Opinion
No. 4-285 / 02-1509
Filed August 11, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Frank Severino and Jeff Noble, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ., but decided en banc.
Christopher Martin appeals his conviction and sentence for the first-degree murder of his son. We affirm.
Background Facts.
From the testimony adduced at trial, the jury could have found the following facts. After what Martin described as a normal family evening, his wife, Karla, and two children, four-year-old Daly and three-year-old York prepared for bed. Karla slept with Daly in one bedroom and Martin slept with York in the master bedroom. However, before going to bed that night Martin claims he went downstairs and consumed Advil Cold and Sinus pills and Sonata, a sleeping agent, with peppermint schnapps. This was in addition to the prescription medication Martin had taken earlier in the day, consisting of Wellbutrin (for depression), Xanax (for anxiety), and Valium (for grinding his teeth). Martin testified that after taking the Advil and Sonata he began feeling hot and nearly fell over. He remembers starting to climb the stairs but does not recall how he got upstairs and into bed. The next thing Martin claims to remember is waking up in the master bedroom with York and needing to use the restroom. He got out of bed carefully so as not to wake York, then realized York was cold. Martin sat for some time, contemplating what to do, before yelling out to Karla. Karla got out of bed and found York lying lifeless on the bed. Martin called 911. Emergency personnel arrived and took York to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. His body appeared to have suffered several blows and he had been strangled. Martin went to the hospital while Karla stayed at the home with Daly. While police were securing the home and beginning the investigation of the premises, Karla and Daly were taken to the West Des Moines Police Station. From the hospital, Martin was also taken to the police station. Prior to and during police interviews that morning, Martin made several inculpatory statements to police and to his priest. Martin was later arrested for the death of York.
Karla testified that because they were toilet-training York, he was sleeping with Martin in the master bedroom while she slept with Daly in another room.
No blood test was performed to confirm the medications Martin ingested on January 8. There is some dispute as to whether or not Martin took the Sonata medication as he claims.
After a jury trial, Martin was convicted of first-degree-murder and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals, attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his motion to suppress, and motion for a mistrial.
Scope of Review.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Iowa 2001). A verdict is upheld if supported by substantial evidence, which means evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt. Id. We view the totality of the record in the light most favorable to the State, drawing any and all legitimate inferences that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. State v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1998). In assessing alleged violations of constitutional rights, our standard of review is de novo. State v. Washburne, 574 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Iowa 1997). We conduct an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). In reviewing the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider both the evidence presented during the suppression hearing and that introduced at trial. State v. Orozco, 573 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1997). We review a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Iowa 1999).
Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Martin first challenges the submission of the charges of first-degree and second-degree murder to the jury alleging there was not sufficient evidence of malice aforethought, that Martin, portrayed by his defense as a loving father, could have acted with a fixed purpose or design to harm his son. The State contends, however, that Martin did not preserve error on this specific argument and therefore it need not be addressed on appeal.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Martin moved for judgment of acquittal on the charge of First Degree Murder, for the reason that there has not been sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find that this Defendant intended, specifically intended to harm or to kill York as is one of the prerequisites for that charge.
Malice aforethought and specific intent are separate concepts. See State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Iowa 1976). Malice aforethought is defined as "a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another existing prior to the act complained of. . . ." State v. Reeves , 670 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 833, 28 N.W.2d 475, 482 (1947)). "While malice aforethought is the specific state of mind necessary to convict of murder, it is far different from the specific intent which is a necessary element of murder in the first degree." State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 142, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290 (1964). While Martin properly preserved error on the lack of sufficient evidence of specific intent on the first-degree murder conviction, he does not challenge that element on appeal. Rather, Martin challenges the submission of the first- and second-degree murder charges for lack of evidence of malice aforethought, but as he did not first raise this to the district court, we cannot address this issue on appeal. See State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996) (holding error not preserved where motion for judgment of acquittal does not point out the specific deficiencies in the evidence). A claimed error must first be raised before the trial court, so that the trial judge is alerted to the claim and has an opportunity to correct any erroneous decision. State v. Escobedo, 573 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). If the trial judge is denied such an opportunity, "we have no decision or action to review." Id. at 277.
Motion to Suppress.
Next, Martin challenges the district court's refusal to suppress statements he made to his priest, Father Cade. The State responds that the Court's ruling was proper because, in its view, Martin was not in custody when the challenged statements were made. Our analysis will focus only on the interaction with Father Cade, as Martin's counsel stated at oral argument that he did not believe Martin was in custody before then and the State conceded Martin was in custody after his arrest.
Martin also claims that the statements he made were involuntary; however, this claim was not raised in the motion to suppress. Therefore, we will not address this issue. See State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997) ("Issues not raised before the district court, including constitutional issues, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.")
