Opinion
C. A. K2-2017-0745A
05-16-2018
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. JEFFREY LEONARD
For Plaintiff: John E. Sullivan, III, Esq. For Defendant: Daniel P. Connors, Esq.
For Plaintiff: John E. Sullivan, III, Esq.
For Defendant: Daniel P. Connors, Esq.
DECISION
PROCACCINI, J.
Before this Court is Jeffrey Leonard's (Leonard) appeal of a Superior Court Magistrate's (the Magistrate) decision finding that there was no "defect" in the Criminal Information (the Information) charging Leonard with violating G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i). Leonard asserts that the Information is "defective" because the language of the statute illustrates that he cannot be in violation of it. Jurisdiction is pursuant G.L. 1956 § 8-2-11.1(d).
I. Facts and Travel
On October 4, 2012, the State of Rhode Island (the State) charged Leonard with violating § 31-27-2-the driving under the influence (DUI) statute. Leonard pled guilty to this charge on October 18, 2012. Less than a year later, on May 23, 2013, the State charged Leonard with a second DUI offense. Leonard pled guilty to this charge on July 11, 2013. On September 1, 2017, the Rhode Island State Police stopped Leonard for a third DUI offense. As a result of this third offense, the State filed the Information on December 1, 2017 charging Leonard with being in violation of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) . Before the Magistrate on January 12, 2018, Leonard objected to the Information. He claimed that he could not be in violation of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) because it required three convictions within a five-year period, and, even if he was convicted on that day of the September 1, 2017 offense, he would not have three convictions within a five-year period. The Magistrate denied Leonard's objection, finding that Leonard fell within the statute's coverage. Leonard appealed the Magistrate's decision to this Court.
Section 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) states, in pertinent part:
"Every person convicted of a third or subsequent violation within a five-year (5) period with a blood alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (.08%) or above, but less than fifteen hundredths of one percent (.15%), or whose blood alcohol concentration is unknown or who has a blood presence of any scheduled controlled substance as defined in subdivision (b)(2), regardless of whether any prior violation and subsequent conviction was a violation and subsequent conviction under this statute or under the driving under the influence of liquor or drugs statute of any other state, shall be guilty of a felony . . . ." Sec. 31-27-2(d)(3)(i).
Specifically, the Magistrate stated: "I find there is no discrepancy in the statute. It's clear to me that your client falls within the ambit of the lookback period and based on that, your motion is denied." Tr. at 3, Jan. 12, 2018. The Magistrate did not explain how he came to this conclusion.
II. Standard of Review
A Superior Court justice's review of a decision of a magistrate is governed by § 8-2-11.1(d). Section 8-2-11.1(d) states, in pertinent part:
"A party aggrieved by an order entered by the . . . magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the superior court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the court, the review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for review of orders entered by the . . . magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt adjudications of the . . . magistrate." Sec. 8-2-11.1(d).
Presently, Rule 2.9(h) of the Superior Court Rules of Practice governs this Court's review of the Magistrate's decision. The rule states:
"The Superior Court justice shall make a de novo determination of those portions to which the appeal is directed and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the judgment, order, or decree of the magistrate. The justice, however, need not formally conduct a new hearing and may consider the record developed before the magistrate, making his or her own determination based on that record whether there is competent evidence upon which the magistrate's judgment, order, or decree rests. The justice may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter with instructions." R.P. 2.9(h).
This Court "shall not substitute [its] view of the evidence for [the Magistrate's] even though a contrary conclusion could have been reached, " if the record illustrates that competent evidence supports the Magistrate's findings. State v. Dennis, 29 A.3d 445, 450 (R.I. 2011) (citation omitted). The record, for purposes of the appeal, includes "[t]he original papers and exhibits filed with the Superior Court, the transcript of the proceedings, and the docket entries[.]" R.P. 2.9(f).
III. Analysis
Leonard argues that he cannot be in violation of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) because it requires three DUI convictions within a five-year period. Specifically, Leonard argues that even if he were to be convicted of the September 1, 2017 DUI offense today, he would not have three DUI convictions within a five-year period. Consequently, Leonard also argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the September 1, 2017 DUI offense because it would only be a misdemeanor. The State argues that Leonard is in violation of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) because it requires only a third DUI violation to occur within five years of the first DUI conviction, not three DUI convictions within a five-year period. The State contends that requiring three convictions within a five-year period "would provide any defendant the opportunity to void the jurisdiction of the superior court by delaying a proceeding beyond the five year period." (State's Mem. at 2.)
