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State v. Lorenz

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two
May 1, 2007
138 Wn. App. 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)

Opinion

No. 34851-9-II.

May 1, 2007.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 05-1-01703-1, Robert A. Lewis, J., entered April 26, 2006.


Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Hunt, J.


Ronald Blayne Lorenz appeals his conviction of a felony violation of a no-contact order. He asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the crime by failing to prove identity of the underlying protection order. The State concedes the error. We reverse.

Facts

On August 8, 2005, the State charged Lorenz with one felony count of violating a domestic violence court order under RCW 26.50.110(4). At trial, the State moved to admit two no-contact orders with what appeared to be Lorenz's signature on them. Over a hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the exhibits as self-authenticating documents. Other than the documents themselves, the State did not present any testimony or evidence at trial to identify Lorenz as the same Ronald B. Lorenz in the protection order. The signature was never authenticated, nor did the victim who was the subject of the no-contact order testify to the fact that Lorenz was the same Lorenz who signed the no-contact order.

RCW 26.50.110(4) provides: "Any assault that is a violation of [a protection] order . . . and that does not amount to assault in the first or second degree . . . is a class C felony."

In order to convict Lorenz, the jury had to find: (1) that Lorenz had willful contact with Sandra K. Weaver on February 11, 2005; (2) that such contact was prohibited by a valid no-contact order; and (3) that Lorenz knew of the existence of the order. See State v. Clowes, 104 Wn. App 935, 944, 18 P.3d 596 (2001); see also Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal § 36.50, at 337; § 36.51, at 338-39 (Supp. 2005).

Lorenz appeals. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence because the State failed to prove the second and third elements.

Analysis

In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the State's evidence, this court, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, must decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 220-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this court draws all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State and interprets them most strongly against the defendant. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. State v. Theroff, 25 Wn. App. 590, 593, 608 P.2d 1254, aff'd, 95 Wn.2d 385 (1980). State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

This court must defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75.

Lorenz argues that the State did not prove that he was the named restrained party or that Sandra K. Weaver was the named protected party. When a previous conviction is an underlying element of the current charged offense, identity of the name alone is not sufficient proof of the identity of the person to warrant the court in submitting to the jury. State v. Hunter, 29 Wn. App. 218, 221, 627 P.2d 1339 (1981). "[T]he State must do more than authenticate and admit the document; it also must show beyond a reasonable doubt `that the person named therein is the same person on trial.'" State v. Huber, 129 Wn. App. 499, 502, 119 P.3d 388 (2005) (quoting State v. Kelly, 52 Wn.2d 676, 678, 328 P.2d 362 (1958)). In Hunter, we held that a work release supervisor's testimony was sufficient independent evidence to establish a prima facie case that the defendant was the same person named in the judgments and sentence. Hunter, 29 Wn. App at 221-22.

However, here, the State offered no evidence to identify Lorenz beyond the no-contact order itself. It did not call any witnesses or present any evidence to prove that the defendant Lorenz was the person named in the no-contact orders. It did not submit a handwriting analysis of the signature on the no contact order. The State concedes it failed to identify Lorenz as the subject of the no-contact order. We accept the State's concession because the evidence was insufficient to identify Lorenz. The evidence was insufficient to convict him of the violation of the no contact order.

We hold that there was insufficient evidence that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lorenz is the same person as the Ronald B. Lorenz on the no-contact order. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is insufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of felony violation of a protection order beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the conviction is reversed based upon insufficient evidence, we remand the matter for an order of dismissal with prejudice. State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 853, 72 P.3d 748 (2003).

Reversed and remanded.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Houghton, C.J., and Hunt, J., concur.


Summaries of

State v. Lorenz

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two
May 1, 2007
138 Wn. App. 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
Case details for

State v. Lorenz

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RONALD BLAYNE LORENZ, Appellant

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two

Date published: May 1, 2007

Citations

138 Wn. App. 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
138 Wash. App. 1028