in case No. 117741. The court also imposed two fifteen-year concurrent sentences in case No. 118993. The court ordered that each of the three pairs of fifteen-year sentences would run consecutively to each other. Thus, Matlock was sentenced to forty-five years in prison. Matlock appeals.
In case number 118993, a jury found Matlock guilty of one count of willful injury and one count of going armed with intent. The charges arose out of an assault on Joel Riley which occurred on September 7, 2003.
This appeal involves case numbers 116785 and 117741. Matlock has filed a separate appeal challenging his convictions in case number 118993.
We may address challenges to the legality of a sentence for the first time on appeal. State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Iowa 1999). We review sentencing decisions for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Because the challenged sentence does not fall outside statutory limits, we review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion; reversal on this ground is warranted only if the court's discretion has been exercised "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). Consideration of an improper sentencing factor is an abuse of discretion and requires that the defendant be resentenced. State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
Matlock contends the sentencing court erred when it considered the fact that a panel of this court reversed his civil commitment in an earlier appeal. Upon review of the record, we conclude Matlock's contention has merit. Just before pronouncing sentence, the court brought up and discussed the fact that Matlock's prior civil commitment had been reversed on appeal. The court mentioned that the commitment was reversed "because the prosecutor in that case didn't put your prison disciplinary record into evidence." The court informed Matlock that he had been "given a great gift in February when the court of appeals decided that the civil commitment wasn't proved and you had a chance to be on the streets and live a normal life and you got right back into trouble again."
We conclude the sentencing court improperly considered the fact that Matlock's civil commitment had been previously reversed when sentencing Matlock for his current offenses. Cf. State v. Padavich, 536 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1996) (affirming conviction where court did not consider the defendant's record of reversed convictions in sentencing). "A defendant's exercise of a right to appeal must be free and unfettered." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080, 89 L. Ed. 2d 656, 699 (1969) (citation omitted). The reversal of Matlock's civil commitment on appeal had no relevance to the question of the proper sentence to impose in these cases. It had nothing to do with pertinent matters such as the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's age, character or propensity, and chances for reform. State v. Cooley, 587 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Iowa 1998).
We recognize that the trial court gave other reasons for the sentence it selected which were not inappropriate; however, we are not in a position to speculate as to the weight the sentencing court might have assigned to the improper factor it considered. See State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1998). Accordingly, we vacate Matlock's sentences and remand for resentencing. In doing so, we do not suggest that other permissible factors would not support the sentences imposed.