In a pretrial stipulation, the parties agreed that statements made by Martin just after his formal arrest were not admissible.
When a defendant is placed in custody and interrogated, Miranda warnings must be given. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 So. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d at 706. Our de novo review reveals the following pertinent facts. The police transported Martin from the hospital to the police station. Once there, he was placed in a separate room from his wife. Officer Castelline initially told Martin he could not speak to Father Cade. Later, when he saw Martin had exited the room and was speaking to Cade, he told him to return to the room. He acknowledged that, at this juncture, Martin was not free to leave the police station. The conversation between Father Cade and Martin in Castelline's presence took place in a room thirty feet inside the entrance to the police station behind two closed doors. Based on these facts, we conclude Martin was in custody when he spoke to Father Cade.
We turn next to whether the State engaged in "interrogation." Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 528-31, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 1936-37, 95 L.Ed.2d 458, 466-67 (1987). The record reveals that Officer Castelline facilitated Martin's meeting with Father Cade and sat in on the subsequent conversation between them. He did not ask questions and there is no evidence that he told Father Cade what to ask. Under these circumstances, we conclude the State did not engage in "interrogation." Id. (concluding police presence during conversation between a suspect and his wife in a custodial setting did not amount to interrogation).
Martin also challenged the admission of an inculpatory statement made following his arrest during the booking process. However, Martin's comment was not only unresponsive to the question asked — if his name was Christopher James Martin — it was volunteered. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 552 (1990) (finding that booking questions were not intended to elicit information for investigatory purposes and therefore fell "within a `routine booking question' exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services"); State v. Matlock, 289 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1980) (finding statements were volunteered by the defendant and not the product of police-initiated interrogation). Therefore, the statement was properly admitted.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Castelline testified as follows:
Q. During the booking process the Defendant made a statement?
A. Correct.
Q. Can you tell us the circumstances, how that statement came about?
A. Just going through the booking sheet one of the initial parts of it is just to ask and clarify the name of the individual arrested, surnames, middle names, anything like that and I asked Mr. Martin clarifying his middle name and if it was — if it was Christopher James Martin? He responded — he responded that, "no, Christopher James Martin was a person which has caused him problems with false identity issues." Martin then said, "I guess I'm the problem now."
Q. At the time that you asked him what his middle name was, were you trying to gain any information about the case? A. No.
Motion for Mistrial.
Finally, Martin asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial based on the testimony of the State's expert, rebuttal witness, Dr. Gregory Saathoff. The State argues that because any error was harmless and Martin declined a curative instruction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
On direct examination by the prosecution of Dr. Saathoff, the following took place:
Q. Based on your review of the literature as well as your professional experience, do the drugs that we just discussed, the Wellbutrin, the Valium, the Xanax, the Sonata — did you discover any situations or case reports where a person has become violent while taking those combination of substances?
A. I have not. I'm not aware of any — any reports in the literature of people becoming violent when taking this combination.
Q. Doctor, based on your review of the records, do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether or not the Defendant could form the specific intent to either harm or kill his child on or about January 8th or January 9th of 2002?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. My opinion is that this Defendant, through taking these medications and looking at the statements that he made afterwards and also examining the documents related to the scene, indicated that he did this act with intent.
Because the answer was unresponsive and concluded Martin intended to and did inflict the injuries to York, the district court, on defendant's motion, struck the answer and admonished the jury to disregard it. Rather than interrupt the proceedings, Martin asked to make a record about the answer at a later time, outside the presence of the jury. The State then continued by asking Dr. Saathoff the following question:
Q. Doctor, the question I asked you is whether or not based on your review of the records and your professional experience, whether or not you believe that the Defendant was capable of forming the specific intent. Do you believe based on your review of those documents that he was capable of forming specific intent?
A. Yes, I do.
Once outside the presence of the jury and after conferring with Martin, the defense moved for a mistrial based on Dr. Saathoff's initial answer. The district court overruled Martin's motion stating, "I believe that the remedy of striking [the answer] was adequate, but if you wish in addition to the admonition . . . to the jury to have a specific curative instruction as well, the Court will entertain that." Martin refused this additional step.
