Opinion
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2012-425
12-06-2012
State of Vermont v. Quondell Knight
ENTRY ORDER
APPEALED FROM:
Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
Criminal Division
DOCKET NO. 596-6-10 &
1170-11-12 Bncr
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
The State appeals the superior court's denial of its motion to detain defendant Quondell Knight without bail under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a. I affirm.
Defendant is charged with first-degree aggravated domestic assault and two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault in connection with an alleged altercation that took place in early November. The State alleges that defendant used a knife to stab a pillow next to the complaining witness' head before engaging in a violent physical confrontation that extended into the living room of the complainant's residence, where defendant allegedly slammed a door—causing it to scratch complainant's shin—and bit complainant's back.
Defendant was arrested and held without bail pending a weight-of-the-evidence hearing, at which the State requested that defendant continue to be held without bail. During the hearing, the complainant testified that she and defendant had been in a seven-year relationship that ended in mid-2012. They have two children, ages four and five. Complainant testified that she often saw defendant when he visited his children. Both children were present in the residence when the alleged fight occurred.
The record reveals that this is not the first time that defendant has been charged with violence toward complainant. She testified that defendant was convicted in October 2010 of domestic assault after the then-couple got into a fight and defendant ran over complainant's leg. After that incident, complainant went to the emergency room but did not require ongoing medical treatment. Complainant also testified that while living in North Carolina, before moving to Vermont, defendant hit her in the face and spent 30 days in jail as a result.
At the hearing, complainant nevertheless testified that she did not fear defendant and believed he simply needed counseling. Complainant said she believed that defendant would follow conditions of release imposed by the court and that defendant normally does not drink. Complainant further stated that the children should have contact with their father.
A probation officer who previously supervised defendant also testified at the hearing. She described defendant as amiable but difficult to contact and indicated that defendant would frequently miss or forget appointments at the probation office. There were sometimes delays of weeks or months in his reporting. She indicated that he also failed to complete a Batterers Intervention Program course. Asked if she thought defendant would follow conditions of release, the probation officer said she was "not certain he could follow conditions."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the State asked that defendant be held without bail. Under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a:
the court may hold a defendant charged with a violent felony without bail if the evidence of guilt is great and it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the defendant's release poses a substantial risk of physical violence to any person, and (2) there are no conditions of release that will reasonably prevent such violence.State v. Hoffman, 2007 VT 141, ¶ 2, 183 Vt. 547 (mem.).
The state's attorney noted that violence had occurred in the past and urged the court to discredit complainant's testimony regarding her level of comfort with defendant's possible release on conditions, drawing parallels to domestic-violence victims who attempt to protect their abusers by recanting or otherwise minimizing abusers' conduct. Defense counsel, meanwhile, argued that conditions, such as geographic restrictions, would adequately protect complainant, in part, because defendant and complainant lived and worked in entirely different and distant regions of the county. Defense counsel also noted that defendant already had a cooling-off period, having remained in jail from the time of his arrest. Finally, defense counsel emphasized that the probation officer testifying on behalf of the State said only that she could not be certain that defendant would follow conditions, not that she believed he would certainly not follow them.
After considering the testimony and evidence, the trial court observed there was no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt, which constitutes the first prong of the hold-without-bail statute. Relying largely on the complainant's testimony, the judge ruled, however, that conditions of release could be imposed that would adequately protect her. The court specifically observed that complainant knew defendant better than anyone and that nothing about her physical demeanor while testifying indicated that she was intimidated by or fearful of defendant. The court noted that victim declined to obtain a restraining order when informed of its availability and affirmatively expressed her desire for parent-child contact between defendant and children. The court opined that she would not suggest this if she thought defendant posed a real danger. The court also observed that complainant neither recanted nor denied that the incident took place; rather she indicated that it happened but that she was satisfied she would be safe if defendant were given conditions of release. Among other conditions, the court restricted defendant to Bennington and Pownal, imposed a nighttime curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m., mandated a mental-health screening to be coordinated by defendant within 10 days, limited any parent-child contact to the family center, and barred alcohol consumption.
The State appealed, advancing largely the same arguments that it did before the trial court. In particular, the State argued that the probation officer's testimony established that conditions would not adequately protect complainant because defendant did not comply with probation conditions from an earlier case and that the Court should only consider complainant's testimony in light of victims' frequent reluctance to prosecute their abusers. A telephone hearing was conducted in this matter. Defendant was present in his attorney's office.
This Court reviews orders imposing bail and conditions of release "only for abuse of discretion." Hoffman, 2007 VT 141, ¶ 5; see 13 V.S.A. § 7556(c) (detailing appropriate standard of review in State's appeal of conditions of release). When the State appeals a defendant's release, this Court must affirm if the order is supported by the proceedings below. Id. § 7556(c).
Contrary to the State's assertion, the trial court's order in this case is subject to a deferential standard of review. See 13 V.S.A. § 7556(c) (governing State appeals from a defendant's release on bail and conditions). State v. Steuerwald, 2012 VT 98, _ Vt. _, which the State cites to urge a more searching de novo review, considered a defendant's appeal from a detention without bail, which is governed by a separate statutory provision. See 13 V.S.A. § 7556(d) ("A person held without bail under section 7553a of this title prior to trial shall be entitled to an independent, second evidentiary hearing on the merits of the denial of bail, which shall be a hearing de novo by a single justice of the supreme court forthwith.").
After reviewing the record in accordance with our deferential standard, I conclude that the trial court's order finds adequate support in the evidence presented. The State is rightly concerned about the potential for abuse victims to shield their abusers. As this Court has recognized, it is a phenomenon that has the potential to severely compromise a victim's ability to secure justice and safety. See, e.g., State v. Connor, 2011 VT 23, ¶ 4, 189 Vt. 587 (discussing potential for domestic-violence victims to recant out of "fear or even misguided affection") (quotation omitted). That is not what has happened here. As the trial court observed, complainant did not recant. Rather, she clearly and matter-of-factly detailed the events giving rise to this case but went on to indicate that, given the proper set of conditions, she believed defendant would not pose a danger to her. This, coupled with the probation officer's testimony, which indicated simply that she could not be certain that defendant would follow conditions, demonstrate that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that the State had not met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably prevent . . . violence." See 13 V.S.A. § 7553a.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
________________________
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice