Opinion
No. 2-1006 / 02-0630
Filed April 4, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Mary Ann Brown, Judge.
The State appeals the district court order suppressing evidence found in a vehicle search. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Johnson, County Attorney, and Michael Bennett, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Alan Waples of Wittkamp Waples, Burlington, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
The State seeks discretionary review of an order suppressing evidence obtained in a vehicle search. The State contends the search warrant was supported by probable cause or, alternately, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A Wal-Mart employee contacted West Burlington police after noticing Dallas Wade Maddox and another man with merchandise that could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. In response to a police officer's inquiry, Maddox retrieved a shopping bag from a truck in the parking lot and consented to a search of the bag. His friend also consented to a search of a bag in his possession. The bags contained cough drops, an aquarium pump, plastic tubing, pitchers and bowls, coffee filters, and starter fluid. Meanwhile, a narcotics officer called to the scene noticed other Wal-Mart bags in the truck but could not discern what they contained.
Police advised the men they would be detained while officers sought a search warrant for a vehicle. The officers obtained a warrant for "[a] red, 1999, Peter Built semi-tractor bearing Iowa license PT 1142 registered to Liberty Transport, Burlington, Iowa."
Following a search of the vehicle, the State charged the two men with possession of precursors with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(4)(a), (b), (f) (2001). Maddox moved to suppress evidence obtained from the vehicle search. The district court granted the motion, concluding the warrant was not supported by probable cause and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement was not satisfied. We review the constitutional issues raised in the court's suppression ruling de novo. State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 1996).
II. Probable Cause for Issuance of Warrant
Search warrants must be based on probable cause. State v. Green, 540 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 1995). In determining whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause, "[o]ur review is limited to a consideration of only that information, reduced to writing, which was actually presented to the magistrate at the time application for the warrant was made." Randle, 555 N.W.2d at 668(citing State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1987)).
The test for probable cause is whether a reasonable person would believe a crime has been committed or that evidence of a crime might be located in the particular area to be searched. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Iowa 2001). There must be a nexus between the criminal activity, the things to be seized and the place to be searched. Green, 540 N.W.2d at 654.
The district court found this nexus lacking, stating:
There is nothing in the affidavit to describe the vehicle that officers want to search. There is nothing in the affidavit to explain why the Defendant has a connection to this vehicle and, as a result, why there might be probable cause to believe there is evidence connected with the Defendant in that vehicle. The affidavit does not even make a general allegation that the Defendant walked to the vehicle, was seen by the vehicle, acknowledged the vehicle was his, or that the officers had seen Defendant put items in or take items out of the vehicle. There is a complete failure to provide any connection between the Defendant and a red 1999 Peterbuilt semi tractor bearing Iowa license number PT1142 registered to Liberty Transport, Burlington, Iowa.
We agree with this assessment. Focusing only on the affidavit attached to the warrant application, we note that it contains two sentences purporting to tie Maddox to the vehicle. The first states, "[t]he subjects denied any knowledge of manufacturing but refused to let officers search the semi tractor even after officers told them they would be detained in an attempt to obtain a search warrant for the vehicle." The second states a narcotics investigator "saw at least two other Wal-Mart sacks in the vehicle in plain view through the windows." Although one could infer from these sentences that there was a vehicle that had something to do with Maddox, neither sentence links Maddox to criminal activity. See State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Iowa 1997). Even when read in context, the sentences do not tie the vehicle to Maddox and criminal activity, given the lawful and common uses for the items in Maddox's shopping bags. Id. For these reasons, we are persuaded that the warrant was not supported by probable cause.
III. Automobile Exception to Warrant Requirement
Courts have recognized an automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 1996). Under this exception, police may search a vehicle without a warrant if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1992). Probable cause exists under these circumstances when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the automobile contains contraband. State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Iowa 1995). The exigency requirement is satisfied when the automobile is mobile and the vehicle's contents may never be found again if the police must obtain a warrant. Id.
The district court assumed the exigency requirement was satisfied but found probable cause lacking. The court noted the purchased items were lawful, Maddox did not buy unusual quantities of the items, and Maddox furnished plausible explanations for his purchases. The court further noted that officers could point to no history of illegal drug activity by Maddox. Finally, the court stated that Maddox's colleague went to a separate vehicle in the parking lot, attenuating the link between the items he purchased and the vehicle that was searched.
We agree with the district court's determination that the exigency requirement was satisfied because a vehicle was involved. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442, 445 (1999). We further agree with the court's determination that probable cause to search the vehicle was lacking. No contraband was found in or around the vehicle or on Maddox. Maddox himself cooperated with police by retrieving a bag of items from the truck and opening it for inspection. Although he later refused to permit a search of the vehicle, that refusal cannot furnish the requisite probable cause to believe a crime was committed, absent other facts. Green, 540 N.W.2d at 656. Here, those other facts are simply not present. At best, the record reveals a suspicion on the part of trained officers that Maddox was purchasing items that might be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. As the district court stated, the probable cause determination must be based on probabilities rather than suspicions. See Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d at 353; see also United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting prerequisite to valid search under the automobile exception is probable cause, not a hunch). We conclude the facts of this case do not satisfy that standard.
See also State v. Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d 345, 353 (Iowa 2000) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001), (holding no probable cause existed to search vehicle even though vehicle was seen leaving at a high rate of speed from an area near the site of several recent thefts, where there was no evidence a crime had been committed or was in progress); Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 207(holding odor of marijuana emanating from car, nervousness of passenger, and observation of drug-related items in plain view furnished probable cause to search vehicle); Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 678 (holding probable cause for full vehicle search established by discovery of loaded handgun and absence of permit to carry gun); State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (holding marijuana in plain view in car and on defendant, together with odor of marijuana, nervousness of defendant and evidence of something heavy in trunk furnished probable cause for search); State v. Lam, 391 N.W.2d 245, 248-49 (Iowa 1986) (finding probable cause for vehicle search where car was parked at the site of recent burglaries, defendant had been seen jump-starting vehicle, and police had discovered stolen item in home of defendant's sister); United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding probable cause for vehicle search established where car was parked at site of drug-related activity and officer saw item commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine in plain view inside the car).
A recent unpublished federal opinion is based on a virtually identical fact pattern. See United States v. Ameling, No. CRO2-3005 MWB (N.D.Iowa, June 26, 2002). In Ameling, a store employee watched two customers purchase multiple boxes of pseudoephedrine, walk together toward the checkout lanes, then separate. They met separately at a parked truck. The employee notified police who followed the truck to a second store. Officers were notified by an employee of this store that the individuals had purchased batteries. As the customers began driving their truck away, officers stopped them. An officer asked one of the occupants whether he could search the truck. The occupant declined. Relying on the same Fourth Amendment principles that guide us here, the federal magistrate found the information the officers had in their possession was not even enough to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, let alone probable cause for the vehicle search.
IV. Disposition
We affirm the district court's ruling granting Maddox's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle.