Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 12-0801
02-18-2014
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee v. PAUL ANDREW LIDDY, Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Eliza C. Ybarra Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Mikel Steinfeld Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2011-107821-002
The Honorable Edward W. Bassett, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Eliza C. Ybarra
Counsel for Appellee
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined. BROWN, Judge:
¶1 Paul Andrew Liddy appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of theft. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 During the course of a traffic stop, police discovered a bag of stolen merchandise from a Dillard's department store in Merrill Davis's vehicle. This information was relayed to the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO"). As part of its investigation, the MCSO contacted Dillard's and confirmed that Davis worked on a loading dock of the Chandler store and had access to merchandise. During a subsequent interview, Davis admitted stealing the merchandise and giving it to Liddy in exchange for methamphetamine.
¶3 Based on this information, the MCSO obtained a warrant to search Liddy's property for stolen merchandise and illegal drugs. Police officers executed the warrant at 6:30 a.m. on February 16, 2011. Teams from SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) and HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas) first swept Liddy's property (which included numerous vehicles, storage trailers, at least one travel trailer, and several buildings/sheds) to secure the premises, and then the detectives began their search. The search focused primarily on a locked tractor-trailer that contained, among other things, boxes and bags of designer purses, wallets, watches, fragrances, sunglasses, linens, silverware, and lingerie. In the "house" where Liddy apparently resided, officers found luggage, car parts, and "stacks of stuff from floor to ceiling." The officers also noticed a hole in an exterior wall that was concealed by a mattress.
¶4 Approximately four or five hours after the search commenced, MCSO Detective Peter Czerwinksi received a tip that Liddy was at a neighbor's house about a block away. The detective went to that house and found Liddy out front, appearing "tired" and "sweaty." Liddy cooperated fully when he was taken into custody.
¶5 On May 19, 2011, Liddy was charged with one count of theft, a class three felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-1802(A)(5), (G). Liddy pled not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial, which resulted in a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.
¶6 Several months later Liddy was retried, during which Susan Sanford, an inventory auditor for Dillard's, explained the store's procedures for tracking and identifying its merchandise. Sandford explained that items sold at Dillard's stores have a seven digit SKU number that is "indigenous" to a specific store. In consultation with the sheriff's office, Sanford used a scanning device to confirm that the merchandise retrieved from Liddy's property was stolen from a Dillard's store in Chandler and had an approximate value of $19,000.
¶7 Davis testified that he was employed at the Chandler Dillard's store for approximately two years before his arrest in February 2011. He "worked on the dock" unloading merchandise. Several months after starting work at Dillard's, Davis began stealing merchandise. He stated that he was addicted to methamphetamine and stole the merchandise as a means of supporting his drug habit. At the time Davis began stealing, Liddy had been his drug dealer for several years and Davis had always paid cash for drugs. Without ever discussing a change in their arrangement, however, Liddy began accepting Dillard's merchandise as payment. When questioned specifically regarding the parties' express agreement, Davis testified that he and Liddy never discussed switching from cash to goods, but he believed "it was a mutual understanding" that Davis was providing Liddy stolen merchandise of far greater value than the drugs he received. According to Davis, Liddy usually gave him "half a teener," which is half of a sixteenth of a gram of methamphetamine, regardless of the value of the merchandise offered in exchange. Based on the frequency of his drug use, Davis estimated that he provided stolen merchandise to Liddy approximately fifty times.
¶8 The jury found Liddy guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Liddy to a term of three years' supervised probation, with two months' jail time as a condition of probation. Liddy timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Liddy argues he is entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. He also asserts that the trial court improperly admitted speculative testimony. We address each claim in turn. I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶10 Liddy contends the prosecutor improperly (1) argued that Liddy fled his property when the search warrant was executed, (2) impugned the integrity of defense counsel, and (3) encouraged the jurors to disregard a jury instruction. Additionally, Liddy asserts that the cumulative impact of all prosecutorial errors, including those objected to and sustained/stricken by the trial court, warrant a new trial.
¶11 Liddy objected to the prosecutor's closing argument regarding flight, but he did not raise the other claims below. Therefore, we review the flight remarks for harmless error and the remaining claims for fundamental error. State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, 13, ¶ 30, 66 P.3d 50, 56 (2003). "Harmless error review places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence." State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). Under fundamental error review, however, the burden is on the defendant to prove that fundamental error exists and that the error caused him prejudice. Id. at 567, ¶ 20, 115 P.3d at 607. "To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury's verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial." State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 459, ¶ 145, 94 P.3d 1119, 1154 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
A. Closing Argument on Flight
¶12 Liddy contends the prosecutor improperly argued during his closing statements that Liddy fled his residence when the search warrant was executed because there was no evidence to support such a claim.
¶13 During the State's closing remarks, the following exchange occurred:
PROSECUTOR: Now, they didn't find meth. But they also didn't find the defendant on the property. They did find him just directly south the next street over, heavily sweated
. . . . You also heard Detective Czerwinski testify about the hole in his house that's behind the mattress. He had the ability and the means to escape if he needed to. Why would he need to? Because he knew a search warrant was about to be conducted on his property.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, Judge, statements not in evidence, misrepresenting the facts.
THE COURT: Overruled.
PROSECUTOR: He knew what was going to happen and he fled. That's why he's sweated.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, may we approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon the following discussion is held at the bench:)
. . . .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I just want to be heard as far as knowledge that my client knew that the search warrant was going to be executed . . . . That didn't come out in any evidence. There has been no testimony to that. Regarding the flight, the same thing. There's been no testimony that anybody saw him flee or that he was running away in any way. In fact, the only testimony that was said was that he was cooperative, that he listened to the officers' instructions. This is all speculation and it's misrepresenting the facts at this point.
THE COURT: I believe that the argument is a fair inference from the evidence that has been presented, so the objection is overruled.
(Proceeding in open court:)
PROSECUTOR: [H]e's got the escape hatch in his house covered up by a large mattress he can head out and he's found directly south of this property. Now, what would a reasonable person do when their home is being searched or when, even when they have several SWAT teams and detectives on their street? What's going on here? What's the
deal? The defendant was one block south sweating profusely. They had to go find him. He didn't come to his house to see what was going on, because he knew what was going on. He knew what they would find.
¶14 Prosecutors are afforded "wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury," State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 305, ¶ 37, 4 P.3d 345, 360 (2000) and "may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions." State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 602, 858 P.2d 1152, 1205 (1993). Notwithstanding this considerable leeway in presenting arguments, prosecutors nonetheless must limit their argument to the "facts the jury is entitled to find from the evidence and not on extraneous matters that were not or could not be received in evidence." State v. Leon, 190 Ariz. 159, 162, 945 P.2d 1290, 1293 (1997); State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 336, ¶ 51, 160 P.3d 203, 215 (2007) ("Prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their arguments to the jury . . . [and are] permitted to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence, but cannot make insinuations that are not supported by the evidence.") (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Reagan, 694 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir. 1982) (referring to the "fundamental rule, known to every lawyer" that "argument is limited to the facts in evidence").
¶15 Here, no evidence was presented to the jury from which one could reasonably infer that Liddy fled his property when the police executed the search warrant. There was no evidence Liddy was notified or otherwise became aware a search was imminent. Nor was there evidence that any person saw Liddy leaving the premises or that he left his property in an urgent fashion prior to or during the search. There was no evidence that Liddy attempted to hide to avoid police discovery or put great distance between himself and the police. Rather, the only evidence was from Detective Czerwinski, who testified he had no knowledge of Liddy's whereabouts or activities during the four to five hours officers searched the property before Liddy was found openly standing in a residential yard a block south of the property. When located, Liddy was sweating profusely. This evidence did not support the inference that Liddy had fled his home when he saw police vehicles approaching, because the alleged flight would have occurred at least four to five hours earlier, with Liddy ultimately found only one block from his home. Therefore, we are not persuaded by the State's argument that Liddy's absence from the property at 6:30 a.m. when a "long procession" of police officers arrived to execute the search, alone, reasonably supported the inference that he fled. The prosecutor's comments suggesting that Liddy fled the scene were not supported by the evidence and therefore the trial court should have sustained Liddy's objection.
¶16 The issue before us, then, "is to determine whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that counsel's statements did not affect the verdict." Leon, 190 Ariz. at 162, 945 P.3d at 1293. To prove Liddy committed theft in this case, the State was required to show that he "control[led] property of another knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen[.]" A.R.S. § 13-1802. As set forth in A.R.S. § 13-2305(1), "possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, may give rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property was aware of the risk that it had been stolen or in some way participated in its theft."
¶17 The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that Liddy knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Davis testified that he stole Dillard's merchandise over a period of nearly eighteen months and tendered that stolen property to Liddy on over fifty occasions. Boxes and bags of goods, with an aggregate value of $19,000, were found inside Liddy's home, and a Dillard's internal auditor identified that property as stolen from the Dillard's store where Davis worked. The sole defense witness, Crystal Plummer, testified that on one occasion in 2008 or 2009, when she was visiting Liddy in his home, Davis stopped by for a few minutes. Davis brought a big bag of merchandise, primarily women's lingerie, and Liddy "pulled a couple items out, looked at them and then pretty much just reached into his pocket and handed [Davis] some cash." Plummer explained that there was little communication between Liddy and Davis and Liddy handed Davis a pre-rolled stack of bills, suggesting "they had already had an amount arranged." Although this evidence challenged the State's theory that Liddy exchanged methamphetamine for the stolen goods, it did not rebut the statutory presumption that Liddy was aware of the risk the property may have been stolen.
¶18 Given the strength of the evidence and the statutory presumption of knowledge, we conclude the State has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's "flight" argument did not contribute to or affect the verdict.
B. Impugning Defense Counsel
¶19 Liddy next contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by implicitly impugning defense counsel.
¶20 During his direct testimony, Davis acknowledged that he entered an agreement with the State that provided him immunity from prosecution for any crimes he testified to committing. Davis explained, however, that he received "no benefit" for testifying. At the close of the cross-examination of Davis, defense counsel challenged the claim that Davis received no benefit from testifying. Defense counsel noted that, during his direct testimony, Davis had admitted to committing numerous crimes that were not incorporated in his plea agreement. Ultimately, defense counsel ended her cross-examination by asking Davis whether his testimony that he was not receiving any benefit from testifying "was a lie." Davis answered "Yes, I suppose it was." On redirect examination, the following discussion ensued:
PROSECUTOR: Did you just feel like you got kind of pulled down a path you didn't know where you were going?
DAVIS: Just the questioning? Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Did you like being - that's called, that's called being led. Did you like it?
DAVIS: It's called what?
PROSECTUOR: Being led.
DAVIS: No.
PROSECUTOR: Did you go to law school?
DAVIS: No, I did not.
PROSECUTOR: Did you receive a criminal justice degree?
DAVIS: No, I did not.
PROSECUTOR: Did a lot of the items she was discussing seem foreign to you[?]
DAVIS: Yeah, I was, I was lost.
¶21 Statements by a prosecutor that impugn the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel are improper. State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, 969 P.2d 1184, 1198 (1998). A prosecutor may, however, properly criticize defense theories or tactics. U.S. v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997).
¶22 Based on our review of the transcript, we discern no prosecutorial attack on defense counsel's character or integrity. Rather, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate one of the State's witnesses who, in response to intense questioning from defense counsel, admitted to lying. Viewed in context, the prosecutor did not imply that defense counsel had been dishonest, but instead implied that Davis was uninformed and easily led.
C. Suggestion that Jury Disregard Voluntary Act Instruction
¶23 Liddy asserts the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by encouraging the jury to disregard a portion of the final jury instructions, which included the following statement on voluntary acts:
Before you may convict the defendant of the charged crime, you must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a voluntary act. A voluntary act means a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination. You must consider all the evidence in deciding whether the defendant committed the act voluntarily.During closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted various portions of the instructions that he argued were particularly important and also informed the jury that certain instructions were not relevant, as follows:
Mere presence isn't an issue here because it's the defendant's property, and even the defendant's own witness confirmed he received at least some of that property. The property was also found in a locked storage container on his property. Now, we'll come back to direct and circumstantial evidence, but mere presence isn't an issue in this case. He wasn't merely present to buy some stolen property that was sitting on the side of the street. It was at his house.
Page four, voluntary act, you can somewhat disregard. That applies more in situations of say a spasm, spasm and hit an officer. It doesn't really apply in this case. The defendant's receipt of this stolen property was a voluntary act. That was not involuntary.
¶24 Unlike the legal authorities cited by Liddy, in this case, the prosecutor did not encourage the jury to disregard substantive, relevant portions of the final jury instructions or otherwise ignore the law. Cf. State v. McCorkendale, 979 P.2d 1239, 1252 (Kan. 1999) (concluding the prosecutor's closing argument, which specifically told the jurors they don't even have to consider the lesser-included offenses that were "thrown in to confuse" the jurors, was improper); State v. Cardus, 949 P.2d 1047, 1054, 1060 (Haw. App. 1998) (concluding the prosecutor's closing argument, which encouraged the jury to not be confused by the "legal jargon" of the jury instructions and instead use their "common sense" to determine whether defendant was guilty, was improper); State v. Hudson, 619 N.E.2d 1190, 1192-93 (Ohio App. 1993) (concluding prosecutor's closing argument, which suggested "practical considerations such as bad character and the public need should be given precedence over the proper application of the law to the admissible evidence presented at trial," was improper). Instead, here, the prosecutor noted that the voluntary act instruction, like the mere presence instruction, did not relate to any evidence or theory presented by either side and therefore had no application to the case. Liddy does not dispute that the voluntary act instruction was irrelevant. Rather, he asserts that the prosecutor's use of the term "disregard" elevated the argument to misconduct. Although the better practice may have been for the prosecutor to request that the trial court omit any irrelevant instructions during the settling of the final jury instructions, the comments were not improper.
D. Cumulative Impact
¶25 Finally, Liddy argues that even if no single alleged error is reversible, the cumulative impact of all prosecutorial misconduct in this case warrants a new trial. In addition to the three alleged errors discussed above, Liddy contends that certain questions and statements by the prosecutor that were objected to and sustained/ stricken by the trial court, when viewed together, require the setting aside of his verdict and a new trial.
¶26 "Arizona recognizes the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct[.]" State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 27, 969 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1998). "[E]ven if there [is] no error or an error [is] harmless and so by itself does not warrant reversal, an incident may nonetheless contribute to a finding of persistent and pervasive misconduct if the cumulative effect of the incidents shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not specific intent, to prejudice the defendant." State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 568, ¶ 35, 242 P.3d 159, 167 (2010) (internal quotation omitted).
¶27 During the presentation of the State's case, the prosecutor asked three separate witnesses similar questions about trafficking in stolen property, as follows:
PROSECUTOR (to Detective Czerwinski): Let me ask your opinion on this. If a man showed up to your house holding a bunch of Dillard's property or just a bunch of new items in general and said, "Hey I want to -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Let me hear the question.
PROSECUTOR: I want to sell this property to you," would you believe that it was suspicious?
THE COURT: Your objection is sustained. Don't answer.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR (to Susan Sanford): If somebody approached you with a bag of merchandise like this -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, speculation.
THE COURT: Let me hear the question, counsel.
PROSECUTOR: If somebody approached you with a bag of . . . items like this and said, "I will make you a good deal," is that something you would purchase?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, speculation.
THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained. Don't answer.
PROSECUTOR: Do you purchase from people off the street?
SUSAN SANFORD: I do not.
PROSECUTOR: Does your store?
SUSAN SANFORD: Not that I'm aware of.
PROSECUTOR: There's vendors that do that?
SUSAN SANFORD: Not that I'm personally aware of, no.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR (to Detective Mackiewicz): So I guess just to ask you a hypothetical -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, Judge.
THE COURT: Let me hear the question.
PROESCUTOR: -- if a person pulled up next to you in a van, opened the door and said would you like to buy some wrapped new Coach purses, they still got the price tags on them, would that allow you to decipher that there's a good chance -
THE COURT: Sustained. The objection is sustained. Don't answer.
¶28 The State presented no evidence that Liddy trafficked any stolen merchandise. Therefore, the hypothetical questions were inappropriate and the trial court properly sustained defense counsel's objections. We agree with Liddy that, in light of the trial court's ruling on the first hypothetical posed to Detective Czerwinski, the prosecutor's subsequent use of similar hypotheticals with Susan Sanford and Detective Mackiewicz was improper. Nonetheless, because the trial court barred the witnesses from answering and, given the strength of the State's evidence, we find no cumulative error requiring reversal.
¶29 Liddy also contends three other alleged errors should be considered. During the prosecutor's direct examination of Davis, he asked whether Davis was "scared" of Liddy. Defense counsel objected and the court sustained the objection and ordered Davis not to answer. Viewing the question in the context of questions relating to Davis's plea agreement, it is apparent the prosecutor was attempting to demonstrate that Davis was a reluctant witness compelled to testify by subpoena rather than a criminal seeking leverage for a better plea offer. We find no error.
¶30 Later, during his redirect examination of Davis, the prosecutor elicited Davis's admission that he initially lied to police to cover up his involvement and then asked "you eventually told them the truth, right?" Defense counsel objected on the basis of vouching, and the trial court sustained the objection. Finally, during his closing argument, the prosecutor remarked:
Davis would show up. He wasn't there very long. It was in and out. He didn't hang out. He didn't socialize. He made the transaction and got out of there. That was consistent with what Ms. Plummer said. He's telling the truth about what happened. He tried to cover it up.Defense counsel objected on the basis of vouching and the trial court ordered the remark stricken.
