Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4343-11T2
04-05-2013
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DEAN MARLETTA, Defendant-Appellant.
Robert A. Warmington, attorney for appellant. Fredric M. Knapp, Acting Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Erin Smith Wisloff, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Waugh and St. John.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 11-035.
Robert A. Warmington, attorney for appellant.
Fredric M. Knapp, Acting Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Erin Smith Wisloff, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Dean Marletta appeals his conviction for failing to maintain automobile liability insurance on a vehicle registered in his name, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. We affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.
In 2006, Marletta entered into an agreement with Charles Rakovic, his brother-in-law, to register a truck purchased by Rakovic in Marletta's name or that of his construction company.Marletta also agreed to obtain the required automobile insurance for the vehicle in his or the company's name. The agreement was necessary for Rakovic because he could not afford the insurance if the truck was registered and insured in his own name. Rakovic agreed to reimburse Marletta for the costs incurred, including the insurance premium. The truck was driven by Rakovic, who was responsible for garaging and maintaining it. Marletta never had the truck in his possession.
The record reflects that the truck was actually registered in Marletta's name, although it may have been "doing business as" Master Craftsman. In fact, it is not even clear whether Marletta's business was a juridical entity or just a trade name. In any event, resolution of that issue is not necessary for the determination of the appeal.
In September 2010, Marletta and Rakovic had a falling out. Marletta informed Rakovic that he would no longer pay the insurance and told him to put the truck in his own name. Marletta did not renew the insurance policy in December 2010. He informed Rakovic, through his mother-in-law, that he had not renewed the insurance and also that he wanted the license plates returned to him. Rakovic, who never responded to Marletta's requests, failed to retitle and insure the truck, but continued to drive it.
Marletta discussed the issue with the police in the town where he lived. He was told he would have to file a complaint for any action to be taken. He considered doing so, but was dissuaded by his mother-in-law. According to Marletta, there were "a lot of . . . things" in his life at the time and he "forgot" about the problem.
On July 6, 2011, Rakovic was driving the truck in Kinnelon when he was stopped by the police. By that time, both the registration and the insurance had expired. Rakovic was initially given a summons for driving an unregistered vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:3-4, and failure to exhibit a valid insurance card, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29. The truck was impounded by the police. Rakovic was subsequently issued a summons for failure to maintain automobile liability insurance. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.
Also on July 6, the police officer ascertained that Marletta was the registered owner of the truck. He issued summonses to Marletta for violations of N.J.S.A. 39:3-4 and N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.
Marletta and Rakovic were tried together in the Kinnelon municipal court in October 2011. Both Marletta and Rakovic were found guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. The remaining summonses were dismissed.
Marletta appealed to the Law Division, which tried the matter de novo on March 23, 2012. The judge found Marletta guilty. In addition to fines and costs, Marletta was sentenced to a one-year suspension of his driving privileges. The judge stayed the suspension pending this appeal.
II.
Marletta raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: DEAN MARLETTA SHOULD BE ACQUITTED OF THE NO INSURANCE CHARGE BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT HE CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO BE OPERATED WITHOUT INSURANCE.
POINT II: PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DICTATE THAT DEFENDANT MARLETTA IS NOT GUILTY OF VIOLATING N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.
Our role in an appeal such as this is limited, in that we "consider only the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961)). The Law Division determination is de novo on the record from the municipal court. R. 3:23-8(a). We are ordinarily limited to determining whether the Law Division's de novo findings "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). Nevertheless, our review of purely legal issues is plenary. State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 225 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 78 (2011).
The basic facts in this case are not in dispute. The appeal turns on whether Marletta's conduct violated the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2, which provides in relevant part as follows:
Any owner or registrant of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State who operates or causes to be operated a motor vehicle upon any public road or highway in this State without motor vehicle liability insurance coverage required by this act, . . . shall be subject, for the first offense, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1,000 and a period of community service to be determined by the court, and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year from the date of conviction.Inasmuch as Marletta was not operating the truck at the time it was stopped, the issue is whether he "cause[d] [it] to be operated" under the factual circumstances described above.
