Opinion
A22MCR160092918S
06-12-2018
STATE of Connecticut v. Louis MASSELLI, Jr.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Brown, J.
The court (Brown, J.) rules on the defendant’s motion to suppress search. For the reasons stated herein, the court denies the motion. An evidentiary hearing on the motion was held on April 25, 2018. There was testimony from Detective Craig Casman, Detective Jonathan Suraci and Sergeant Joseph Romano of the West Haven Police Department, as well as the defendant. The court finds the following facts based upon this testimony.
In August 2016, the defendant, Louis Masselli Jr. ("defendant") resided at 88 Meloy Road in West Haven. The home was owned by his late father, Louis Masselli, Sr. (Transcript, 4/25/18, pp. 7-8, 102-03). On August 15, 2016, Detective Casman and Detective Suraci were travelling in the area of 88 Meloy Road when they observed the defendant’s son, Louis Masselli III standing on the sidewalk in front of said 88 Meloy Road (Transcript, Id. at 7-8). Detective Suraci recognized Masselli III. After confirming with dispatch that he was the subject of multiple arrest warrants, Casman and Suraci requested the assistance of additional patrol units and returned to 88 Meloy Road (Transcript, Id. at 7). The request for more officers was made based upon the officers’ prior experience with Masselli III running from the police (Transcript, Id. at 9).
Upon returning to the area, Masselli III was no longer in sight outside of the house (Transcript, Id. at 8). Detectives Casman and Suraci made the decision to approach 88 Meloy Road to determine if he was inside. They were joined by Sergeant Romano (Transcipt, Id. at 11-12). After knocking on the front door, they were greeted by Masselli Sr. (the owner of the home) and at some point soon thereafter by the defendant. The officers informed them of the reason for their presence, namely to seek consent to search the house for Masselli III for whom they had active arrest warrants. They were informed Masselli III was not at home but they could search the house for him. Neither Masselli Sr. nor the defendant placed any conditions or limitations on the scope or duration of the search (Transcript, pp. 12, 59-60, 78).
Detective Casman searched Masselli Sr.’s bedroom, while Detective Suraci searched the defendant’s bedroom (Transcript, pp. 16, 80). The defendant was physically present during Suraci’s search of his bedroom. Detective Suraci testified there was a door to the closet. He opened the door and saw clothes hanging from a bar. He pushed the clothes out of the way in order to see if a person (in this case Masselli III) was hiding in the closet. He discovered what appeared to be a leather long gun case leaning up against the wall of the closet. Based upon his personal ownership of guns and gun cases, as well as his experience in law enforcement, Detective Suraci was quickly able to determine there was in fact a gun in the case. He was also aware that the defendant was a convicted felon who was prohibited from being in possession of any firearms (Transcript, pp. 80-86). Shortly thereafter, the defendant stated the gun was a family heirloom.
The defendant testified that he never gave the officers consent to search the home, his bedroom or the closet, although he also stated he did not voice any objections to the search. He also testified he did not hear what the officers discussed with his father before he came downstairs. It should be noted that the defendant testified the closet did not have a door, which contradicts Detective Suraci’s testimony. Though there were recent photographs taken of the closet which were entered as exhibits, the court is unable to determine whether in fact there were doors to the closet in August 2016. The court concludes that the existence of a door to the closet, or lack thereof, does not impact the court’s analysis regarding the legality of the search.
The defendant stated that, based upon his dealings with these officers over the years, they had always treated him like a gentleman so he agreed to let them look for his son. The defendant testified the police searched everywhere in an effort to locate Masselli III. The court asked the defendant whether he felt pressured in any way to consent to a search or whether he allowed it based on the aforementioned years of shared respect; he stated that the respect was the basis for allowing the search (Transcript, pp. 102-34).
Consent is one of the six major exceptions to the Warrant requirement, the others being search incident to lawful arrest (See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) ), plain view (See State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22 (2015) ), stop and frisk (See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ), the automobile exception (Carroll v. U.S., 276 U.S. 132 (1925) ), and exigency/hot pursuit (See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) ). "A warrantless search ... into a house is not unreasonable ... when a person with authority to do so freely consented ... [t]he question of whether a defendant has given voluntary consent to enter or search his or her premises is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry or search ... [T]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the [f]ourth [a]mendement is that of objective reasonableness- what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? ... The scope of the search is generally defined by its expressed object ..." (State v. Vaught, 157 Conn.App. 101 (2015) ).
