Opinion
23-0634
03-06-2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANAH RENEE KLEPPE, Defendant-Appellant
Jeffrey L. Powell of Keegan, Tindal, & Jaeger, PLC, Iowa City, for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P. Strausser, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey L. Powell of Keegan, Tindal, & Jaeger, PLC, Iowa City, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Carr, S.J. [*]
SCHUMACHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
Danah Kleppe appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI). Kleppe claims the district court should have granted her motion to suppress. She asserts that an officer did not have probable cause to stop her vehicle because the evidence does not show that she committed a traffic violation. We find Kleppe violated Iowa Code section 321.314 (2021). Because of such and the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Kleppe's vehicle. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts &Proceedings
On August 22, 2021, at about 1:00 a.m., Officer Robert Dearmore of the Wilton Police Department saw a woman standing in the middle of the street in front of a bar. This woman was later identified as Kleppe. There was screaming between Kleppe and two individuals standing by the entrance of the bar. Kleppe got in her vehicle and drove away. Officer Dearmore asked the individuals in front of the door what the screaming was about, as he could hear them from a distance. The individuals at the entrance responded that the person who just drove away should not be driving. Officer Dearmore testified that he was concerned the driver was intoxicated.
Dashcam video shows Officer Dearmore following the vehicle in his patrol car. The vehicle stopped at the intersection of Fourth Street and Chestnut, then turned left without the use of a turn signal. There was a black pickup truck stopped at this intersection, and a passenger was getting out of the pickup. Officer Dearmore continued to follow the vehicle, which turned left at the intersection of Fifth Street and Chestnut without using the turn signal. He stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Kleppe.
Kleppe did not sound her horn, even as a passenger was exiting the pickup.
Kleppe failed field sobriety tests and was arrested. A chemical breath test showed she had a blood alcohol level of .253, substantially over the legal limit. Kleppe was charged with OWI, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(a) and (b).
Kleppe moved to suppress, claiming there was no legal basis for the traffic stop. "Generally, police officers have probable cause to stop a motorist if they witness the motorist commit a traffic violation." State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 860 (Iowa 2021). Section 321.314 provides:
No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement or after giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in sections 321.315 through 321.318 in the event any other vehicle may be affected by such movement.
Kleppe asserts there was no evidence any other vehicle was affected by her left turns through either intersection and therefore, she was not required to use her turn signal. Kleppe claimed that because she did not violate section 321.314, the officer did not have probable cause for the traffic stop.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. The court found:
When the Defendant made the left turn at the intersection of 4th and Chestnut, the Defendant failed to use a turn signal. There was a black pickup truck within close proximity and also at the intersection of 4th and Chestnut that may have been affected by the Defendant's failure to use a turn signal. In addition, the officer in this case was operating his squad car within half a block of the Defendant when the Defendant failed to use a turn signal.
The court noted, "The officer was not required to establish that the other drivers were actually affected by the Defendant's turn." The court determined that the officer here must simply determine whether based on their proximity and direction of travel, another vehicle "may have been affected by the movement of the Defendant's vehicle."
Kleppe waived her right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded as a bench trial. Kleppe and the State filed a stipulation of facts. The court found Kleppe guilty of OWI. She was sentenced to ninety-two days in the county jail, with ninety days suspended, placed on probation, and ordered to pay a fine. Kleppe appeals the district court's ruling on her motion to suppress.
II. Standard of Review
When a motion to suppress is based on a constitutional challenge, we review the district court's ruling de novo. State v. Struve, 956 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Iowa 2021). We independently evaluate the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Iowa 2010). We give "deference to the factual findings of the district court due to its opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but are not bound by such findings." State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
III. Motion to Suppress
Kleppe's sole argument on appeal is that Officer Dearmore did not have probable cause to stop her vehicle. She asserts that she was not violating traffic laws by turning left without signaling because no other vehicles were affected by her failure to signal. See Iowa Code § 321.314. Kleppe claims her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the traffic stop and the district court should have granted her motion to suppress.
Kleppe has not raised a separate argument related to the Iowa constitution. When a distinct analytical framework has not been raised under the Iowa constitution, we ordinarily apply the federal framework in considering a defendant's claims. See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 491-92 (Iowa 2014).
The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an officer had probable cause to stop a vehicle. State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2013). "When a peace officer observes a violation of our traffic laws, however minor, the officer has probable cause to stop a motorist." State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). "The existence of probable cause for a traffic stop is evaluated 'from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 293-94 (citation omitted).
Kleppe relies on State v. Malloy, where officers were about one and one-half blocks behind the defendant when he made a right turn without using a turn signal. 453 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The officers stopped the defendant, and he was ultimately charged with OWI. Id. On the defendant's appeal of his conviction, we stated:
There was also evidence that the defendant turned from the middle lane of a five-lane, one-way street. Malloy, 453 N.W.2d at 244. The Iowa Court of Appeals determined there was probable cause for stopping the defendant's vehicle based on his turn from an improper lane, in violation of section 321.311. Id. at 245.
Defendant was not required to signal his right turn unless another vehicle was affected by the turn. We find that since the police officers were far enough behind the defendant at the time of his turn, that turn did not affect the officers' vehicle. Thus, defendant was not required to use a signal. Consequently, the officers had no reasonable grounds to stop defendant's vehicle based on a violation of section 321.314.Id. at 245.
The holding in Malloy has been distinguished several times. In State v. Schlichting, a defendant turned left at an intersection without using his turn signal and the officer was about 150 to 200 feet behind the defendant's vehicle. No. 16-0579, 2017 WL 2461490, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2017). We found, "Schlichting's failure to use a turn signal affected 'any other vehicle'-namely the officer's approaching car-as demonstrated by its close proximity." Id. at *3. We noted, "the statutory language creates a broad rule for determining the legal use of a turn signal. Section 321.314 requires signal use anytime 'any other vehicle may be affected.'" Id. The traffic stop was upheld. Id.
The ruling in Malloy, was distinguished in a federal case that applied Iowa law. United States v. Miller, 915 F.3d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 2019). The court found a defendant's failure to use a turn signal provided an independent basis for a traffic stop when the officer was one to two car lengths behind the defendant, concluding the officer's vehicle was affected by the defendant's turn. Id. The court determined the holding in Schlichting, 2017 WL 2461490, at *3, applied, rather than the holding in Malloy, 453 N.W.2d at 245. Id.
Malloy was also distinguished in State v. Whitson, where an officer received a report that the defendant was driving while intoxicated. No. 10-1284, 2011 WL 3925698, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2011). An officer followed the defendant's vehicle and saw that she made a left turn without using her turn signal. Id. We stated:
In the instant case, Officer Burk testified that another vehicle, traveling eastward, was waiting at the stop sign to turn right when Whitson, who was westbound, turned left at the intersection without signaling. In his opinion, the eastbound vehicle was affected by Whitson's movement: "Because the other vehicle started to go and then had to stop because the defendant then turned in front of him."Id. at *3. Also, "Officer Burk did not have to establish that the other drivers were actually affected by Whitson's turn, just that by their proximity and direction of travel they may have been affected by the movement." Id. We concluded the traffic stop did not violate Whitson's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at *4.
The holding in Malloy was also distinguished in State v. Chamberlain; the defendant there did not signal a right turn "despite the fact that the deputy sheriff was directly behind his vehicle and another vehicle was in the vicinity." No. 01-1621, 2002 WL 1973931, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2002). We determined Chamberlain violated section 321.314 and the traffic stop did not violate his constitutional rights. Id.
At the first intersection, Fourth Street and Chestnut, a black pickup was to Kleppe's left. Kleppe came to a stop, then turned left in front of the pickup. The dashcam video shows that after Kleppe went by, a passenger got out of the pickup. The district court found:
In this case there was another vehicle in very close proximity to the intersection. It is clear that an individual was attempting to get out of that vehicle. A reasonable conclusion is that black pickup truck was attempting to drop somebody off and then would leave the area. Thus, it is clear the Defendant's failure to use a turn signal may have affected the actions of both the black vehicle and the passenger attempting to get out of that black vehicle.... The clear point of the statute is to use a turn signal if anyone is in close proximity and may be affected.
As noted, an officer "[does] not have to establish that the other drivers were actually affected by [a defendant's] turn, just that by their proximity and direction of travel they may have been affected by the movement." Whitson, 2011 WL 3925698, at *3. The black pickup was stopped at the intersection to Kleppe's left when she turned left, crossing in front of the vehicle, without using a turn signal. The black pickup could not have continued straight through the intersection or turn left itself because of Kleppe's movement through the intersection. Section 321.314 requires signal use anytime "any other vehicle may be affected." Schlichting, 2017 WL 2461490, at *3. We find that due to its proximity and location, the black pickup may have been affected by Kleppe's left turn and therefore, under section 321.314, she was required to use a turn signal.
Along with the evidence that Kleppe violated section 321.314 at the intersection of Fourth and Chestnut because of the presence of the black pickup, she also made the turn when officer Dearmore was about one-half block away. Furthermore, at the intersection of Fifth and Chestnut, the officer was about one-half block behind Kleppe when she turned left without using her turn signal. This case is not like Malloy, where the officers were one and one-half blocks away. See 453 N.W.2d at 244. It is more like Schlichting, 2017 WL 2461490, at *1, where the officer was about 150 to 200 feet behind the defendant's vehicle and Chamberlain, 2002 WL 1973931, at *1, where the officer was directly behind the defendant. In both Schlichting and Chamberlain we found the defendant had violated section 321.314. 2017 WL 2461490, at *1; 2002 WL 1973931, at *1. Here, too, we find Kleppe violated section 321.314 based on the closeness of the officer when she turned without using a turn signal.
And finally, while Kleppe appears to limit her argument to whether her failure to twice use her turn signal justified the traffic stop, there is more. In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop, the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, "including all information available to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to stop the vehicle. Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204. Kleppe ignores the officer's testimony that he heard screaming at 1:00 a.m. in front of a bar, others told him Kleppe "should not be driving," and he watched her drive away from the bar. We consider whether, "It would have been a dereliction of duty for the officer to allow an alleged intoxicated driver to simply enter the public roadway without confirming or dispelling the suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Pettitt, No. 05-0022, 2005 WL 2990089, at *2, n. 3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005). Further, the dashcam video shows that as Kleppe is backing out of the parking spot at the bar, she turns nearly 90-degrees too far to the right before turning nearly 180-degrees the other way to attempt a sharp left turn. And a driver's irregular or erratic driving can contribute to the totality of the circumstances that provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Wuol, No. 21-0951, 2022 WL 2348185, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jun. 29, 2022).
We conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Kleppe because of the totality of the circumstances and her traffic violations. See Warren, 955 N.W.2d at 860. We affirm the district court's decision denying Kleppe's motion to suppress and affirm the conviction.
AFFIRMED.
[*] Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2024).