Opinion
P1-19-3607AG P1-19-3607BG
04-29-2020
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. JOSEPH LANCIA STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. LANCE IMOR
For Plaintiff: Joseph J. McBurney, Esq. Katelyn M. Revens, Esq. For Defendant: Joseph J. Voccola, Esq. Jason Dixon Acosta, Esq.
Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Joseph J. McBurney, Esq. Katelyn M. Revens, Esq.
For Defendant: Joseph J. Voccola, Esq. Jason Dixon Acosta, Esq.
DECISION
K. RODGERS, J.
Before this Court is a Motion by Defendants Joseph Lancia and Lance Imor to disqualify this Court from presiding over this matter, or otherwise require this Court's recusal. The State objected thereto on March 27, 2020. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motion is denied.
I
Background
The charges in this case arise from an incident which allegedly occurred on or about June 12, 2019, in or around 161-163 Messer Street in the City of Providence. The activities in the area of 161-163 Messer Street had been observed and/or recorded by a camera attached to an unspecified pole, which, according to Defendants, had been placed on said pole by the Rhode Island State Police (State Police) approximately fifteen years ago. The State Police applied for certain search warrants supported by affidavits of members of the State Police, and those search warrants were duly executed on June 12, 2019, allowing the State Police to search 161 Messer Street and a Tesla automobile. It is expected that, among other evidence, the State would offer evidence seized as a result of these court-authorized searches. Defendants contend that the search warrant affidavits contain false statements and omitted material facts.
Defendants assert that this Court is disqualified from presiding over this matter because her husband, Scott N. Raynes, now the Chief of Police in Little Compton (Chief Raynes), is retired from the State Police. Defendants maintain that this creates an appearance of impropriety. Moreover, Defendants speculate that discovery in this case, for which they are seeking records dating back roughly three years, may include documents authored by Chief Raynes or by a member of the State Police under his command.
By way of background, Chief Raynes served as a member of Uniform Division of the State Police from 1994 until 2011, at which time he was then assigned in an administrative capacity to the Rhode Island Municipal Training Academy. Chief Raynes was elevated to the position of Executive Director of the Rhode Island Municipal Training Academy, while simultaneously serving as Lieutenant of the Rhode Island State Police, and continued in that role until December 2017. He returned to the Uniform Division for a short time until his retirement in February 2018, at the rank of Lieutenant. From 1999 until 2017, Chief Raynes also served as a member and ultimately team leader of the State Police Tactical Team. On one instance, in the early 2000's, in his capacity as a member of the State Police Tactical Team, he and others made entry into 161 Messer Street pursuant to a court authorized search warrant. At no time was he involved in the investigation prior to or subsequent to the execution of that search warrant, the seizure of any evidence therein, or any prosecution arising therefrom. Moreover, Chief Raynes was unknown to this Court until mid-2004, well after Chief Raynes' brief experience with 161 Messer Street in the early 2000's.
At no time did Chief Raynes serve in the Detective Division, the investigating unit within the Division of the State Police, nor did any member of the Detective Division seek his review of any matters involving these Defendants, 161-163 Messer Street, or the so-called pole camera in the vicinity of 161-163 Messer Street. Any records or evidence in the possession of the State Police dating back roughly three years that Defendants seek in this case would not have been authored by nor reviewed by Chief Raynes who, during those three years, was either serving in an administrative capacity as the Executive Director of the Rhode Island Municipal Training Academy from 2011 through December 2017 or in the Uniform Division from December 2017 until February 2018. Neither Chief Raynes nor this Court has any personal knowledge of any evidentiary facts concerning the investigation that took place in or about June 2019 in the area of 161-163 Messer Street, nor the so-called pole camera that Defendants allege was placed there by the State Police fifteen years earlier.
By referencing this area of concern as expressed by Defendants in their Motion to Disqualify, this Court is not in any manner conceding-or even reaching-the question of whether Defendants are entitled to such discovery.
II Pertinent Provisions
Defendants cite two provisions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Judicial Conduct in support of their Motion to Disqualify. Rule 1.2 states:
"Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary - A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Sup. Ct. R. Jud. Conduct, Art. VI, Rule 1.2 (internal references to defined terms omitted).
Rule 2.11 provides in pertinent part:
"Disqualification - (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:
"(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or has demonstrated an actual bias towards a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
"(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner. . . is:
"(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party;
"(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
"(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or
"(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding." Sup. Ct. R. Jud. Conduct, Art. VI, Rule 2.11 (internal references to defined terms omitted).
Relying upon ethics opinions in Kentucky, Washington, Ohio and Alabama, Defendants argue that Chief Raynes was an "officer" of a "party," namely, the Rhode Island State Police.
III Analysis
It is well settled in Rhode Island that a judicial officer must recuse himself or herself only if he or she is unable to render a fair or an impartial decision. See, e.g., State v. McWilliams, 47 A.3d 251, 260 (R.I. 2012); State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 998-99 (R.I. 2011); Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 902 (R.I. 2008); Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999); State v. Cruz, 517 A.2d 237 (R.I. 1986). It is equally well settled that a judge has as great an obligation not to disqualify himself or herself when there is no sound reason to do so as he or she has to do so when the occasion does arise. State v. Washington, 189 A.3d 43, 64 (R.I. 2018); McWilliams, 47 A.3d at 260; Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I. 2008); State v. Clark, 423 A.2d 1151, 1158 (R.I. 1980).
"Before a judge is required to recuse in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, facts must be elicited indicating that it is reasonable for members of the public or a litigant or counsel to question the trial justice's impartiality. However, recusal is not in order by a mere accusation that is totally unsupported by substantial fact." Clark, 423 A.2d at 1158 (citing Marr v. Marr, 383 So.2d 194, 196 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980)). It is the party seeking recusal who "bears the burden of establishing that 'the judicial officer possesses a personal bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his [or her] impartiality seriously and to sway his [or her] judgment.'" Washington, 189 A.3d at 64 (quoting State v. Howard, 23 A.3d 1133, 1136 (R.I. 2011)); see also Mattatall, 947 A.2d at 902; Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608, 621, 375 A.2d 911, 917 (1977). The party seeking recusal "must show that there are facts present such that it would be 'reasonable for members of the public or a litigant or counsel to question the trial justice's impartiality.'" In re Jermaine H., 9 A.3d 1227, 1230 (R.I. 2010) (quoting In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653 (R.I. 1992)); see also Washington, 189 A.3d at 65. It is a "substantial burden of proof" that the moving party must meet to prevail on a motion to recuse. In re Jermaine H., 9 A.3d at 1230; see also Washington, 189 A.3d at 65.
In considering the broader question of whether there is an appearance of impropriety, it is axiomatic that courts must "take the steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary." Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988). The question in the instant case, then, is whether Chief Raynes' past employment with the State Police has "any connection, real or reasonably perceptible, to the conduct of the trial" that would create the appearance of impropriety. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 913 (R.I. 2001).
The facts and circumstances on the record and in reality are bereft of any bias, prejudice, or appearance of impropriety, and Defendants have failed to sustain their substantial burden of proof. Chief Raynes retired from the State Police over a year before the alleged offense date of June 12, 2019. For the many years before this alleged incident, Chief Raynes served in an administrative capacity as the Executive Director of the Rhode Island Municipal Police Academy which, as the name suggests, involved the training of municipal officers and not members of the State Police. Chief Raynes never served as a detective in the State Police, nor did any detective ever seek his review of any matters involving this incident which occurred after his retirement or the so-called pole camera.
With respect to the single instance in which, as a member of the State Police Tactical Team, he entered 161 Messer Street pursuant to a court-authorized search warrant in the early 2000's, Chief Raynes gained no personal knowledge or information which would have any bearing on the evidence, testimony, or prosecution of the instant action. Unlike members of the State Police Detective Division who would have applied for the search warrant in the early 2000's and again in June 2019, members of the State Police Tactical Team have no first-hand knowledge of the facts and circumstances precipitating that search warrant, the overall investigation, or the resultant prosecution. Instead, the Tactical Team serves to secure the premises for the detectives to execute the warrant and seize evidence. Furthermore, and importantly, the limited experience that Chief Raynes had with 161 Messer Street took place close to twenty years ago, and at a time when he was not even known to this Court. There is no reason to believe that there is any correlation or common facts arising from the execution of a search warrant almost twenty years ago and the instant matter that would require or warrant Chief Raynes as a likely material witness.
Chief Raynes' past employment with the State Police and/or his service as a member of the State Police Tactical Team entering 161 Messer Street almost twenty years ago does not create the appearance of impropriety. It is unreasonable to suggest that Chief Raynes' service as a member of the Uniform Division of the State Police and his responsibility for training municipal police officers in the last seven years of employment with the State Police has any real or perceived connection to the instant case and the anticipated conduct of the trial, especially given his retirement well over a year before the alleged incident herein and the lack of interaction he had with the Detective Division throughout his twenty-four years as a member of the State Police. The one instance in which he came into contact with the premises at issue here-almost twenty years ago-also provides little connection to the instant case. To suggest that Chief Raynes' entry into that particular premises decades ago creates an appearance of impropriety is as unreasonable as concluding that recusal is required in a motor vehicle accident case where a judicial officer's spouse patrolled the roadway on which that accident occurred in his role as a police officer many years before.
Finally, Chief Raynes is not and never was an "officer" of a "party." Defendants seem to conflate a police "officer" with being an "officer" for purposes of Rule 2.11 of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Judicial Conduct (Rule 2.11). Defendants are simply wrong. In the context of Rule 2.11, numerous designations within a corporate structure are enumerated, all of which would have some level of governance and decision-making in corporate matters: an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee. By comparison, agents or employees of a party are not enumerated as being a basis for recusal. The distinction is important: the former direct the corporate entity or organization to act; the employees and agents act in accordance with the directive of the decision-makers. It cannot reasonably be argued that Chief Raynes had any decision-making authority on behalf of the State Police. Indeed, at the peak of his career, there were four categories of ranked officials to whom he reported: Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and the Colonel/Superintendent. Chief Raynes was an agent of the State Police from June 1994 until February 2018, and not an "officer" in the corporate hierarchy sense, as reflected in Rule 2.11. He is no longer an agent of the State Police.
Additionally, the State Police is not a party to this action. The parties are the State of Rhode Island, Joseph Lancia, Lance Imor and Amber Gill. It is this finite list of parties that are permitted under the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond to and/or seek discovery, file motions, participate in jury selection, cross-examine witnesses and present evidence at trial. The State Police has no such authority. While one or several members of the State Police will likely testify at trial, and one may possibly sit at counsel table to assist the prosecutors in presenting the case during trial, see State v. Mathias, 423 A.2d 484, 487 (R.I. 1980), that does not elevate the State Police to be a party to the instant action.
IV
Conclusion
For all these reasons, Defendants' motion is denied.