Opinion
No. 07-411.
Filed March 4, 2008.
Guilford County Nos. 05CRS23009, 05CRS23010.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 9 November 2006 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 2008.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State. Robert J. McAfee for Defendant.
FACTS and PROCEDURE
Defendant Christopher Leach was convicted by a jury of first-degree kidnapping of Mary Ann Pearson, first-degree kidnapping of Frank Lee Pearson, first-degree burglary, and robbery with a dangerous weapon at the 6 November 2006 Criminal Session of the Superior Court of Guilford County, the Honorable Catherine Eagles presiding. Upon the jury's verdicts, Judge Eagles entered judgments, imposing consecutive sentences as follows: 151 to 191 months for first-degree kidnapping of Mary Ann Pearson and first-degree burglary; followed by 151 to 191 months for first-degree kidnapping of Frank Lee Pearson; followed by 133 to 169 months for robbery with a dangerous weapon. From these judgments, Defendant appeals.
At trial, the State introduced evidence tending to show the following: in September 2004, Defendant, along with Tyrone Dukes ("Tyrone"), Latesha Nicole McCollum ("Nicole"), Atari Burke ("Atari"), and Ronald Stanley ("Dred"), developed a plan to rob a High Point drug dealer named Carl Jackson, aka "Big Carl." The group did not know where Big Carl lived, so they decided to rob the home of his parents, Frank and Mary Ann Pearson.
Around midnight on 9 September 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Pearson were watching television in their home when they heard a knock at the door. When Mr. Pearson opened the door, a black man, later identified as Tyrone, stated that he had run out of gas and needed to use the phone. As Mr. Pearson was retrieving his cell phone for the man to use, the man pulled out a .357 caliber handgun and ordered Mr. and Mrs. Pearson to lie down on the floor. Tyrone then turned the light switch on and off several times, and two more men entered the home carrying handguns. Mr. Pearson identified one of those men as Defendant. A fourth man also entered the home wearing a face mask and gloves.
The group tied up the Pearsons and "ransacked" the house. When the men left, they took money, two cell phones, keys, the Pearson's Toyota and Acura automobiles, and a suitcase that belonged to Big Carl. Tyrone and one of the other intruders put Mr. Pearson into the back seat of the Toyota, covered his face with a bandana, and drove him to a trailer in Red Springs. Approximately 24 hours later, Mr. Pearson was able to escape and drive home in his car.
Detective Mark McNeil of the High Point Police Department was assigned to investigate the events that had occurred. During the course of his investigation, Detective McNeil learned of Nicole's identity and, after obtaining warrants charging her with the same offenses charged in this case, arrested her on 17 May 2005. Detective McNeil took Nicole's statement in which she detailed what she knew about the robbery, burglary, and kidnapping of Frank and Mary Ann Pearson. During the interview, Nicole identified Defendant in a photograph shown to her by Detective McNeil as the "Chris" that participated in the robbery.
While Nicole was in jail awaiting trial, she received several letters from Defendant threatening her if she testified negatively against him at his trial. Defendant was also in jail at the time. Some of the letters came in envelopes that had Defendant's name and the return address of the jail written on them. They were written in slanted handwriting, and contained the same "slang language." Defendant referred to Nicole by her nickname, "Princess," in some of the letters. Defendant would ask Nicole whether she had received his letters when they would speak to each other while in custody. Nicole also corresponded with Defendant by sending him letters through inmate mail. After being released from jail, Nicole received another threatening letter from Defendant.
II. DISCUSSION
In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence five letters written by Defendant to Nicole while Defendant was in jail awaiting trial on the charges in this case. We disagree.
"A trial court's ruling on an evidentiary point will be presumed to be correct unless the complaining party can demonstrate that the particular ruling was in fact incorrect." State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 749, 370 S.E.2d 363, 373 (1988). Furthermore, even if the complaining party can show that the trial court erred in its ruling, relief ordinarily will not be granted absent a showing of prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2005).
Defendant first argues the letters were inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated. "The requirement of authentication . . . as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 901 (2005). Authentication or identification of handwriting may be established through "nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(2) (2005). "[A] sufficient familiarity with the handwriting of another person may be acquired by seeing him write, by exchanging correspondence, or by other means, to afford a basis for identifying it on subsequent occasions." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 901 (2005) (commentary). Furthermore, "authentication or identification may be established through distinctive characteristics and the like, i.e., through `appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.'" State v. Young, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 651 S.E.2d 576, 583 (2007) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(4) (2005)).