¶31 "There are two types of prosecutorial vouching: (1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness, and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony." State v. Duzan, 176 Ariz. 463, 467, 862 P.2d 223, 227 (App. 1993) (internal quotation omitted). "A prosecutor must avoid assertions of personal knowledge." Id. "When determining whether a prosecutor's statements improperly vouched for a witness's credibility, the statements must be considered in context." U.S. v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2008).
¶32 Here, the prosecutor did not suggest that the State had undisclosed information that supported Davis's testimony. Nor do we perceive the prosecutor's statements as an attempt to place the prestige of the government behind its witness. Instead, the prosecutor's question to Davis as to whether he "eventually told [the police] the truth" was part of an attempt to draw the sting of Davis's initial deception and then rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony that he eventually acknowledged his cover-up and was honest. Likewise, in his closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to assure the jury of Davis's veracity, but not through his personal knowledge of Davis's truthfulness. Rather, the prosecutor emphasized that much of Davis's testimony was consistent with the testimony of the sole defense witness, and argued that consistency demonstrated Davis's truthfulness. Although a prosecutor may not place the prestige of the government behind a witness or suggest that undisclosed information supports the testimony, a prosecutor may characterize a witness as truthful when the argument is "sufficiently linked to the evidence." State v. Corona, 188 Ariz. 85, 91, 932 P.2d 1356, 1362 (App. 1997). The prosecutor's statements here were sufficiently linked to the evidence, and we discern no prosecutorial error or prejudice. II. Evidentiary Rulings
¶33 Liddy argues the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce "speculative testimony" on two occasions.
¶34 "Decisions on the admission and exclusion of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed on appeal only when they constitute a clear, prejudicial abuse of discretion." State v. Ayala, 178 Ariz. 385, 387, 873 P.2d 1308, 1309 (App. 1994) (internal quotation omitted). To warrant reversal, the "prejudice must be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about whether the verdict might have been different had the error not been committed." Id.
¶35 "As a general rule, a lay witness, if competent, may testify to relevant evidence." Id. "[L]ay testimony may include inferences or opinions 'which are (a) rationally based on the perceptions of the witness and (b) helpful [in understanding] the witness' testimony or [determining] a fact in issue.'" Id. (quoting State v. Koch, 138 Ariz. 99, 102, 673 P.2d 297, 300 (1983)); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 701.
¶36 At trial, Detective Czerwinski testified that Liddy appeared "tired" and "sweaty" when found standing in front of his neighbor's home. The prosecutor then asked whether, "based on his appearance," Liddy "look[ed] like he had just been exerting himself?" Defense counsel objected on grounds of speculation and the trial court overruled the objection. The detective responded that "[i]f I was sweating that much, yeah, I think I would have been exerting." The prosecutor then elicited testimony that the weather on February 16th was cool and Liddy was sweating to a notably greater extent than Detective Czerwinski who had been "busy working" and "digging through" Liddy's property. We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of this evidence. The detective testified regarding his observations of Liddy and his rational inference that, given the cool weather, Liddy mostly likely exerted himself to become tired and sweaty.
¶37 Later, Detective Czerwinski testified regarding the hole in the wall of Liddy's trailer, which was covered by a mattress.
PROSECUTOR: Would there be a way to exit his house—We find no abuse of discretion to the admission of this evidence. The officer testified as to his observation of a hole in the wall and his rational inference that the hole was large enough in dimension to accommodate a person and provide an alternative exit from the trailer.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, speculation.
THE COURT: I haven't heard the question, counsel. So renew it if you - after I hear the question. Go ahead.
PROSECUTOR: Based on your walk-through and your observance, would it be possible for you if you wanted to exit his house to do so without going through either the front or back door and -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, leading.
THE COURT: Let me hear the question, counsel.
PROSECUTOR: Based upon your observances of his house, would [he] have been able to exit his house without going through the front or back door?
DETECTIVE CZERWINSKI: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And why is that?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I renew my objection.
THE COURT: Too late, counsel.
PROSECUTOR: And why is that?
DETECTIVE CZERWINSKI: On the west wall covered by a mattress which had been pulled down, there was a hole in the wall.
PROSECUTOR: And where did that, where did that hole in the wall lead to?
DETECTIVE CZERWINSKI: It led outside[.]
Our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Detective Czerwinski's observation and inference regarding Liddy's appearance and the condition of his property is not in conflict with our determination that the prosecutor improperly argued that Liddy fled his home. Supra ¶ 15. The detective's testimony met the relatively low bar of relevance, see Ariz. R. Evid. P. 401, but the existence of a hole in the wall large enough to be used as an exit does not provide a logical basis for concluding that Liddy fled to avoid law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
¶38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Liddy's conviction and sentence.