In finding Marletta guilty, Judge Thomas V. Manahan relied primarily on our decision in State v. Hayducka, 337 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2001). In that case, we upheld the conviction of the owner of a car who had left it and the keys at her mother's residence, explaining to her mother that she left the keys in case it was necessary to move the car from one side of her driveway to the other. Id. at 170. The defendant subsequently let the car's insurance coverage lapse, but did not notify her mother because she was not expecting her to use the car on the public roads. When the mother's car was being repaired, she used the defendant's uninsured car and was involved in an accident. The defendant was found guilty under N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2, and appealed. Ibid.
The defendant in Hayducka argued that she did not violate the statute because she did not "cause" her mother to drive the vehicle on the public roads. Id. at 171. We rejected her argument:
In construing a statute, "[w]e are required to 'effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved.'" Wendling v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 279 N.J. Super. 477, 482 (App. Div. 1995) (citing State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514 (1980)). Courts must give effect to the language employed by the legislative body. Dixon v. Gassert, 26 N.J. 1, 9 (1958).
We now look to the language of the statute to ascertain its plain meaning. See Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club, 124 N.J. 605, 610 (1991). The verb "to cause" has been defined as "to effect as an agent, to bring about." Webster's Unabridged New International Dictionary 427 (2d ed. 1947). Words synonymous with "to cause" include "produce, occasion, originate, induce." Ibid. From these definitions, we conclude that the meaning of the phrase "causes to
operate" is, therefore, much broader than "authorizes to operate." The statutory term is akin to the concept of proximate cause, which has frequently been defined in our jurisprudence as "any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred." Gaido v. Weiser, 115 N.J. 310, 313 (1989).
The conclusion that the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 to have such a meaning is supported by the statute's objective. The obvious purpose and intent of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 is to keep uninsured vehicles off the road for the protection of the public who may be injured or damaged by their operation. State v. Schumm, 146 N.J. Super. 30, 34 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 199 (1978). Thus, the statute penalizes all those responsible for creating a situation where the statutory protection given to the public is denied to them. Ibid.
Here, it is clear that defendant caused the [car] to be operated by giving possession of the vehicle and its ignition key to her mother. The interpretation urged by defendant would exclude from the legislative blanket of responsibility one who has caused another to operate an uninsured vehicle, albeit under certain limitations. Such frustration of the legislative purposes is unacceptable. Id. at 35.
[Id. at 171-73.]
In this case, Marletta, having undertaken to put Rakovic's truck in his name and insure it so that Rakovic would not have to obtain his own, more expensive insurance, then canceled the insurance on the truck at a time when he knew it was still being driven by Rakovic. When Rakovic refused to return the license plates and re-register the truck, Marletta declined to file a complaint with the police and took no further action to prevent the uninsured truck from being driven. Unlike the defendant in Hayducka, Marletta knew Rakovic was driving the truck when he cancelled the insurance and had no reason to believe Rakovic had stopped driving it after he refused to return the license plates registered to Marletta.
Although N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 is not part of Title 2C, we note that N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(a) provides that "[c]onduct is the cause of a result when: (1) It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred." Had Marletta not let Rakovic use the truck under Marletta's name and insurance, then cancelled the insurance without stopping Rakovic's use of the truck, the truck would not have been driven on the public roads without insurance. Marletta's role was more egregious than that of the defendant in Hayducka, who "caused" her uninsured car to be driven on the public roads by leaving the keys with her mother and then cancelling the insurance. To hold otherwise would unacceptably frustrate the legislative purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. Hayducka, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 173.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(a)(2), which requires that "any additional causal [statutory] requirements" be satisfied, is inapplicable in this case, because there are no such additional requirements in N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.
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Having reviewed Marletta's remaining arguments in light of the applicable law and the record before us, we find them to be without merit and not warranting discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELATE DIVISION