Here, Nicole testified she received several letters from Defendant while he was in jail. Defendant contends the State did not satisfy the authentication requirement because Nicole had never seen Defendant actually write and thus could not claim she was familiar with Defendant's handwriting. However, in State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 431 S.E.2d 755 (1993), the trial court correctly admitted a letter written by the defendant to a co-defendant, where the co-defendant had never actually seen the defendant write, but was familiar with the defendant's handwriting because he had received another letter from the defendant in the same handwriting and had seen songs written by the defendant.
Furthermore, identifying handwriting is not the only method to authenticate a letter. In State v. Young, supra, there was sufficient evidence to authenticate three letters written by the defendant to the co-defendant where the co-defendant testified that on several occasions the defendant said he would write the co-defendant; one of the letters was addressed "From Navothly to Q," which was how the co-defendant and defendant referred to each other; two of the letters had defendant's return address on them; and the content of the letters indicated that the defendant wrote them because they contained intimate knowledge of the crime. Id. Similarly, the letters in this case were all written in the same "slanted" handwriting, contained the same "slang language," punctuation and content, and referred to Nicole as "Princess," Defendant's nickname for her. Nicole also had telephone conversations with Defendant in which they discussed the letters. Furthermore, some of the letters sent through inmate mail contained Defendant's full name and his return address in jail. As in Young, this evidence was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the letters were either written or authorized by Defendant.
Defendant next argues the letters were inadmissible because they were not relevant to the issues or, even if relevant, were unfairly prejudicial. "`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2005). Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rules 402 and 403 (2005).
Defendant contends "the letters themselves did not place [D]efendant in the robbery scenario" and that "[o]ther than to undermine [D]efendant's persona before the jury, the letters had no proper purpose in making any fact in the case more or less probable." However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that "`[a]n attempt by a defendant to intimidate a witness in an effort to prevent the witness from testifying or to induce the witness to testify falsely in his favor is relevant to show the defendant's awareness of his guilt.'" State v. Mason, 337 N.C. 165, 171, 446 S.E.2d 58, 61 (1994) (quoting State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 485, 428 S.E.2d 167, 177 (1983)). Here, it is clear that the letters were written to attempt to prevent Nicole from testifying at Defendant's trial or to manipulate her testimony. One of the letters stated:
Well. Well. Well. Well. What do we have here? Yeah, it's me. What, you thought I didn't have the potentials to find your funky ass. I guess you was very much wrong, Cole Princess, Apple Bottom, wicked snake like eye slimy ass. Now, I know you know why I'm coming off on you like this, because you was dead wrong helping them people give Dred almost 50 years in prison. That's a half of a hundred years. You somewhere laughing like it's funny.
. . . .
I've got my peeps on the track and as you told A-hole before you exit High Point that you was finished and wouldn't have to work with the pigs to help blaze me. You better hope this is true. I'm serious, because you didn't have to lie to get us F'd up. If you're going to tell some shit why didn't you tell the truth along with the whole story (snitch).
. . . .
Now, Cole, this shit ain't right, and I don't mean to be so harsh here, but you was wrong. You led a soldier to the line of fire knowing that you was going to help F him up. Now, unlike Dred, all my G's will be present. Any and all playing the fool will surely look like one when the some clear — that my word on my dead father and son. This ain't no MF game. You think you at a Toy's R Us company or something. I'm afraid not, my friend. Also my G's will soon know your exact location through your P.O. and as soon as they call and get the proper information. You played your fam, but you won't play me. You better go back to where your father's at. Do it quick, because I ain't trying to see a half of a hundred years.
Through this letter, Defendant tried to intimidate Nicole by threatening to have his "G's" at the trial and by stating that his "G's" were going to get her address from her probation officer. Moreover, Defendant expressed his fear of getting a fifty-year sentence, like his co-defendant Dred, against whom Nicole had previously testified. Furthermore, throughout her testimony, Nicole made it clear that Defendant was the only "Chris" that participated in the crimes at issue and that Defendant was in fact the "Chris" she mentioned in her statement to police. Despite this, Defendant was trying to manipulate her into saying he was not the "Chris" involved in the crimes. It is clear that Defendant wrote the letters to try and prevent Nicole from testifying against him or to induce her to lie in her testimony. Thus, the letters were relevant to show Defendant's awareness of his own guilt. State v. Mason, supra.
