Opinion
(5801)
Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of two counts of the crime of burglary in the third degree, the defendant appealed to this court claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence seized during his warrantless arrest. Held that there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in determining that, as a passenger in an automobile stopped by the police, he lacked the requisite standing to challenge its search; he neither demonstrated a possessory interest in the automobile or in any of the seized property, nor did he establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.
Argued November 3, 1987
Decision released January 12, 1988
Informations charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of burglary in the third degree, two counts of the crime of larceny in the sixth degree, and one count of the crime of criminal mischief in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, geographical area number fourteen, where the court, Schimelman, J., denied the defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the matter was presented to the court, Miano, J., on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to two counts of burglary in the third degree; judgments of guilty of two counts of burglary in the third degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. No error.
Michael A. Georgetti, for the appellant (defendant). Joseph C. Morelli, special assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant appeals from the judgments of conviction rendered after he entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to two counts of burglary in the third degree, in violation of General Statutes 53a-103, following the denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant claims on appeal that the court erred (1) in finding that the police had sufficient articulable grounds to stop him, (2) in finding that the duration of the stop did not exceed constitutional limits, (3) in refusing to suppress evidence obtained incidental to his arrest, and (4) in finding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle in which he was a passenger. We find no error.
This appeal arises from the same factual background as State v. Foster, 13 Conn. App. 214, 535 A.2d 393 (1988). The defendant's first three claims of error are identical in all respects to the claims raised by the defendant in State v. Foster, supra. Unless this defendant can establish, however, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of the vehicle searched, we need not reach those claims with respect to him.
The defendant's remaining claim, therefore, is that the court erred in finding that he lacked the requisite expectation of privacy in Foster's automobile to challenge its search. We find that this claim lacks merit.
The defendant claims that he had standing to challenge the search. A separate inquiry into whether a defendant has standing is no longer conducted. Rather, the inquiry is limited to whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. State v. Daay, 5 Conn. App. 496, 497 n. 3, 500 A.2d 248 (1985).
"A person may not object to the introduction of evidence resulting from an illegal search unless he first proves that he was a victim of that search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). One is a victim of a search when it violates his reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1978). Therefore, the first question that must be answered in any suppression case is whether the individual who seeks suppression had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id. `This inquiry . . . normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," [Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)]. . . . The second question is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable,'" id., at 361. . . .' Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 236, 456 A.2d 288, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 1014, 79 L.Ed.2d 244 (1983)." State v. Daay, 5 Conn. App. 496, 498, 500 A.2d 248 (1985).
In this case, the defendant has neither demonstrated a possessory interest in Foster's car or in any of the seized evidence. Nor has he established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161, 179, 448 A.2d 837 (1982).
The defendant's claim that he should be permitted to challenge the search because he has a possessory interest in his person is little more than a rephrasing of the argument that, having been charged with a possessory crime, the defendant can challenge a search. This argument has been unequivocally rejected. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); State v. Altrui, supra; State v. Daay, supra, 499. The area searched was not the defendant's person; it was, instead, the front seat of Foster's automobile. We conclude, therefore, that the court ruled correctly in finding that the defendant lacked the requisite reasonable expectation of privacy in the front seat of Foster's automobile so as to challenge the search.