We have long recognized the general sufficiency of cautionary instructions except in extreme cases. State v. Mahoney, 515 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). When the trial court responds quickly to objectionable evidence, the defendant bears a heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. State v. Keys, 535 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); Mahoney, 515 N.W.2d at 51. While the State's question was proper, Dr. Saathoff's answer was not. The issue then before us is whether the remedial action short of a mistrial — striking of the answer, admonishing the jury, and asking the question a second time, receiving a properly responsive answer — was sufficient to protect Martin from any resulting unfair prejudice. "A reversal must be predicated upon the proposition that the [testimony] . . . was so prejudicial, its effect upon the jury could not be erased by this procedure and defendant was denied a fair trial." State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1971), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973). We do not find such prejudice here. The court quickly struck Dr. Saathoff's answer and admonished the jury to disregard the testimony and the State reposited the question to Dr. Saathoff resulting in a properly responsive answer. As the court stated, "[T]here is sufficient evidence in this record from which the jurors could conclude, if they were so inclined, to find that [Martin] was, in fact, the person who inflicted these injuries on the child. Maybe they wouldn't, but there's sufficient evidence that they could make that conclusion . . . I don't believe that [Dr. Saathoff's] opinion in the way that it was stated which came out inadvertently rises to the level of an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant." We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial as Martin was not unfairly prejudiced. See generally State v. Jackson, 587 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Iowa 1998) (finding the court's denial of defendant's motion for mistrial, based on prosecutor's improper questioning of witness, was not an abuse of discretion where the court admonished the jury to disregard the question); State v. McGonigle, 401 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Iowa 1987) (finding no abuse of discretion where the court instructed the jury to ignore the improper testimony); State v. Lawrence, 559 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (finding no abuse of discretion where testimony, despite motion in limine disallowing, referred to defendant's recent release from prison, as court struck testimony and admonished jury); Keys, 535 N.W.2d at 785-86 (finding no abuse of discretion where testimony of police officer indicated he had run a criminal history check on defendant was stricken and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony).
Finding no error in the district court's rulings, we affirm Martin's first-degree murder conviction for the death of three-year-old York.
AFFIRMED.
All judges concur, except Vogel and Huitink, JJ., who specially concur.
I concur with the result reached by the majority on all but one point — whether Martin was in custody during the Father Cade conversation. On that fact finding, I would affirm the district court that he was not.
Using an objective test, four factors are considered in determining whether a person is in custody:
(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of [his] guilt; and (4) whether the defendant is free to leave the place of questioning.
State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997) (citing State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994)). Applying these factors to the circumstances in this case lead me to agree with the district court that Martin was not in police custody during the Father Cade conversation. I will address each factor in turn, reexamining the facts in the record leading up to that conversation.
1. Language used to summon the individual.
On the morning of York's death, Officer Troy Shelley drove Martin to the hospital behind the ambulance. Karla chose to stay at the home with Daly. After spending some time at the hospital, Martin was then driven from the hospital to the West Des Moines Police Station by Officer Shelley while Karla was separately transported to the station. Meanwhile their home was secured as a potential crime scene awaiting the issuance of a search warrant. Neither parent was threatened nor intimidated in going to the police station, but rather went so the police could obtain background information and begin to piece together the circumstances of the child's death.
2. Purpose, place and manner of interrogation.
Detective Castelline was called to the West Des Moines police station, having been told a small child was dead and some people were coming to the station to be interviewed. He was assigned to conduct an initial interview with the father, beginning about 6:00 a.m. Detective Castelline understood the child died at home but there were no primary suspects at that time. When Martin first arrived at the police station he was placed in an unguarded, unlocked conference room off of the public lobby with Detective Castelline. Martin was not handcuffed nor restrained in any way prior to arriving at the station nor at any time during the interview process.
Early in the interview with Castelline, Martin asked if he could contact an attorney. Castelline stated he, of course, could do that and offered to assist Martin. After Castelline located the requested attorney's telephone number and offered to place the call, Martin changed his mind and decided not to call the attorney.
Meanwhile, Father Cade arrived at the police station and took a seat in the lobby. A detective came out, greeted him, and told him it would be a little while before he would be able to see Martin. From his vantage point, Father Cade could see into the open door of a conference room just off the public lobby. He observed Detective Castelline leave the conference room on a couple of occasions, walk into and across the lobby, and go through what appeared to be a secure door. When Detective Castelline left the conference room, Father Cade could see that Martin was sitting at the conference room table alone. At one point, the unattended Martin left the conference room and came into the lobby, seeking a restroom. When Father Cade identified himself to Martin, Martin sat down next to Father Cade and briefly described the circumstances of the morning, informing him that York was dead. When Detective Castelline returned to the lobby, he asked Martin if he would return to the conference room. Father Cade described this request as Dectective Castelline "very politely . . . "invit[ing] Chris to go back into the conference room."