Being relevant, it remained for the trial court to make a determination, pursuant to Rule 403, whether the probative value of the letters was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403. "Rule 403 calls for a balancing of the proffered evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect. Necessarily, evidence which is probative in the State's case will have a prejudicial effect on the defendant; the question, then, is one of degree." State v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 93-94, 343 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1986); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (commentary) ("`Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, as an emotional one.") (emphasis added). "The decision whether to admit evidence subsequent to a Rule 403 analysis rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be overturned unless it is shown that the ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." Mason, 337 N.C. at 171, 446 S.E.2d at 61 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, the letters from Defendant to Nicole, threatening her and attempting to persuade her to change her testimony against him, were strong indications of Defendant's awareness of his own guilt. "Such highly probative evidence necessarily is prejudicial to the defendant — otherwise it would not have such great probative value." Mercer, 317 N.C. at 95, 343 S.E.2d at 890. However, we do not find its prejudicial effect to be "undue" or to substantially outweigh its probative value so as to require exclusion pursuant to Rule 403. The letters, most of which were simply photocopied and given to the jury, were "not presented in a manner designed to inflame the passions of the jury or otherwise to have an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis." Mason, 337 N.C. at 171, 446 S.E.2d at 61 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, Defendant has shown no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in the admission of the letters. Accordingly, Defendant's assignment of error based on the admission of the letters is overruled.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him because there was insufficient evidence to establish Defendant's identity as a perpetrator of the crimes. "Our standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged . . . and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense." State v. Prush, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 648 S.E.2d 556, 558 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Blake, 319 N.C. 599, 356 S.E.2d 352 (1987) . The trial court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 250 S.E.2d 204 (1978) . The trial court is concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury, and not with its weight. State v. McNeil, 280 N.C. 159, 185 S.E.2d 156 (1971).
At trial, Mr. Pearson identified Defendant as one of the four individuals who entered his home on 9 September 2004. Defendant asserts, however, that the identification by Mr. Pearson was unreliable because it was made twenty-six months after the incident. However, "[w]here there is a reasonable possibility of observation sufficient to permit subsequent identification, the credibility of the witness' identification of the defendant is for the jury[.]" State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 732, 154 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1967).
Here, Mr. Pearson testified that Defendant's face was not covered when he entered the Pearson's home, that all the lights were on in the room when Defendant entered, and that Defendant and the other three men were in Mr. Pearson's house for seven to eight minutes. Thus, Mr. Pearson had a reasonable opportunity to observe Defendant sufficient to permit subsequent identification.
Furthermore, two co-defendants, Atari and Nicole, identified Defendant as a perpetrator of the crimes charged. Although neither Atari nor Nicole was present at the Pearson's house when Defendant entered, "[c]ircumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence." State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988). If the evidence presented is circumstantial, the court must consider whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 526 S.E.2d 451, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2000). Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, then "it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty." State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1965). Furthermore, "[t]he credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury except where the testimony is inherently incredible and in conflict with the physical conditions established by the State's own evidence." State v. Begley, 72 N.C. App. 37, 43, 323 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1984).
In this case, Atari's testimony tended to show that Defendant visited the Pearson's house prior to the night the crimes were committed; Defendant was with the other perpetrators in the area where the crimes were committed at the time the crimes were committed; and that Atari argued with Defendant over the phone concerning money that had been taken from the Pearson's house during the commission of the crimes at issue. Furthermore, Nicole's testimony also tended to show Defendant visited the Pearson's house prior to the night the crimes were committed; Defendant was with the other perpetrators in the area where the crimes were committed at the time the crimes were committed; and that Defendant wrote to Nicole from jail specifically referencing the crimes that had been committed.
Reasonable inferences can be drawn from this testimony that Defendant was a perpetrator of the criminal activity charged. Furthermore, it was not inherently incredible and in conflict with physical conditions for Defendant to have participated in the activities charged. Absent such an inherently impossible situation, the credibility of the testimony given by Atari and Nicole was a matter for jury determination. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence that Defendant was a perpetrator of the crimes charged to survive a motion to dismiss, and the weight and credibility of Mr. Pearson's identification of Defendant and of Atari's and Nicole's testimony were matters for the jury. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit, and it is overruled.
We hold Defendant received a fair trial, free of error.
No error.
Judges TYSON and GEER concur.