Opinion
No. UWY CR07-0364704-T
August 13, 2009
Ruling on Motion to Suppress
The defendant, charged with first degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child, moves to suppress his September 14, 2007 confession. For the following reasons, the court denies the motion.
I
The defendant first claims that he did not make a valid waiver of the Miranda rights that the Waterbury police read him during the September 14 interview at the police station. In order to invoke Miranda rights, the defendant bears the initial burden of proving custodial interrogation. See State v. Tomaski, 238 Conn. 253, 269, 681 A.2d 922 (1996). While there is no disagreement that the defendant was subject to interrogation at the Waterbury police station, the element of custody is in dispute. The court credits the testimony of Officer Jay Costanzo that he initially put the defendant in handcuffs on Walnut Street in Waterbury on September 14 only for a quick pat down and then removed the handcuffs. Costanzo told the defendant that he was not under arrest. Such a brief Terry stop does not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. See State v. Jackson, 23 Conn.App. 151, 154-55, 585 A.2d 694 (1990).
The court credits the testimony of Costanzo and Detective Kenneth Borer that, when asked whether he would get into Borer's car to talk to detectives about a matter, the defendant did so on his own volition. The defendant was unrestrained in the police car as Borer drove to the police station. He remained unrestrained at the police station, where he entered and sat down in an interview room. At no point did the defendant ask to leave or voice any objection to his treatment. The court credits the testimony of Detective Ruta Pratt that at no time did the police threaten the defendant, promise him anything, or use any force. The police did not formally arrest the defendant until after he provided the confession in question.
The ultimate issue in determining custody for Miranda purposes is whether "a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 758, 670 A.2d 276 (1996). Even though a police station is not completely free of coercive effect, when, as here, a suspect voluntarily goes to a police station, even in a police vehicle, and remains unrestrained in a police interview room, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed that his movement was restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest. See id., 759-61. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to prove custody. Therefore, there was no requirement that the police advise the defendant of his Miranda rights or that the defendant waive them prior to answering questions.
II
Alternatively, the court concludes that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The state bears the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted). State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 99, 944 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901, 957 A.2d 873 (2008). The court must look to the totality of the circumstances of the claimed waiver. See id., 100.
In the present case, the court credits the state's evidence of what happened inside the detective bureau at the Waterbury police station. The defendant received two sets of written and oral Miranda warnings before completing his written confession. The defendant stated that he was agreeable to speaking to Pratt. The defendant signed the rights forms that the police gave him and initialed that he understood his rights and wished to waive them. The defendant never expressed any unwillingness to speak, any uncertainty about his rights, or any desire for an attorney. He was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The defendant, who had been arrested one time previously, was very cooperative with the police. At no time did the police threaten, coerce, restrain, or promise the defendant anything to induce him to talk. The defendant and the police understood each other's conversation.
As for the defendant's testimony that the police promised him that he could go home, harassed and intimidated him, and then physically abused him, all in a campaign to make the defendant waive his rights and confess to sexual assault on a minor, the court rejects this testimony as wholly unbelievable.
Although the testimony of Dr. Bernard J. Barile established that the defendant had a low IQ, took special education courses, and did not graduate high school, it stands for little else relevant to this case. To begin with, evidence of low IQ, special education, or even learning disabilities and mental retardation does not by itself prevent a defendant from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. Id., 101-02. Moreover, Barile had seen the defendant for a total of two hours in a controlled setting and obviously was not present during his interview with the police. Barile admitted that he was not an expert on competency to waive Miranda or competency to confess. The more credible testimony of what the defendant was like in the real world came from the people who had actually worked with or known him there — his former employer and his former girlfriend — and from the defendant himself. This testimony showed that the defendant could write lengthy letters, fill out a job application and other forms, read a newspaper and a computer screen, respond to questions, and — based on his testimony in court — concoct a story of police misconduct to advance his defense. The totality of these circumstances establishes by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See id., 99-103.
III
The defendant's remaining claim is that his confession is involuntary under the due process clause. The state bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a suspect's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 419, 736 A.2d 857 (1999). While the court, in deciding voluntariness, must take into account many of the same factors that help determine whether a Miranda waiver is valid; see id.; the court must also recognize that "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Id.
In the present case, there was no coercive police activity. The interview lasted only about two hours and ten minutes. The defendant was not physically restrained or mentally abused. Although a police station does not have the comforts of a hotel suite, there is no evidence that the police deprived the defendant of any necessity. In short, the questioning of the defendant was routine. The defendant appeared to understand his written statement, read some of it aloud, signed and initialed it, and said that the statement was correct. Coupled with the facts supporting the conclusion that the defendant effected a valid waiver of his Miranda rights, the facts showing an absence of coercive police activity establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's statement was not involuntary under the due process clause. See State v. Linarte, supra, 107 Conn.App. 104-07.
IV
The court denies the motion to suppress.
It is so ordered.