In State v. Ortiz, 95 Conn.App. 69 (2005), the court held that items seized from the defendant’s residence as the result of an entry and search pursuant to the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement were admissible against him at trial. The police were called to investigate a possible breaking and entering at the defendant’s apartment building. An employee of the security company granted the police access to the premises. In the process of trying to locate a potential burglary suspect, the police entered the defendant’s apartment, bedroom, and master bathroom. At the suppression hearing, the officers indicated "they were looking in places only a person could hide." In so doing, in plain view they discovered a cardboard shoebox containing "wads of currency; " on the sink they discovered bags containing white powder and scales. Given their training and experience, the police concluded that the apartment was a narcotics and stash house, a location used to hide illegal drugs and money. Thereafter, they applied for and were granted a search warrant for the premises.
The Appellate Court upheld the initial search and seizure based upon both the emergency and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement. In addition, in a footnote, the court also concluded that the search and seizure were permissible pursuant to the consent exception. The court held in pertinent part: "[A]lthough our holding with regard to the emergency doctrine resolves the issue of the legality of the search, we also hold that the police properly searched the defendant’s apartment with the defendant’s free and voluntary consent. The evidence supports the court’s finding that by virtue of his statement to an agent of his alarm service, the defendant requested the police to respond to the alarm at his apartment. The defendant did not place any limitations on the scope of the investigation he authorized, and it was reasonable to find that the defendant authorized the police to enter the apartment and search in any areas where a perpetrator or a person in need of assistance reasonably might be present" (State v. Ortiz, 95 Conn.App. at 84, n.4).
The court now turns to the facts of the present case. The evidence supports a finding that the defendant gave his free and voluntary consent to a search of his bedroom. The defendant testified that he was residing in the home at 88 Meloy Road with his father at the time of the search. He also testified that he slept in the bedroom where the gun case and gun were found. He further testified that he did not give consent to the search, but he also testified he never voiced an objection to the search, nor did he limit the scope of the search in any way. The defendant also testified that he did not hear the conversation between his father and the officers prior to coming downstairs from the bedroom. All three officers testified that both Masselli, Sr. as well as the defendant consented to a search of the home for Masselli III with no limitations on the scope of the search.
The defendant testified that he was present in the bedroom during the search of his closet and never voiced any objections or limitations on the search of his bedroom or closet. The defendant testified that he allowed for the search because of his respect for the police and his long history with these particular officers. It was reasonable for the police to search the defendant’s closet for the defendant’s son, as he could have been hiding in the corner next to or behind clothes. In fact the defendant testified that, in August of 2016, both his clothes and his mother’s clothes were hanging in the closet (Transcript, Id. at p. 129). It was reasonable for the police to push aside the clothes to determine if someone was hiding behind them. There was testimony from Detective Suraci that he immediately recognized that the object in the corner of the closet was a leather long gun case. He also knew immediately that the defendant could not lawfully possess such an item as he was a convicted felon. Thus, he was able to conclude that he had probable cause to believe the leather long gun case was evidence of a crime. Accordingly, the search was based upon consent and the gun seized during the search can lawfully be admitted against the defendant in a prosecution for Criminal Possession of a Firearm.
The court finds that the search and seizure can also be upheld based upon the plain view exception to the Warrant requirement. In State v. Jones, Id., the Supreme Court held "[p]lain view provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer’s access to an object has some prior justification under the fourth amendment. Plain view is perhaps better understood, therefore, not as an independent exception to the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s access to an object may be ... In other words, if police have lawful access to an item that they reasonably believe constitutes evidence of criminal activity and ... the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the item, the police may seize it without obtaining a warrant ..." (citing U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1984).
Turning to these facts, the police had lawful justification, consistent with the fourth amendment, for searching the defendant’s home, bedroom and closet, predicated upon consent. Based upon this prior justification, the officer’s access to the leather gun case was lawful. As was stated earlier, Detective Suraci reasonably believed the item constituted evidence of criminal activity and thus the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the item. Accordingly, the court finds the item was in plain view and was lawfully seized by the police without obtaining a warrant.
Based upon the foregoing, the Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.