Opinion
No. 6-187 / 05-0526
Filed April 12, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Robert C. Clem, Judge.
Steven Larson appeals from his conviction for operating while intoxicated (second offense). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and J. Aaron Kirsch, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The State charged Steve Larson with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2003). Shortly before trial, Larson advised the district court that he may have Lyme disease. He sought to postpone the trial date to obtain a conclusive diagnosis and medical evidence concerning the effect of this disease on his motor skills and balance. The district court denied the motion, noting that the case had been continued "numerous times" and almost fourteen months had elapsed since the date of the incident giving rise to the charge.
The case proceeded to a jury-waived trial. The district court found Larson guilty. Following his stipulation to a prior conviction for operating while intoxicated, the court entered a finding of guilt for OWI (second offense). Larson filed a motion for new trial, contending he had now been conclusively diagnosed with Lyme disease. The district court denied the motion and imposed sentence.
On appeal, Larson contends the district court should have granted his motion for a continuance. Our review of the court's ruling is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Melk, 543 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
A defendant is only entitled to a continuance "upon a showing of good and compelling cause" or "when necessary to obtain `substantial justice.'" Iowa R. Crim P. 2.9(2); Melk, 543 N.W.2d at 300 (quoting State v. Simmons, 454 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1990)). Larson had ample opportunity to gather medical evidence supporting his theory that Lyme disease affected his coordination. In fact, he did so. A health professional himself, Larson testified to the symptoms of Lyme disease, the tests for detecting the disease, the results of tests administered on him, and the specific symptoms he experienced. Additional evidence would have been cumulative.
Additional evidence also would have been of questionable relevance. Larson proffered his medical diagnosis to explain his lack of balance. However, at trial, Larson testified that he did not have any problems with balance at the time of his arrest. He also admitted that, if his balance was indeed off on the evening of his arrest, this could have resulted from factors other than Lyme disease, such as his earlier consumption of painkillers and alcohol. Finally, the State's case did not rest entirely on Larson's poor balance. Several Sioux City police officers testified to the signs of intoxication they discerned in Larson, including a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot and watery eyes. One officer also cited Larson's admission that he had been drinking alcohol earlier in the evening. In short, the additional evidence Larson hoped to garner would have proved of marginal utility to his defense.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Larson's motion to continue the trial date. We affirm Larson's conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (second offense).