If Leonard were to be convicted of the September 1, 2017 DUI offense today, only the July 11, 2013 conviction would be within five years.
When reviewing a statute, the Court's "'ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.'" Providence Journal Co. v. R.I. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Kilmartin, 136 A.3d 1168, 1173 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)). In addition, "'[i]t is well settled that the plain statutory language is the best indicator of the General Assembly's intent.'" Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho, 127 A.3d 897, 900 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. of R.I., 61 A.3d 432, 436 (R.I. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, if a statute's language "is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 288 (R.I. 2012). Regarding the plain meaning of words in a statute, our Supreme Court has said:
"In giving words their plain-meaning . . . we note that this approach is not the equivalent of myopic literalism. When we determine the true import of statutory language, it is entirely proper for us to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context. As we previously have held, it would be foolish and myopic literalism to focus narrowly on one statutory section without regard for the broader context." Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 71 (R.I. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, the Court is required to "consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections." Twenty Eleven, LLC, 127 A.3d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the statute at issue states, in relevant part: "Every person convicted of a third or subsequent violation within a five-year (5) period . . . shall be guilty of a felony . . . ." Sec. 31-27-2(d)(3)(i). This Court finds the language of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) to be ambiguous. This Court reaches that conclusion after comparing § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) with similar statutes from other states. See Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(b)(1) ("Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs within 10 years after a prior conviction for a violation of this section commits a felony of the third degree . . . .") (emphasis added); Cal. Veh. Code § 23550(a) ("If a person is convicted of a violation of Section 23152 and the offense occurred within 10 years of three or more separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or Section 23152 or 23153, or any combination thereof, that resulted in convictions, that person shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .") (emphasis added). Based on the way these statues are written, it is clear that the offense must occur within a certain time period and not the conviction.
The language of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i), however, is not as clear. Unlike the Florida and California statutes, § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) forces a reader to speculate as to which word- "convicted" or "violation"-is the operative word. The Florida and California statutes make it clear that "offense" is the operative word. In this Court's opinion, the interpretation put forth by Leonard-which makes "convicted" the operative word-is reasonable, as is the interpretation advanced by the State-which makes "violation" the operative word. This Court is aware that Leonard's interpretation could potentially provide defendants with the ability to delay proceedings to avoid violating § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i)-by preventing the possibility of having three convictions within a five-year period-but the way the statute is written allows for such an interpretation. It may be an unfavorable interpretation, and one that could have been avoided- evidenced by the Florida and California statutes-but this Court's "role is to interpret and apply statutes and not to legislate . . . ." Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 458 (R.I. 2006).With more than one possible interpretation, this Court finds § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) to be ambiguous. See Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011) ("Ambiguity exists only when a word or phrase in a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning.").
According to our Supreme Court, "'[w]hen the meaning of a criminal statute is ambiguous, the policy of lenity in the construction of criminal statutes requires that the less harsh of two possible meanings be adopted.'" State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 925 (R.I. 1980)). In addition, "'penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the party upon whom a penalty is to be imposed.'" Id. (quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I. 1996)). Based on this guidance from our Supreme Court, this Court finds the language of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) to mean that three convictions are required within the five-year period, as this would be the "less harsh of two possible meanings to be adopted." Smith, 766 A.2d at 924. Applying that interpretation, this Court finds that Leonard does not have the requisite number of convictions needed for him to be in violation of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i). Therefore, this Court finds that the Information charging Leonard with violating § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i) is "defective."
IV. Conclusion
After de novo consideration of those portions of which the appeal of the Magistrate's decision are directed, this Court rejects the decision in whole. Leonard does not have the requisite number of convictions needed for him to be in violation of § 31-27-2(d)(3)(i), which makes the Information "defective." This Court further determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the September 1, 2017 DUI offense, which would only constitute a misdemeanor. Counsel shall submit an appropriate order for entry.