Later, Martin asked to speak with Father Cade. After conferring with the county attorney, Detective Castelline decided not to interrupt the interview process by allowing Martin to speak with his priest. He testified that at this early stage of the investigation there was no prime suspect but definitely both parents were potential witnesses and being separately interviewed. They did not want to run the risk of information being passed between Martin and Karla through private conversations with the family priest. By comparison, when asked whether Karla Martin would be allowed to meet with Father Cade, Detective Castelline also testified that because of the potential of information sharing between the parents, he would "most definitely" not allow Karla to have a private conversation with Father Cade. This position was based on the agreement of the investigators, as lead investigator, Thomas Boyd testified for the integrity of the investigation we did not want information being shared through Christopher Martin through Father Cade. It was also believed that Karla Martin was also a parishioner of Father Cadels (sic). It was to be anticipated or expected that she may wish to speak to Father Cade as well and we decided that at the time it would be best to keep Father Cade out of that to keep the information more secure.
Detective Castelline again offered Martin assistance contacting an attorney. Martin asked Detective Castelline to ask Father Cade if he knew of any attorneys. Father Cade gave Detective Castelline a name of an attorney from his parish. When the attorney was contacted, he gave Detective Castelline the names of three criminal attorneys that Martin could contact. Martin was uncertain which attorney to contact and looked to Detective Castelline to make that decision for him; however, Detective Castelline told Martin that was his decision to make. Detective Castelline also asked Martin if he would like him to contact any family members and he emphatically stated he did not want his parents contacted.
As the interview continued, Martin suggested that he speak with Father Cade with Detective Castelline present. Detective Castelline agreed, and Martin was moved from the conference room to the "role call" room. As the name indicates, the role call room is used by the officers to meet and receive assignments for their shifts. The room is located behind two security doors in which one cannot enter without a using a coded key pad; however, once inside, one may freely exit through the doors. Father Cade described the room as being "very casual," and not secured, containing a table, chairs, phone, phonebook, sink, and coffee pot. He described Detective Castelline as being very casually dressed wearing sweat pants and a t-shirt, with no weapon on his person. The meeting with Father Cade began at 7:15 a.m. and ended about 8:15 a.m.
3. The extent to which defendant is confronted with evidence of his guilt.
Detective Castelline testified that the purpose of his interview with Martin was to gather background information as there was information being gathered from many sources in the early hours following the child's death. Meanwhile, Detective Boyd was coordinating the information as it came in from the crime scene and hospital, as well as from Detective Wade, interviewing Karla Martin, and from Detective Castelline, interviewing Chris Martin. During the interviews with Detective Castelline, and more particularly the interview under question with Father Cade, Detective Castelline made no accusations, threats, or promises nor did he or anyone else confront Martin with any evidence of his guilt, emphasizing all were still in an information gathering mode.
4. Whether defendant is free to leave the place of questioning.
At the suppression hearing, Father Cade testified as to whether he thought Martin was free to leave the police station initially when Martin had wandered out into the public lobby and spoken with Father Cade. He testified,
My impression would have been and is right now that if Chris would have wanted to debate that issue with Detective Castelline, he could have because I do not remember a direct harsh order such as `Get back in that room' kind of thing.
To buttress his observation, he added that the two of them had been sitting in the lobby, just four steps from the outside door. When Father Cade was later in the interview room with Martin and Detective Castelline, Martin remained unrestrained in what Father Cade described as a casual setting.
When Detective Castelline was asked on cross examination whether Martin was free to leave during the interview with Father Cade, Detective Castelline responded,
I would have explained to him that let me check with the investigators to see where we're at and if they say fine we'll get you transportation out of here and wherever you want to go . . . I would have, again, asked him to sit down for his safety sake and for liability reasons until he had a way, safely, to leave. I wouldn't feel comfortable letting a blind man walk out of the police station on his own.
Detective Castelline reiterated that the county attorney had not told him that Martin was not free to leave. Detective Boyd, who Detective Castelline had been conferring with, agreed and testified, "at that time my opinion was — is that there probably was not enough probable cause for the arrest, so I would have authorized him to leave the building."
After the hour-long session with Father Cade, Detective Castelline met again with the county attorney and the other investigators, including Detective Boyd to determine what was going to be happening, what was going to be done with Mr. Martin, if he was free to go, if there was enough evidence that I wasn't aware of. . . . the only thing I was involved with was the interview with Mr. Martin. I — I had no idea of any types of autopsy information obtained from the hospital information obtained from the wife, or from the crime scene. I did not know what had transpired, if there was now a primary suspect or not.
It was not until sometime after the Father Cade session that according to Castelline:
[W]hen other investigators came up with other evidence or information independent from what I was doing and when that information was combined, that's when Mr. Martin became a suspect, as far as I know.
It was not until this joint meeting, where information was shared with all investigators, that it was decided there was probable cause to arrest Martin.
Based on the four-part objective test as set forth above, I agree with the district court that Martin was not in custody for purposes of Miranda until sometime after his meeting with Father Cade and Detective Castelline. For these reasons, I would affirm the district court ruling in its entirety.
Huitink, J., joins this special concurrence.